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Preface
The internationalisation und Europeanisation of national law has pro-
ceeded apace in recent decades. This development is, however, only 
rarely mirrored in the curricula of today’s law faculties. Whereas na-
tional law is taught extensively and in great detail, the understanding of 
its links to supranational and European law is at times neglected.
This textbook is essentially our suggestion on how students may 
be introduced to the broader sphere of law beyond national borders. 
Accordingly, the aim of the book is to help students understand that 
legal systems do not only exist in their own national context but also 
within and part of various supranational and European levels. We at-
tempt to provide a clear account of International and European Public 
and Private Law as it ought to be covered in undergraduate and post-
graduate courses. The authors intend the textbook to be used as teach-
ing material in universities and other institutions throughout Europe 
and elsewhere in order to familiarise future generations with interna-
tional and European law and to provide an analysis of the impact of 
supranational legal system and European law on the developments of 
national law.
The overall structure of this textbook is as follows. After the first 
chapter, which deals with introductory matters, chapter 2 addresses 
the various problems arising in conflict of laws and uniform private 
law; questions of public international law, including its implementa-
tion within national systems and the United Nations, are considered in 
chapter 3; chapter 4 examines questions relating to European law. Con-
sistent with our aim, some topics have been excluded and the coverage 
is far from comprehensive. Indeed, there are many excellent textbooks 
on the individual topics covered here; of their rich contents our intro-
duction can do no more than give a teaser.
We are indebted to our colleagues and the students for providing 
food for thought in various discussions. We wish to express our sincere 
thanks to two fine colleagues, Marlene Brosch and Donna Stockenhuber, 
for taking on the task of discussing, proof-reading, indexing and cross-
referencing earlier versions of the manuscript. Finally, we would like to 
Preface
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  Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law¶
thank our publisher, Jan Sramek, for including this textbook in its third 
edition in his programme; the cooperation with him and his team was 
most enjoyable and highly professional.
Graz/Wien, June 2016  Brigitta Lurger and Thomas Thiede
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Chapter 1
 Introduction and Orientation
I.  Public international law and private 
international law
The legal universe can be roughly divided into two spheres: interna-
tional law and domestic law. International law prescribes rules govern-
ing the relations of nation-states ( or » states « ) and international organi-
sations as well as rules governing the cross-border relations of private 
persons. It encompasses both public and private international law. Do-
mestic law, on the other hand, prescribes rules governing everything 
else, primarily the conduct or status of individuals, corporations, and 
other » private « entities within each state comprising the legal relations 
among individuals or corporations and the relations between the indi-
viduals or corporations and the different state authorities within a state.
It is important to be clear on terminology: What do we mean by » pri-
vate « persons or entities ? This refers to all natural or legal persons ex-
cept states. In other words, » state « is regarded as the opposite end of 
the spectrum to » private «. » Individuals « are natural persons while cor-
porations are legal persons. States are also legal persons, but they are 
not » private « persons. Private entities are private persons that are nei-
ther individuals nor corporations.
Of course, the term » private « can also be used in a different sense: » pri-
vate « persons acting for private purposes are usually called consum-
ers as distinguished from companies and entrepreneurs who act on a 
professional basis. However, we will not use the word » private « in this 
sense here. If we refer to » private « persons in this sense, the term » con-
sumer « will be used.
Public international law must be distinguished from private interna-
tional law. Public international law primarily governs the activities 
of state governments in relation to other state governments and the 
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activities of international organisations, whereas private international 
law or » conflict of laws « deals with the cross-border activities of indi-
viduals, corporations and other private entities. A large body of private 
international law consists of choice-of-law rules determining which 
state’s domestic law would apply to a dispute between private individ-
uals who have a significant connection with more than one state, such 
as an international sales contract between a company in Austria and a 
company in Germany.
In legal literature you will find both a wider and a narrower usage of the 
term » private international law « and again we need to agree on the ter-
minology used in this book. In its wider meaning, private international 
law entails all the rules pertaining to cross-border relations between 
private individuals, corporations or other private entities including:
 ▷  rules on international competence to adjudicate a case specifying 
which court may adjudicate matters concerning cross-border rela-
tions, so-called » adjudicatory jurisdiction «;
 ▷  rules on the law applicable to these relations, so-called » choice-of-
law rules «;
 ▷  rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments within 
a domestic legal system, and, finally,
 ▷ rules on uniform private law.
In the common law you will rarely find the term at all. Here, private in-
ternational law is usually called » conflict of laws «.
However, in the Germanic terminology, private international law is also 
used in a narrower sense referring to choice-of-law rules determining 
the domestic state law applicable to a cross-border private relationship.
In this book the term private international law will be used only in the 
wider sense and interchangeably with » conflict of laws «.
Regarding the scope and terminology of private international law, we 
must be aware that this area of law has expanded significantly in the 
last decades and encompasses a number of international treaties on 
many subjects that were traditionally covered by domestic private law 
only. A good example of such development are the rules on uniform 
private law established by international treaties, such as the UNCI-
TRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods ( CISG ) which we 
will discuss in this book ( see no. 2 / 102 et seq., below ).
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As a result of this development and with regard to content, the di-
viding line between public and private international law has become 
blurred as the rules of traditional public international law now also 
purport to govern private conduct. Originally, treaties under public in-
ternational law established rights and duties of states towards one an-
other. Today, the main aim of uniform private law treaties – which are, 
indeed, treaties under international public law – is the creation of pri-
vate law rules that govern the relations between private individuals and 
corporations and that fulfil the same function as domestic private law 
rules – only with the additional advantage for cross-border relations 
between private individuals that private law rules are now uniform in 
a number of states. States also frequently conclude treaties granting 
rights of trade or investment to nationals of other states, proclaiming 
individual human rights that are required to be protected by the states, 
or establishing environmental standards to be followed by industrial 
plants near international borders.
The line between international law and domestic law, as well as be-
tween public law and private law, has also become somewhat artificial 
especially for practitioners. Indeed, at least to some commentators, 
the intellectual basis for the traditional conceptual dichotomy of the 
old legal universe with public international law opposed to private in-
ternational law; international law opposed to domestic law; and public 
law opposed to private law seems obsolete. The following introductory 
chapter on European law ( see no. 1 / 13 et seq., below ) includes a num-
ber of examples illustrating the difficulty in drawing a dividing line be-
tween public international law and private international law on the one 
hand, and between domestic and international law, on the other hand.
Figure 1: Interrelations of international and domestic, public and private law ▷
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Figure 1: Interrelations of international and domestic, public and private law.
II.  Sources of law
The US-American Restatement of International Law ( section 101 ) de-
fines public international law as follows: » ›International law ‹ as used 
in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general appli-
cation dealing with the conduct of states and of international organi-
sations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their 
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical. «
The main sources of public international law are treaties and cus-
tomary law. A treaty or convention is understood as an agreement be-
tween two ( bilateral ) or among several ( multilateral ) states that is 
reached by the executive branches of the governments ( for instance the 
President ) often with the legislative branch’s support ( for instance the 
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Parliament ). Note that treaties among states often establish interna-
tional organisations. If the provisions of these treaties so provide, the 
decisions of organs of international organisations may also be sources 
of binding public international law. Finally, customary law is not based 
on an explicit agreement, but on the long-standing observation of a 
certain, originally non-binding rule by a great number of states.
The main fields of private international law are adjudicatory juris-
diction, choice-of-law ( private international law in the narrower sense ) 
and recognition and enforcement. These fields are governed by » do-
mestic « rules of the states – not » domestic « with respect to their con-
tent, but » domestic « with respect to their origin –, EU regulations and 
international treaties. International treaties and European law sources 
govern the field of uniform private law.
Figure 2: Major sources of public and private international law.
III.  Enforcement of rights and duties 
established by public and private 
international law
What is » private law « ? There are two meanings of the English term 
» private law « which correspond to the Germanic notions of » Privatre-
cht « and » Zivilrecht «. The narrower meaning of » private law « is the 
meaning of » Zivilrecht « ( or » Bürgerliches Recht « ) – » private law « in this 
sense includes all subjects covered by the » Civil Code «, which is the 
» ABGB « in Austria, namely the law of contracts and other obligations, 
property law, family law, and the law of succession. » Private law « in 
this narrow sense is a sub-branch of the wider notion of » private law «  
1 / 8
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( » Privatrecht « ) which comprises not only » Zivilrecht « but also commer-
cial law, the law of corporations, intellectual property law and individ-
ual labor law.
The main function of private law as well as of private international law 
is to establish rights and duties of private individuals, corporations 
or other private entities. These individual rights and duties can be di-
rectly enforced by the national court system of the state involved.
Mr. A, a Bosnian national living in Vienna wants to divorce his wife Mrs. 
A, who is also a Bosnian national living in Vienna. He brings an action 
in an Austrian court. The Austrian choice-of-law rule laid down in an 
Austrian federal statute on private international law ( IPRG ) obliges the 
Austrian court to apply Bosnian law to the divorce issues. If the Austrian 
court refuses to apply Bosnian law, but applies Austrian divorce law in-
stead, Mr. A can enforce his right to have Bosnian divorce law applied 
by filing an appeal with the superior court. This means that Mr. A can 
rely on the Austrian courts to enforce the choice-of-law rules that deter-
mine which law has to be applied to private law issues.
Mr. C is an Italian entrepreneur. He concludes a sales contract with 
the Austrian manufacturer B, to which uniform private law applies, 
namely the contract law rules of the UNCITRAL Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods ( CISG ) ( see no 2 / 102 et seq., below ). The CISG 
rules give Mr. C the right to demand damages from Mr. B because the 
goods delivered by Mr. B were defective. How can Mr. C enforce this 
right to damages ? He can bring an action against Mr. B in an Austrian 
court and demand that the court enforces the right granted to him by 
the CISG.
One of the main characteristics of public international law, which dis-
tinguishes it from private law and private international law, is the iden-
tity of legislators and those subjected to the legislation. In the case of 
an international treaty, the contracting parties are the legislators and 
they are thus bound by the rights and duties established by the treaty. 
The same applies to customary public international law: The customs 
are established by state practice ( legislators ) and those subjected to 
customary rules are again states.
This identity of legislators and those subject to the law leads to one 
important weakness of public international law – the key problem of 
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rule enforcement. Public international law rules can normally not be 
enforced by state courts and therefore most often cannot be enforced 
at all. The consequential lack of sanctions leads some commentators 
to opine that the rules of public international law do not have the char-
acter of law at all. As we discussed above, the main content of public 
international law rules are the rights and duties of states and interna-
tional organisations and sometimes also the rights of individuals vis-à-
vis states or international organisations. For the enforcement of these 
rules against states or international organisations, an institution su-
perior to the states or international organisations is needed, which is 
endowed with the power to compel the states or international organi-
sations to comply with their public international law duties. In most 
cases such superior institutions do not exist. As states are usually not li-
able to one another due to so-called » state immunity «, the courts of one 
state are not superior to those of other states. As a result, international 
courts are necessary and, indeed, some exist. For example, the Inter-
national Court of Justice in The Hague in the Netherlands which has 
only a very limited field of competence and cannot enforce all interna-
tional law. There is also the European Court of Human Rights ( ECtHR ) 
in Strasbourg, France, which enforces the European Convention on 
Human Rights ( ECHR ) against the signatory states of the Convention. 
Additionally, specific international courts exist such as the criminal 
tribunals of Yugoslavia ( ICTY ) and Rwanda ( ICTR ), as well as the In-
ternational Criminal Court ( ICC ), which only exercise jurisdiction over 
specific international crimes in particular geographic areas.
International organisations often try to establish new forms of law 
enforcement, for instance, the United Nations with its Security Coun-
cil, but they are normally rather ineffective. Another way for states to 
respond to the breach of duties of public international law is via bi-
lateral or multilateral sanctions. This means that a state or a group 
of states impose economic or political sanctions on the state violat-
ing its public international law duties. Such sanctions were utilised in 
the Kosovo conflict and are currently in place against Iran and North 
Korea.
Figure 3: Enforcement of rules (examples). ▷
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Figure 3: Enforcement of rules (examples).
As an initial exercise, consider whether the norms established by the 
legal instruments described below would qualify as public or private 
international law or as domestic law in terms of the definitions out-
lined above.
You should focus on the norm or rule established by each of the instru-
ments, rather than on the instrument itself. It is not the origin of the 
instrument that is important but rather its content. To which institu-
tion would you have to turn to enforce rights or duties established by 
the respective instrument ?
A treaty between Germany and Poland establishing the boundary be-
tween the two countries.
An agreement between Mitsubishi Industries Ltd., a Japanese corpora-
tion, and General Motors Inc., a US corporation, for the purchase and 
sale of 200.000 cars to be manufactured by Mitsubishi in South Korea. 
Does it make a difference if the agreement does or does not include a 
clause selecting a particular body of law, for instance Delaware law, to 
govern the validity and construction of the agreement ?
An Austrian statute imposing a tax on foreign corporations.
A treaty between Austria and all other Member States of the European 
Union that determines which ( domestic ) state law has to be applied to 
controversies concerning cross-border contracts.
A treaty between Austria and 50 other states that establishes uniform 
contract law rules for cross-border sales contracts.
?
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A rule of the Austrian Constitution ( art. 7 B-VG ) imposing the duty on 
the Austrian state to treat all citizens equally on the basis of the law 
( » principle of equality « ) or a provision of the Austrian Constitution es-
tablishing the fundamental right of protection of individual property 
including the right of an individual to not be subject to expropriation 
by the state without just compensation.
A custom, long observed by all the countries, not to imprison duly ac-
credited diplomats.
A treaty between the US and Japan under which each agrees to permit 
nationals of the other country to invest freely in its economy, and not 
to tax certain profits from that investment nor expropriate property 
without payment of just compensation.
IV.  Where does European law fit in ?
What is » European law « ? Is it public or private international law, do-
mestic law or international law ? To answer these questions, we best 
begin by discussing the existing European organisations.
A.  European organisations
Until 2002, the European Coal and Steel Community ( ECSC ) was also 
counted among the European Communities, but the treaty has since 
expired and was not renewed. With the Reform Treaty of Lisbon of 2009, 
the European Community ( EC ), also part of the European Communi-
ties, merged with the » old « European Union – an umbrella organisa-
tion without legal personality – into the » new « European Union ( EU ), 
thus forming one single legal personality.
The Council of Europe in Strasbourg is an organisation outside the 
EU system. It was founded soon after World War II by Western Euro-
pean democracies in response to the foundation of the Eastern Euro-
pean communist states. Its main objectives are the promotion of peace 
and the support of Western European ideals such as democracy, close 
cooperation and the protection of human rights. To date almost all 
Eastern European states have also become members of the Council 
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of Europe. The most significant Convention drafted by the Council of 
Europe is the European Convention on Human Rights ( ECHR ). The 
ECHR established an important institution that ensures the enforce-
ment of the human rights of the Convention by the Member States: the 
European Court of Human Rights ( ECtHR ) in Strasbourg.
The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
( OECD ) with its headquarters in Paris is no longer a solely European 
organisation, given that Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand and the USA are also Member States, while several Eastern Eu-
ropean states are not members. Its history is, however, European as 
it developed out of the Organisation of European Economic Coopera-
tion ( OEEC ). According to its mission statement, the OECD is to pro-
mote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of 
people around the world and provides a forum in which governments 
can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common 
problems. Thus, the OECD works with governments to understand 
what drives economic, social and environmental change by measuring 
productivity and global flows of trade and investment and by analysing 
and comparing this data to predict future trends.
The European Free Trade Area ( EFTA ) was founded in 1960 by a treaty 
among seven European countries that were at the time not members 
of the EU ( Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden 
and Switzerland ), later joined by Iceland, Finland and Liechtenstein. 
Its aim was to simplify and enhance the trade among the signatory 
states. Many of EFTA’s 
original signatory states 
later became EU Member 
States. Iceland, Norway 
and Liechtenstein – three 
of the four remaining 
EFTA members – are 
now part of the European 
Economic Area ( EEA ). 
The EEA is based on a 
treaty between its Mem-
ber States, the EU and 
the EU Member States. 
It establishes a height-
ened free trade area ( for 
1 / 16
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Figure 4: EU, EEA, and EFTA.
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instance, by including the application of the four » European « free-
doms, see no. 4 / 66 et seq., below ) between its members and the EU 
Member States which are also part of the EEA. As a result, the EEA is 
the largest economic area in the world.
The last European organisation to be mentioned is the Organisa-
tion of Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ). It has 56 members 
from Europe, Central Asia and North America and forms the largest 
regional security organisation worldwide. It was founded in the 1970s 
with its main objective being the peaceful cooperation between East 
and West in the European North-Atlantic region. The main tasks of the 
OSCE today are the promotion of peace, arms reduction, the protec-
tion of human rights and of minorities, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation.
B.  European law versus EU law
All the above-mentioned European organisations are based on public 
international law treaties amongst signatory or Member States. One 
could say that they are all based on European public international law 
or on » European law «. The traditional terminology, nevertheless, dis-
tinguishes between the law on which the EU is based and the law which 
is produced by the EU, on the one hand, and the law concerning other 
European organisations on the other hand. » European law « in the tra-
ditional sense is restricted to EU law, excluding the law of other Euro-
pean organisations.
The other European organisations ( no. 1 / 15 to 1 / 18 ) are thus discussed 
in a separate chapter on general public international law. In this book 
we will follow the traditional distinction and terminology. » European 
law « in our sense therefore refers to EU law and nothing else.
What are the reasons for granting the EU this unique status in terms of 
which its law is referred to as » European law « ? The EU is based on trea-
ties between its Member States, namely the EU-Treaty ( TEU ) and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU ( TFEU ) which initiated close coop-
eration and integration between them – not only on the economic level 
but also on a legal level. It is said that the EU is not only an economic 
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community, but also a community of law. Some of the institutions of 
the EU have the power to create legal rules on their own and they have 
used this competence to produce a significant body of so-called » sec-
ondary « EU law that takes precedence over the domestic laws of the EU 
Member States. The extent of legal integration brought about by the 
unique powers of EU-institutions and the special nature of EU law jus-
tifies the treatment of EU-law as a specific body of law, unique in the 
realm of international organisations and international cooperation. It 
is thus generally referred to as » European law «.
C.  Primary European law
European law can be divided into two different types of law: First, the 
so-called » primary « European law and second, the so-called » second-
ary « European law. The primary law of the EU consists of treaties con-
cluded among all Member States. The founding treaty of the EU ( TEU ) 
is one of the most important of them. It was concluded by the Mem-
ber States in Maastricht ( in force since 1993 ) and was subsequently 
amended by the Amsterdam Treaty ( in force since 1999 ), the Nice Treaty 
( in force since 2003 ) and the Lisbon Treaty ( in force since 2009 ). The 
older TFEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty ( 2009 ), is equally impor-
tant and determines the activities of the EU. The other » Communities « – 
EURATOM and ECSC, absorbed in 2002 into the former EC-Treaty – are 
( or in the case of the ECSC were ) based on separate treaties.
The TEU stipulates a number of common goals including the pro-
motion of peace and the establishment of an internal market, as well as 
principles, such as the principle of conferral, the principle of subsidi-
arity and democratic principles, which govern the activities of the EU. It 
furthermore contains general provisions on the EU institutions, as well 
as the revision procedure of the treaties and provisions regarding the 
admission of new Member States and the withdrawal of current Mem-
ber States from the EU. Finally, the TEU also governs the EU’s common 
foreign and security policy ( CFSP ). Due to its special, intergovernmen-
tal character, the CFSP is now the only EU policy area that remains out-
side the TFEU. Moreover, some provisions ( see art. 21 et seq. TEU ) that 
deal with the general aspects of the external activities of the EU ( which 
are of relevance not only to the CFSP, but also to external commercial 
relations or humanitarian aid, both of which are regulated in the TFEU ) 
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provide for special procedures and provisions in matters of the CFSP. 
This includes, for instance, the prevalence of unanimity with respect 
to Council decisions, that the European Court of Justice ( CJEU ) enjoys 
virtually no competence for judicial control as well as the limited influ-
ence of the Commission and the European Parliament.
Except for some general provisions, namely on the competences of 
the EU, the TFEU, which is far more voluminous than the TEU, largely 
consists of rules regarding Union policies and internal actions. These 
include the internal market policy, the four freedoms, competition, 
economic policy, social policy and energy, and institutional provisions, 
detailing the tasks and the composition of the EU-organs and includ-
ing the procedures for the adoption of the EU’s legal acts and the pro-
cedures applicable to the CJEU.
Figure 5: Overview of the content of TEU and TFEU.
Both treaties which form the basis of the EU are treaties in the tra-
ditional sense of public international law in that they are treaties 
amongst states. Accordingly, if a treaty has to be amended, an agree-
ment among all EU Member States is necessary; if one Member State 
does not concur, the new ( amending ) treaty – which is, of course, also 
a treaty of public international law – cannot be concluded. In other 
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words, all changes to primary European law must be unanimous. If 
states want to become new members of the EU and fulfil the necessary 
criteria, an accession treaty has to be concluded between the new po-
tential Member State and the existing EU Member States. If one of the 
existing EU Member States refuses to sign the accession treaty, it will 
not come into being and the accession of the applying state will thus 
be denied.
The last treaty amending the EU-Treaty and the former EC-Treaty ( now 
TFEU ) was the Lisbon Treaty. So when we talk about EU primary law 
» after Lisbon « we refer to the TEU and TFEU as amended by the Lisbon 
Treaty. Similarly, the expression » before Lisbon « refers to the TEU and 
the TEC ( EC-Treaty ) as amended by the Nice Treaty, which was the pe-
nultimate amendment treaty.
Figure 6: Treaties of the EU.
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The last three accession treaties concerned the accession of ten 
new Member States in 2004 ( Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia ), Bulgaria 
and Romania in 2007 and the accession of Croatia in 2013.
D.  Secondary European law
EU primary law not only creates several institutions of the EU which 
have to fulfil different functions ( see no. 4 / 15 et seq., below ) but it also 
endows some of these institutions with the powers and competences 
to create law. This law created by EU institutions is called secondary 
European law. However, due to the principle of conferral, the EU insti-
tutions may only create secondary law if there is a special competence 
in the TFEU or the TEU that allows them to do so. No general compe-
tences are included in the EU treaties which allow the EU institutions 
to simply create law whenever they choose to.
The legal acts that can be adopted by the EU institutions are regula-
tions, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. Only the 
first two instruments have the character of generally binding sources 
of law whereas decisions are only binding in their entirety upon those 
to whom they are addressed and recommendations or opinions have 
no binding character at all. Regulations create » uniform law «; they are 
directly applicable in the Member States. Directives are not directly 
applicable in the Member States, but prescribe goals and rules to be 
implemented by the Member States via the adoption of national stat-
utes. The laws created by respective national statutes to implement a 
directive are thus rarely uniform. While each Member State may imple-
ment the goals and rules of the directive in a different way, as they are 
underpinned by the same directive the implementing national stat-
utes by nature share a common basis. As a result, EU directives do not 
create » uniform « law in the strict sense, but rather generate » harmo-
nised law «.
There are several different procedures that have to be followed by 
the EU institutions when they adopt a legal regulation, directive, rec-
ommendation, etc. depending on the competence on which the legal 
instrument is based. In most cases all three above-mentioned institu-
tions, that is, the Commission, the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, are involved in the process of law creation. The Commission – 
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which does not have the power to decide on the adoption of a regulation 
or directive – prepares the text of the instrument which is then adopted 
jointly by the Council and the European Parliament.
Secondary European law is adopted by the EU institutions to im-
plement the goals and policies of the EU – such as a common Euro-
pean internal market, fundamental freedoms, antitrust, etc. – and is 
primarily economic in nature. The goals and policies of the EU have 
become broader and more numerous over time. Today they cover a 
variety of subjects that can no longer be directly linked to the inter-
nal market goal and the initially rather restricted and purely economic 
approach. Secondary law has, therefore, extended European law to a 
great number of fields of law. Innumerable provisions of secondary 
European law can be found in administrative law, the law of agricul-
ture, in private law, choice-of-law, the law of corporations, commercial 
law, competition law, labor law, social security law and even in criminal 
law. Similarly, primary European law can be found to have an impact 
on all these fields of law.
Note that prior to Austrian EU membership all the above-mentioned 
fields of law were primarily, some exclusively, covered by Austrian do-
mestic law ( including Austrian law of corporations, Austrian labor law, 
Austrian administrative law ). EU law now has a significant impact on 
these fields of law.
In the majority of cases the Council can adopt a regulation or di-
rective ( jointly with the Parliament ) by majority decision among its 
members, which are the government ministers of all Member States. 
Only in exceptional cases is a unanimous decision among members 
required, for instance, in matters concerning the common security 
and defence policy ( see no. 1 / 22, above ). This lack of requirement of 
unanimity marks an important difference between the creation of pri-
mary and secondary European law. Primary law can only be created 
by unanimous action of all Member States. Secondary law can most 
often be adopted by mere consent of a majority of state ministers 
against the will of the non-consenting ministers that form the minor-
ity in the Council. Nevertheless, the regulation or directive adopted 
by the majority in the Council is also binding on the non-consenting 
states.
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Another difference between primary and secondary European law 
is, of course, also the way in which the respective instruments are 
adopted. Primary law as an international treaty has to be adopted ac-
cording to the procedures prescribed by public international law and 
national constitutional law ( see no. 3 / 12 et seq., below ). Secondary law 
must be adopted by EU institutions according to the procedures pre-
scribed by the TFEU. The actors in the TFEU procedures for the adop-
tion of secondary law are not the governments themselves via their 
direct competent representatives ( as in the case of primary law ), but 
rather the EU institutions: the Council and the European Parliament. 
The way in which these bodies are required to adopt the respective 
measures of secondary law is exclusively prescribed by the TFEU. No 
other rules of public international law or national constitutional law 
are involved in the creation of secondary European law.
There are two further important special features of European law 
which distinguishes it from other public international law:
 ▷ Primary and secondary European law have supremacy over the na-
tional law of the Member States including constitutional law. This 
is why we speak of the supremacy of EU law. If, for example, a rule 
of European law contradicts domestic Austrian law, the rule of Eu-
ropean law will have priority over the domestic rule; the domestic 
rule may not be applied.
 ▷ The rules of European law have » direct effect «. This means that, un-
der certain conditions, they must be directly applied by national 
courts and administrative authorities in a similar manner to the 
rules of domestic law. There is no need for further implementation 
of European law by national statutes in order to render them di-
rectly applicable in the respective national legal systems.
The fact that the EU was established to achieve a set of ambitious com-
mon goals amongst its Member States and that the legal institutions of 
the EU were created for this purpose evidences that the EU represents 
a departure from the traditional » intergovernmental « nature of the in-
ternational legal order and from the traditional regime of international 
treaties in the sense of public international law. Quite contrary to ordi-
nary international treaties, the TFEU has created its own legal system 
which has become an integral part of the legal systems of the Member 
States and which, due to EU law’s supremacy and direct effect, their 
courts are bound to apply.
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The CJEU, which initiated the doctrines of » supremacy « and » direct ef-
fect «, described the special nature of European law that distinguishes 
it from other public international law in its decision CJEU 18. 7. 1964, 
C-6 / 53, Costa v. ENEL, ECLI : EU : C : 1964 : 66 ( see no. 4 / 55, below ), as fol-
lows:
» By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own in-
stitutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of 
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real 
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of pow-
ers from the states to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus cre-
ated a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. «
E.  The separate category of European law
We have now gathered enough information to answer the initial ques-
tion of this chapter, namely, whether European law is public interna-
tional law, private international law or something else.
The primary EU law – TEU, TFEU, the amending Treaties of Maas-
tricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon and the Accession treaties – are 
treaties in the sense of public international law. But, as we discussed 
previously, it is not the instruments themselves which are decisive in 
qualifying their legal rules as public international law or private inter-
national, but rather their content. We noted that some treaties contain 
rules on private law and that, accordingly, their rules are not rules of 
public international law, but of private international law. The TEU and 
the TFEU, on the other hand, contain provisions on the organisation 
of the EU, for instance concerning the institutions of the EU and their 
powers. This sphere of EU law is called » institutional European law « and 
its primary law rules can be classified as public international law. They 
establish the EU as a European organisation of public international law.
But the provisions of the TEU and TFEU are not restricted to organ-
isational and institutional matters. They also contain so-called » sub-
stantive « or » material European law « which consists of rules that have 
a direct impact on the different fields of material law in the Member 
States. Examples are the non-discrimination rule in art. 18 TFEU, the 
fundamental freedoms in artt. 34 et seq. TFEU as well as the antitrust 
rules in artt. 101 et seq. TFEU.
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The majority of rules of secondary European law, especially regula-
tions and directives, fall under so-called » material European law «. As 
mentioned above, the rules of EU regulations and directives pervade 
almost all fields of material law. The content of material European law 
rules is unrelated to public international law but rather associated with 
the fields of material law mentioned. Thus, material European law is 
not public international law. Material secondary as well as primary Eu-
ropean law establishes uniform or harmonised rules of international 
( European ) character and origin in almost all fields of private and pub-
lic law. All material rules of European law that are included in the field 
of private law can therefore be considered part of private international 
law, namely part of uniform ( or harmonised ) private law. All material 
norms of European law concerning material public law, such as admin-
istrative law can be considered to establish uniform ( or harmonised ) 
public law, and uniform administrative law.
In essence, due to the special features of material EU law – the far-
reaching legislative competence of the EU institutions to create sec-
ondary material law, the supremacy of European law over the law of the 
Member States, and its direct applicability in the Member States – the 
EU is distinctively different from other organisations of public interna-
tional law. We could, therefore, say that all material EU law that is appli-
cable to the domestic private law of the Member States is – according to 
its contents − private international law, specifically uniform private law, 
and that material EU law that interferes with the national public law of 
the Member States is according to its content uniform ( harmonised ) 
public law. From this perspective, uniform ( harmonised ) private law as 
a sub-discipline of the international dimension of private law is com-
posed of two types of law, namely the uniform private law created by 
international treaties ( for instance the CISG ) on the one hand and the 
uniform ( or harmonised ) private law created by EU regulations and di-
rectives on the other hand. The latter category is commonly referred to 
as » European private law «.
Because of its special features, European law – both primary as 
well as secondary and institutional as well as material – is normally 
regarded as falling within the confines of the traditional disciplines of 
public international law and private international law, even though it 
would be justifiable as explained above. Instead, European law is usu-
ally considered as a special category of law, namely, that of European 
law. The usual way of teaching European law is to treat it as a separate 
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subject, that is, not as a part of public international or private interna-
tional law, and to divide the subject into the two parts, namely, institu-
tional European law and material European law.
Another approach to teaching European law is to teach the particu-
lar facets of material European law as part of the corresponding fields 
of private law. So, for instance, one would teach European private law 
as part of the fields of private law, commercial law, corporations, pat-
ent law, antitrust, competition, individual labor law, etc. or teach Euro-
pean public law as part of the fields of administrative law, criminal law, 
procedural law, etc. The two approaches supplement each other: the 
subject of institutional and material European law identifies the basic 
principles and provides a general overview of European law as a whole, 
while the details of material European law can be studied in the corre-
sponding fields of material law.
Attempt to identify to which category / categories of European law the 
rules mentioned in the following examples belong ( i.e. primary or sec-
ondary law, institutional or material law ). Who created the respective 
rule ( s ) ?
 ▷ Artt. 26 et seq. TEU prescribe the duties of the ( European ) Council 
( and the High Representative ) in the field of the so-called » Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy « ( CFSP ).
 ▷ Artt. 251 et seq. TFEU contain rules on the composition of the Court 
of Justice of the EU and its competences.
 ▷ Company A terminates its contract with its agent B; B contends 
that A has the duty to pay him a certain amount of compensation 
according to an EU directive on agency contracts.
 ▷ Art. 34 TFEU defines the fundamental freedom of trade. According 
to art. 34 TFEU Member States are not permitted to restrict cross-
border trade transactions among themselves in terms of national 
rules. German company C was prevented from selling its prod-
ucts on the Austrian market to Austrian consumers by an Austrian 
court. The Austrian court argued that the labels attached to the 
products violated an Austrian domestic rule on food safety. Com-
pany C contends that the Austrian rule allegedly violated is itself 
contrary to art. 34 TFEU.
 ▷ An EU directive contains rules of labor law that confer rights on the 
employee ( against his employer ) under the employment contract.
 ▷ The norms of the EEA Treaty establish a heightened free trade area 
between the EU Member States and the ( remaining ) EFTA Member 
States ( except Switzerland ).
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V.  Private international law
A.  What constitutes a » conflict of laws « problem  
and when does it arise ?
The terms » conflict of laws « and » private international law « describe 
interchangeably one of the international dimensions of private law 
which additionally includes the fields of uniform private law and com-
parative private law. » Conflict of laws « is the discipline that deals with 
the legal aspects of cross-border private law matters when there is no 
uniform private law applicable to the issues raised.
Uniform private law, established by international treaties and EU 
legislation, covers a relatively limited range of private law questions to 
date. Accordingly, if, in a cross-border dispute, private law questions 
are raised that are not covered by a uniform private law treaty or a Eu-
ropean regulation, the parties find themselves in a situation where 
the private law rules of more than one state are potentially applicable. 
Here, we have a cross-border legal relationship.
A traffic accident involving an Austrian driver and a German driver that 
occurs in Germany has potential implications in both German and 
Austrian domestic law. If the German driver demands damages from 
the Austrian driver, the question arises whether German ( substan-
tive ) private law or Austrian ( substantive ) private law will be applica-
ble to the damages claim. This question is answered with reference 
to » choice-of-law « rules. Other legal questions will also arise: For ex-
ample, the German driver will also ask himself or herself whether he 
or she can sue the Austrian in a German court or only in an Austrian 
court, which is the question of adjudicatory jurisdiction, and whether 
the judgment rendered against the Austrian by a German court will be 
recognised and enforced in Austria, which is a question of recognition 
and enforcement.
The discipline that deals with questions of choice-of-law, adjudicatory 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments is called 
» private international law « or » conflict of laws «. Whenever the facts of a 
case involving private persons have connections to more than one state 
and the relevant rules of substantive law are not uniform in the states 
concerned, the legal situation that arises can be described as a » conflict 
of laws «. If the domestic rules of all states that have a potential legal 
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connection to the case were applied, the likely outcome would be the 
application of contradictory and conflicting rules. We therefore need a 
» choice-of-law rule « that indicates the » substantive « law of which par-
ticular state must be applied to the legal question concerned. In order 
to avoid contradictions, the substantive law of only one of the states 
can be applied. Subsequent additional questions that will arise are that 
of the competent court to adjudicate the matter and the possibility of 
enforcing the judgment in other jurisdictions. We will address these 
questions later ( see no. 2 / 6 et seq., below ).
The situation of a » conflict of laws « not only arises with respect to 
private law issues, but also with respect to all other fields of substan-
tive law, for instance, in criminal law, administrative law and proce-
dural law.
If an Austrian national commits a crime in Italy, in which state are the 
criminal courts competent to adjudicate the matter ? Austria or Italy ? 
Will the court be required to apply Austrian or Italian criminal law ?
A French national wants to open a restaurant in Austria. He or she is al-
lowed to operate a restaurant under the rules of the French Industrial 
Code but not under the Austrian » Gewerbeordnung « ( the functional 
equivalent to the Industrial Code ). Are the French or the Austrian rules 
applicable to the situation ? Which country’s administrative authori-
ties are competent to enforce which rules ?
If a court is confronted with a cross-border private law or criminal law 
case, the procedural law of which state must be applied ?
It is thus clear that the problem of » conflict of laws « arises with respect 
to all fields of substantive law as soon as a case has connections to 
more than one state and the relevant substantive legal rule ( s ) is ( are ) 
not uniform in the respective jurisdictions. Conflict of laws problems 
can potentially arise in all fields of private law as well as in administra-
tive law, criminal law and procedural law.
B.  The application of foreign law
There is, however, a major difference between » conflict of laws « issues 
in private law, on the one hand, and » conflict of laws « matters in pub-
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lic law, on the other hand, namely the potential application of foreign 
law to the case.
A court that is confronted with a private law case that has connec-
tions to Austria and one or more other state ( s ) will either have to apply 
Austrian private law or the private law of one of the other states con-
cerned. In other words, if the choice-of-law rule points to the private 
law of a foreign state, the Austrian court is obliged to apply this state’s 
foreign private law instead of Austrian private law.
This is entirely different in all issues of public law. Here, national 
courts and administrative authorities will only ever apply domestic na-
tional public law even when confronted with a public law case that has 
connections to a foreign state. An Austrian criminal court will thus only 
apply Austrian criminal law, an Austrian administrative authority will 
only apply Austrian administrative law, and all other Austrian courts will 
only apply Austrian constitutional law and Austrian procedural law.
However, we have to keep in mind that material European law has 
to be applied by national courts and administrative authorities as if it 
were domestic law, even in fields of public law. Thus, if Austrian courts 
and agencies have to apply » Austrian « criminal, administrative, con-
stitutional and procedural law in public law matters, in practice this 
means » Austrian « law including all norms of material European law 
that are valid within the Austrian legal system. Even substantive uni-
form law created by international conventions, such as the CISG, is 
considered to be part of the Austrian legal system and, therefore, a part 
of » Austrian « law.
As a result, national courts and administrative authorities are fre-
quently required to apply foreign private law, but they never apply rules 
of foreign public law. This does not, however, mean that no » conflict of 
laws « problems arise with respect to public law; rather, such problems 
simply have to be approached in a different way. A national court or ad-
ministrative authority confronted with a criminal or administrative law 
matter concerning more than one state ( see the examples above ) has 
to determine whether it is competent to adjudicate upon the merits of 
the case. If it is competent, it will then apply its national criminal or 
administrative law to the case.
If, for instance, an alleged criminal is an Austrian citizen, the relevant 
criminal conflict of laws rule would give competence to an Austrian 
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court and, based on this competence, the Austrian court will apply Aus-
trian law.
The administrative conflict of laws rule determines that the admin-
istrative authority is competent and authorised to apply the Austrian 
» Gewerbeordnung « in a matter concerning a Frenchman seeking to es-
tablish a business located in Austria.
The procedural conflict of laws rule dictates that the Austrian court or 
agency must always apply Austrian procedural law.
However, it is only in public law cases that both questions – adjudica-
tory jurisdiction and applicable law – are linked. In contrast, in pri-
vate law cases both questions must always be addressed separately ( see 
no. 2 / 6 et seq., below ).
VI.  Comparative law
» Comparative law « – as its name suggests – is the discipline that deals 
with the comparison of legal rules of different national legal systems. 
The domestic rules in almost all fields of law differ from one state to 
another. Consequently, there is a need to find a way to effectively com-
pare the rules of different legal systems. The discipline of » compara-
tive constitutional law « compares the constitutional law of different 
states while the discipline of » comparative private law « compares the 
private law of different states, and » comparative criminal law « com-
pares the criminal law of different states, etc. When comparing legal 
rules stemming from different legal systems which frequently arise, 
questions include: Are the rules chosen for comparison comparable ? – 
If yes, why, and if not, then why not ? If the rules compared are found 
to be different, why are they different ? What conclusions can be drawn 
from the comparison and to what extent is it helpful ? The key ques-
tions of comparative law are, first, the choice of comparative method 
to be used and, second, the definition of the goals of the comparative 
study. Regarding the latter, the usual objective of comparative studies 
is to gather information about foreign legal systems and to establish 
similarities and differences.
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In the following, we concentrate on the basic purpose of compara-
tive law. Why is comparative law helpful and under what conditions 
can it be used ? We start by identifying the different ambits of compara-
tive law studies and drawing a dividing line between the disciplines of 
comparative private law and comparative public law.
A.  Comparative private law
As we have discussed earlier, in the field of private international law 
» choice-of-law rules « serve a unique function, namely, they determine 
whether a court must apply domestic or foreign private law to a cross-
border case ( see no. 1 / 41 et seq., above ). The choice-of-law rules act as a 
» mediator « between the potentially applicable ( conflicting ) state laws. 
They have to take into account all the connections of the case to the 
two or more relevant states and identify criteria for determining which 
state’s law is applicable. Choice-of-law rules are usually formulated 
broadly with the aim of rendering a variety of legal systems potentially 
applicable.
For instance, no choice-of-law rule is phrased as follows: » Austrian law 
is applicable to contracts « but rather: » contract for the sale of goods 
shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his ha-
bitual residence «.
Choice-of-law rules are formulated to potentially include all the pri-
vate law systems of the various states relevant to the particular issue, 
as in our example above where the rule is the » habitual residence of 
the seller «. The notions and criteria used by choice-of-law rules can 
therefore only be understood with knowledge of comparative private 
law and of the private law systems of different states.
This specific way of interpreting choice-of-law rules is commonly 
referred to as » characterisation « as developed by the Austrian legal ac-
ademic Ernst Rabel. We will discuss the question of characterisation 
below in greater detail ( see no. 2 / 29 et seq., below ), for the time being 
it suffices to understand the first specific purpose of comparative law, 
namely, that comparative private law serves as a basis for the interpre-
tation of choice-of-law rules.
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Practitioners and judges dealing with private law matters with links 
to foreign jurisdictions are often confronted with the fact that it is not 
domestic but rather foreign private law rules that are applicable to the 
case before them. They must, therefore, be able to determine the con-
tents of the foreign private law rules applicable to the case. At best, do-
mestic lawyers usually have only a vague knowledge of foreign legal 
systems. However, this is changing in light of ongoing comparative law 
research, publications and, thus, readily available information on for-
eign legal systems ( in the form of articles, books and databases ) which 
is of great assistance to practitioners and courts.
The benefit of knowledge of substantive foreign law does not stop 
with the determination that foreign law must be applied due to a 
choice-of-law rule. In some areas of private international law, for ex-
ample, the parties to a contract may choose the law applicable to the 
contract ( see no. 2 / 32, below ). In such instances, knowledge of foreign 
private law enables the parties and their legal advisors to make a rea-
sonable choice regarding which law to apply to their relationship de-
pending on their interests.
In certain fields of private law, such as family or property law, how-
ever, no such choice of law is possible, but nevertheless knowledge of 
the different legal regimes enables parties ( via their legal representa-
tives ) to adjust their activities in such a way that the legal system best 
suited to protecting their interests becomes or remains applicable. 
Both approaches exemplify why adequate knowledge of foreign private 
law systems gives parties and practitioners considerable professional 
advantage over colleagues who have a limited understanding of only 
one specific domestic legal system. Comparative private law is an im-
portant tool for both courts and practitioners who are required to de-
termine the specifics of foreign private law rules applicable to cross-
border cases.
B.  The overall purpose of comparative law
As we have discussed earlier ( see no. 1 / 48, above ), in public law there 
are no choice-of-law rules prescribing the application of foreign law. 
Hence, in the field of public law, courts and administrative authorities 
are never confronted with the need to apply foreign public law. The ob-
vious question then is whether it makes sense to inquire about foreign 
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public law at all. There are, of course, several other purposes of com-
parative law independent of the application of foreign legal rules in 
another state. This makes it worth addressing this issue. Below we will 
discuss two pivotal purposes beyond that of a day-to-day practitioner’s 
approach, namely, first, the assistance that comparative law can pro-
vide legislators when it comes to amending existing domestic rules or 
creating new rules and, second, the advantage to law students, practi-
tioners and academics alike of gaining a better understanding of their 
own legal system in relation to other legal systems worldwide.
Comparative law provides potential assistance to the legislature. In 
developing a new legislative project, such as a statute, the legislature 
may find it helpful to refer to how other legal systems have dealt with 
the facts or socio-economic problems that they seek to address. Com-
parative law is useful in obtaining and interpreting the information 
about the corresponding rules in foreign legal systems. In fact, specifi-
cally in certain fields of law, national legislation is increasingly based 
on extensive studies of comparative law. It is generally opined that na-
tional legislation rooted in extensive comparative law research is of 
superior quality to that where no such research has been undertaken. 
The national legislator, however, is generally under no duty to develop 
its legislation with reference to comparative law.
Knowledge of comparative law also provides a better understand-
ing of one’s own legal system and provides one with basic orientation 
in a world of differing legal systems. Law students as well as practition-
ers and academics should not only have knowledge of the black letter 
rules of their domestic legal system but should also understand the 
underlying goals, purposes and effects of their law in order to meet the 
expectations attached to their respective professions. The best way to 
develop a thorough understanding of one’s domestic legal system is to 
view it in relation to other legal systems. Teaching which focuses only 
on the rules of one’s own domestic legal system inaccurately conveys 
the impression that there is only one way of addressing a legal problem 
whereas in fact, there are usually several alternatives for addressing a 
certain legal problem.
Remember your first semester courses. Here, you were taught how the 
Austrian state is organised on the basis of the Austrian Constitution, 
about the powers of the government, the Parliament and the Constitu-
1 / 61
1 / 62
28 Introduction and Orientation   
  Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law¶
tional Court, of the rights of buyers when the goods they bought are de-
fective, about the amount of child support a child can demand from its 
parents, etc. Did you think that this is the only way the law can be ? Or 
did you consider the idea that these rules might be different in other 
states or that they could be different in your own system ? If your an-
swer to the second question is » no «, this illustrates what we mean.
If you are armed with knowledge about foreign legal systems and, ac-
cordingly, how different legal problems can be addressed, you will un-
derstand that there is no one perfect legal solution but rather a whole 
range of possibilities. By comparing the goals, purposes and effects 
of a domestic rule with that of possible alternatives in foreign legal 
systems you will acquire important background knowledge that ena-
bles you to look at your own domestic rules in a new, more critical way 
and as a result, you will develop a deeper understanding of your legal 
system.
Furthermore, if you compare the developments of the different le-
gal systems in Europe or in the world, you will notice that certain states 
have adopted the solutions of other states to legal problems which 
have led to the development of so-called legal families. Following these 
lines of international legal development will not only improve your un-
derstanding of your domestic legal system, but will also provide a fun-
damental orientation in a world of legal systems and thereby facilitate 
your ability to access foreign legal material where necessary.
C.  Rules of European or international origin
From our previous discussion we know that international treaties as 
well as European law sources often contain rules of substantive pri-
vate or public law, at times directly applicable in the signatory states 
or in European Member States ( see no. 1 / 32, above ). These legal instru-
ments create uniform or harmonised private or public law rules, that is 
rules ( somewhat ) identical in all the instrument’s Member States. Ex-
amples are the CISG and the numerous EU regulations that deal with 
various issues of public and private law in the EU Member States ( see 
no. 2 / 28 below and no. 2 / 16, below ). Comparative law research plays 
an important role with respect to these internationally or Europe-wide 
uniform rules in two particular situations. Comparative law has a sig-
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nificant role to play first in the creation of such instruments and, sec-
ond, once in force, as the basis of uniform interpretation of these rules 
in all signatory or EU Member States.
In contrast to national legislators who may or may not consult for-
eign legal solutions in developing their domestic legislation, drafters 
of international uniform law and the European legislator are obliged 
to consult comparative law when drafting new legislation. In order to 
produce a draft acceptable to all states concerned, it is mandatory for 
the international or European legislator to take into account all the dif-
ferent legal systems of the signatory states or EU Member States in the 
field of law affected. Towards this end, extensive studies of compara-
tive law are constantly conducted and form the basis of every » act of 
legislation « at the European or international level.
When a legal rule is adopted, in applying the law the legal profes-
sion turns to the rule’s interpretation, that is how the legal rule should 
be understood in a specific context. Indeed, most legal systems have 
developed domestic principles of interpretation which thus vary from 
state to state. Generally, national principles of interpretation include 
references to the meaning of specific terms and their meaning in the 
context of particular sentences and in the system in which they are 
used, to the intentions of the legislature when it adopted the law and, 
finally, to the goals of the provision in question. All interpretation of le-
gal norms of domestic origin is guided by this domestic interpretative 
system and with scant regard to relevant foreign legal rules.
There are rare exceptions to this purely domestic approach to interpre-
tation; one of these is, notably, of Austrian origin. § 7 of the Austrian 
Civil Code states that if a question of interpretation cannot be solved 
by the above-mentioned traditional means of interpretation the inter-
preter must seek interpretative guidance in the » natural principles of 
law «. Historically, the theory of » natural law « was the basis of all legis-
lation at the time of the enactment of the Austrian Civil Code in 1811. 
There was an assumption that a » natural law « common to all states in 
Europe and worldwide existed at this time. The legislators therefore 
sought to » determine « this natural law and to replicate it to the extent 
possible when formulating the rules of the Civil Code or, indeed, any 
other legislation. If, on rare occasions, an Austrian rule remained am-
biguous, the assumption was that the Austrian legislator had failed in 
expressing the principles of natural law. The interpreter was, therefore, 
advised to look at comparable rules of other legal systems which might 
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have better approximated the ideal of natural law. Today, while there 
is no longer support for the idea that » natural law « is the basis of our 
legal system, the reference in § 7 ABGB to the » natural principles of 
law « is understood as an invitation to look to other legal systems and 
draw conclusions from a comparison of laws where the legal rule under 
interpretation shows a proximity to international and European legal 
developments.
However, it must be duly noted that such » comparative law interpreta-
tion « is the exception when it comes to legal rules of domestic origin. 
Primarily, it is an important element of interpretation with respect to 
rules of international or European origin and the comparative law in-
terpretation is the mirror image of the comparative law origin of in-
ternational and European instruments described above. As noted, the 
uniform rules are drafted with the Member States differing legal sys-
tems in mind and must be interpreted as such.
Two final important issues must be addressed in bringing our dis-
cussion on comparative law interpretation to a close. First, we need 
to look at what interpretative conclusions can be drawn from a com-
parison of different legal system and, second, which institutions may 
be competent to interpret international or European instruments in a 
comparative way.
If a rule of international or European origin contains vague terms 
such as » contract «, » unfair «, or » unreasonable «, the interpreter can 
commence by looking at what the respective terms mean in the legal 
systems of other Member States. The meanings may be entirely differ-
ent or even opposing in the various Member States’ legal systems in 
which case the majority view is followed, i.e. the meaning favoured by 
the majority of systems. If this is not the case, the interpreter evaluates 
the different meanings found in the different legal systems in depth 
giving due attention to the goals and purpose of the relevant legal in-
strument itself as well as the effect on those subject to the legal in-
strument. This comparative method of interpretation is by no means a 
technical tool that automatically produces the best solution to the in-
terpretative problem at issue. Rather, the outcome that emerges from a 
comparative investigation is somewhat subjective and will likely differ 
from one interpreter to the next.
Accordingly, it seems desirable to render one institution competent 
to interpret international and European legal instruments. Regarding 
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uniform law based on international conventions, such as the CISG, no 
such institution exists leaving the door open to divergent application 
and interpretation of the law. International conventions thus oblige 
the courts of the signatory states to apply the principles of interpreta-
tion laid down in the convention itself rather than their own national 
principles of interpretation thereby ensuring that national courts take 
due account of the international character of the rule. When interpret-
ing vague terms like » contract «, the national courts are obliged to refer 
not only to their domestic legal system but also to compare the mean-
ing of the term » contract « in the different legal systems of the signatory 
states with a view to finding an acceptable » intermediate « solution be-
tween differing interpretations. As discussed above, such comparative 
law interpretation is by no means a guarantee for reaching uniform 
solutions of interpretation problems. Nevertheless, it leads to a greater 
degree of uniformity than would arise if the courts of each signatory 
state were to refer only to their domestic interpretation of such » uni-
form « rules.
The situation is, however, entirely different with respect to Euro-
pean law. As discussed, the rules of European law must be applied and 
interpreted by the national courts of the Member States. If, however, 
the court of a Member States discovers an ambiguity in interpreting 
such a rule it may – and in the case of the court of final appeal, it must – 
refer the question to the Court of Justice of the European Union ( CJEU ) 
for a preliminary ruling ( see art. 267 TFEU ). The CJEU’s interpretation 
is binding on the court as well as on all Member States ( see no. 4 / 49, 
below ). This procedure leads to a uniform interpretation of European 
law in all Member States. Accordingly, the degree of uniformity in Eu-
ropean law is considerably higher than the degree of uniformity that 
can be reached by an international uniform law convention. For the 
CJEU, the comparison of the relevant legal rules of the Member States 
is also an important means of interpreting European law.
VII.  The law as a multi-level system
By now we have discussed numerous new definitions and you have 
been confronted with various new terms and phenomena, some of 
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which you may not have heard of before. The sole purpose of this chap-
ter was to introduce all the topics covered in this book and to provide 
references to later chapters. Accordingly, you will probably not under-
stand all concepts presented until you have studied the rest of this 
book. To help you we conclude this chapter with a small summary of 
the different international fields of law and outline some basic connec-
tions between these fields.
If one looks beyond the rules of domestic origin, the realm of in-
ternational law seems very complicated. The ongoing process of » inter-
nationalisation « and » Europeanisation « of law has further complicated 
our understanding of the law and the provision of legal solutions to par-
ties seeking legal advice. With this in mind, one might ask whether the 
ongoing process of internationalisation and Europeanisation is indeed 
necessary and worthwhile and whether it should be continued or not. 
Further, one might question the justification for the continued produc-
tion of vast quantities of international and European law and of domes-
tic rules that deal with the international dimensions of cases.
The reasons for the proliferation of international and European 
rules are manifold including the promotion of peace among nations, 
the protection of human rights, the enhancement of economic devel-
opment, the augmentation of the wealth of our societies and citizens 
and the protection of natural resources. However, there is one underly-
ing cause, namely, the protection of the basic values necessary to real-
ise a life worth living. As a consequence of the development of technol-
ogy, economies, politics and cultures, these values can increasingly no 
longer be protected by the isolated efforts of national legislators and 
governments.
Historically, treaties between states were only concluded for rea-
sons of war or peace and the acquisition of new territory. The only sub-
jects bound by international law were the states. Increasingly, the cit-
izens of these states felt the need to protect and promote their own 
basic interests and values, such as human rights, economic wealth 
and their environment in a more effective manner and the number 
and scope of international instruments accordingly expanded to this 
end. With the inclusion of rights of individuals and other private enti-
ties in international legal rules, the process of » internationalisation « 
and later also of » Europeanisation « of law gained increasing momen-
tum. Nowadays the creation of rights and duties of private persons 
is the indispensable key element of all international and European 
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instruments as, without such rights and duties, it would be impossible 
to achieve most of the above-mentioned goals. Thus, the paradigm of 
international law changed from the traditional cooperation between 
states – creating rights and duties of states – to the direct integration of 
citizens of these states into the system of international law.
It is this integration of private persons and entities that also blurs 
traditional borders making it difficult to understand the various rela-
tions between domestic and international law. In former times tradi-
tional public international law was a matter between states, with do-
mestic law dealing with the rights and duties of private persons; when 
the activities of private persons crossed borders – which happened less 
frequently than today – states provided domestic conflicts rules deter-
mining the application of their own domestic law or foreign domestic 
law.
So how can the more complex legal scenario of today be systema-
tised ? To navigate the otherwise confusing world of domestic and in-
ternational legal norms you should always ask yourself three questions 
about the legal rule you are dealing with. First, what is the origin of the 
legal rule ? Is it a domestic statute, an international treaty, an interna-
tional custom or an act of European legislation ? Second, what is the 
purpose and content of the legal rule ? Is it exclusively aimed at states 
thus creating only rights and duties of and between states and not of 
private individuals ? Does it deal with the organisation of an interna-
tional body or the EU and its institutions and is thus a rule of institu-
tional law ? Does it ( also ) create rights and / or duties of private persons 
vis-à-vis another private person, the state or an international organisa-
tion or the EU ? If it is a rule that creates rights and / or duties of private 
persons and is, thus, a rule of substantive law, to which field of law does 
it belong ? Is it private law in the narrower sense, namely commercial 
law, labour law, administrative law, criminal law, etc. ? Or is it a rule 
that does not create rights and duties of private persons and is thus not 
substantive law, but rather a rule that only determines the substantive 
law which is applicable to a case and thus, a choice-of-law rule ? Third, 
which institution is competent to apply, interpret and enforce the legal 
rule ? Is there an institution endowed with the binding authority to ap-
ply and enforce the rule at all ? In traditional public international law, 
which creates rights and duties of states against states, such an institu-
tion is often absent. Is the rule directly applicable by the national court 
system ? Is it part of the domestic legal system ? Are there institutions of 
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the relevant international organisation or the EU that have the power to 
apply, interpret or enforce the rule ?
Sociologists created the term » multi-level system « to describe how 
different groups of rules that are produced by different political actors 
co-exist and interact in a certain system. As discussed above, primary 
and secondary European law must be considered as a separate system 
of law, having its own characteristics and following its own goals and 
rationales. You could, therefore, regard the whole of European law as 
a separate level of law. This European level can be contrasted to the 
domestic level of law and to the level of production of rules of inter-
national law that is not European law. The totality of all levels of rule 
production forms our legal system, which thus becomes a multi-level 
system with various different relations between the European, domes-
tic and the international levels.
Take, for example, the relationship between the European and the do-
mestic levels. The first and foremost relation is that of the supremacy 
or superiority of European law over domestic law. Thus, a new level is 
added to the hierarchical system of domestic law. European law is at 
the top of this domestic hierarchy. No domestic rule may contradict 
the fundamental freedoms laid down in the TFEU.
Apart from this vertical, hierarchical aspect of the relation between the 
European and domestic level, there is also a horizontal aspect: material 
European law is directly applicable in the Member States. The norms of 
material European law never apply to a whole field of substantive law, 
but only to distinctive situations.
For instance, the European doorstep-selling directive grants the con-
sumer the right to withdraw from a contract when the contract was 
concluded outside the business premises of the entrepreneur, namely 
the consumer’s home. But there are no general rules under which the 
contract is valid and nothing is stated about the fate of the perfor-
mances already engaged in by the parties.
All remaining general questions must be addressed by those rules of 
domestic contract law of the respective Member States which are not 
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superseded by the rules of the directive. This means that, at the hori-
zontal level, European rules and domestic rules operate side by side; 
they have to supplement and complement one another.
One may explain this horizontal link of the European and the do-
mestic level of rule production by comparing the different levels of rule 
production to the different levels of legal application and enforcement. 
Legal rules can be enforced either at the interstate level – one state ex-
ercising influence and power over another state in order to ensure the 
latter state’s compliance with its legal obligations – by international 
institutions – for instance, the CJEU or the European Commission, the 
European Court of Human Rights, the UN Security Council – or by na-
tional institutions – national courts or administrative agencies, as in 
the case of EU law norms which have direct effect in domestic law. If a 
rule is of public international law or European law origin but must be 
applied and enforced by domestic courts, one can safely assume that 
the level of production and the level of application and enforcement of 
the respective rule are intertwined or overlapping.
As a result, you can best comprehend the international dimension 
of the law when aware that different levels of law – and, thus, law pro-
duction as well as law application and enforcement – are inherently 
linked. When addressing legal problems, such as, for example, the 
avoidance of a consumer contract, the consequences of such avoid-
ance, and subsequent enforcement, you must be aware that different 
international levels of relevant rules exist – with some of them » dis-
guised « as domestic rules – belonging to different levels of law produc-
tion, which, accordingly, must be treated differently. This includes tak-
ing into account the levels of legal application and enforcement which 
frequently do not correspond with the levels of law production. This 
illustrates the importance of a clear concept of the rule at hand and 
the need to always address the three above-mentioned questions ( see 
no. 1 / 78, above ).
Always make sure that you can categorise the origin and content of the 
legal rule to be analysed, and that you are aware which institution has 
the competence to apply, interpret and enforce the legal rule in ques-
tion ( see no. 1 / 78, above ). If you cannot answer these questions with 
the assistance of this book, attempt to study the text again more care-
fully and consult your colleagues and instructors.
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Always read the original wording of the rule at hand. Inevitably, at 
some point of your studies and career, you will have only the text of a 
legal rule to rely on and you will be expected to use this text as the ba-
sis of your answers, arguments and litigation; general knowledge or 
deliberations will not suffice. If you are unfamiliar with the original 
wording of the legal norms and do not know how to find them, you will 
not be able to effectively argue your point. The original wording of the 
legal rules studied in this book is rarely reproduced here; you will only 
find a commentary and explanation of the legal rules. It is up to you to 
conduct an independent search for these rules and to study their word-
ing; this is an indispensable prerequisite to successfully complete your 
studies and to ensure your future successful work in legal practice.
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Chapter 2
 The International Dimensions of 
Private Law
I.  Private international law
A.  Introduction
The field of private international law ( PIL or conflict of laws, see no. 1 / 2, 
above ) has changed fundamentally in the last decade as a result of in-
creased activity of the European legislator. Alongside international 
conventions and national law, a set of unified rules applicable to cases 
concerned with foreign jurisdictions has been enacted at the European 
level. In almost all private international law fields, the hitherto appli-
cable national rules have been replaced by directly applicable Euro-
pean regulations in this regard. Indeed, private international law is one 
of the fastest developing areas of practice and, hence, is a field worth 
studying.
In the following chapter the basic concepts of private international 
law are introduced beginning with abstract illustrations and later mov-
ing on to real life cases. In the course of these cases we will discuss con-
tractual obligations and non-contractual cases with a foreign element. 
But before we proceed to examine individual private international law 
categories ( jurisdiction, choice-of-law and enforcement ), we begin 
with a purely domestic private law dispute to illustrate the concept.
Seller A in Austria and buyer B also in Austria conclude a contract for 
the delivery of certain goods in Austria on 11 October 2014. The contract 
specifies the nature of the goods to be delivered, as well as the price to 
be paid. When A delivers the goods on 12 October 2014, B refuses to take 
delivery or pay for them. A then sues B for damages in an Austrian court. 
Three questions have to be answered: First, which court is competent 
to hear the action of A against B ? Second, which law will be applied by 
this court ? And third, how can the judgment of this court be enforced ?
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In this purely domestic illustration we can safely assume that Aus-
trian courts will have jurisdiction and are competent to adjudicate this 
dispute. The courts in literally any state will exercise jurisdiction in 
a private law action brought against a party domiciled in that forum 
state by a person also domiciled there. This assumption derives from 
the universally accepted maxim found in the domestic procedural law 
of all states, namely, » actor sequitur forum rei « – the plaintiff follows 
the defendant to his or her forum. Put another way, the defendant’s 
domicile provides a general basis for the forum court to assume ju-
risdiction over the claimant and, thus, adjudication of the plaintiff’s 
claim, whatever its subject matter might be.
Once a domestic court has jurisdiction, it has the power to adjudi-
cate the substance of the case, and in a purely domestic case, the court 
will do so by applying its domestic law to the facts. Indeed, in the case 
above, we can assume that the competent Austrian court will unhesi-
tatingly apply the substantive contract law of Austria to determine the 
rights of the parties based on the fact that Austrian private law is the 
only conceivably relevant law.
So if we assume, for instance, that B was not entitled to reject the 
goods and refuse to pay for them, because a one day delivery delay is 
not deemed a significant delay under Austrian law, the Austrian court 
would have good reasons to render a judgment on the merits in favour 
of A.
Assuming that the judgment rendered by the Austrian court in our il-
lustration is not appealed to a higher court, that judgment will be rec-
ognised and enforced throughout Austria, simply because sovereign 
states invariably recognise and enforce final judgments rendered in 
their own courts. So if, as we have just assumed in our illustration, A 
wins under Austrian law, that judgment will surely be enforced through-
out Austria, if necessary by state force.
Figure 7: A standard domestic private law case.
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B.  The foreign element
Now to highlight the relevance of private international law rules in an 
analogous international scenario, we can adjust our purely domestic 
private law scenario by injecting a single » foreign « element.
Seller A in Austria and buyer B in Germany conclude a contract for de-
livery of certain goods in Germany on 11 October 2014. The contract 
specifies the nature of the goods, as well as the price to be paid, but nei-
ther designates a specific forum for the resolution of disputes which 
might arise nor the substantive law applicable. When A delivers the 
goods on 12 October 2014, B refuses to accept or pay for them. A then 
sues B for damages in an Austrian court.
Again three questions have to be answered. Which court is competent 
to hear the action of A against B ? Which law will this court apply ? Can 
the judgement by this court be enforced in another country ?
The only difference between this illustration and the previous one is 
the foreign element » Germany «, the buyer’s foreign domicile, but this 
element renders the legal landscape in our illustration » international « 
and, as we shall see, much more complex, since the foreign element 
raises a series of private international law issues, each of which might 
well affect the eventual outcome of the dispute.
As the defendant B in our illustration is not domiciled in the forum 
state Austria where the plaintiff A has decided to bring his action, we 
cannot take for granted that the Austrian court is competent to adjudi-
cate the parties’ dispute. To resolve the competency issue, the Austrian 
court must first consult the relevant rules on international jurisdiction. 
Once the Austrian court determines the relevant international jurisdic-
tion rules – which might, for instance, be the jurisdiction rule which ap-
plies to contractual matters – it may ascertain whether there is a basis 
for the assertion by the Austrian courts in a case like this. In other words, 
the first PIL step might be really a two-step affair: First the relevant rules 
need to be determined and, on the basis of these rules, the international 
competence of the court to adjudicate on the matter can be established.
If the Austrian court determines that it is in fact competent to ad-
judicate on this matter, that is to say it has international jurisdiction 
in our illustration, B’s lawyer then might advise B to travel to Austria 
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or hire a legal counsel there for the purpose of appearing voluntarily 
before the Austrian courts and defending B’s position, for instance by 
contesting the merits of A’s claim. If, on the other hand, the relevant 
private international law rules on jurisdiction lead to the conclusion 
that the Austrian court is not competent and, thus, cannot exercise 
jurisdiction, the court must simply dismiss A’s case. Technically, this 
means that neither party wins since the court does not render a deci-
sion on the merits of the case.
Figure 8: A private law case with a cross-border element.
To take the next step in our international scenario, let us assume that 
the application of the relevant jurisdiction rule ( step 1, no. 2 / 3, above ) 
leads to the conclusion that the Austrian court is in fact competent to 
adjudicate in the case. Let us also assume, for the present purposes, 
that B appears to defend himself. Having determined its competence, 
the Austrian court will now need to take the next major private inter-
national law step which relates to applicable substantive private law. In 
order to determine which state’s substantive law governs the dispute 
at hand, the court must determine which choice-of-law rule applies in 
this kind of case. Then, on that basis, it must decide which State’s pri-
vate law to apply. After the court has selected the applicable choice-of-
law rule and has made the choice between the » competing « substan-
tive law – in our illustration, Austrian or German law – it can proceed to 
determine the substantive outcome on the basis of the chosen law and 
the evidence presented by the parties.
Once a competent court determines the outcome of a given com-
mercial litigation with an international element, courts in other states 
may need to apply the private international law rules which regulate 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Under these circumstances A might have reason to ask a court in 
France to enforce the judgment against B, for instance by seizing B’s 
assets in France so as to satisfy the judgment rendered in Austria to se-
cure payment of the damages due. If the judgment rendering court is 
located in a Member State, the issue of recognition and enforcement 
of that judgment in another Member State will be regulated by the 
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Brussels I a Regulation and the Austrian judgment will almost certainly 
be enforced in France.
C.  Forum shopping
At first glance, it might seem unnecessary to take step 2 in our sce-
nario, that is to make a choice between the law of different states, since 
we had already determined that the courts in question had jurisdic-
tion. Can we not assume that, for instance, the competent Austrian 
court will apply Austrian substantive law ? The answer to that question 
is always rendered in the negative. We cannot make that assumption 
regarding the substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute. 
When determining a dispute with an international element, such as 
parties from different states, a court will only apply its own procedural 
rules when internationally competent, but it may well apply the sub-
stantive law of a different country in order to resolve the merits of that 
dispute. In other words, even if a domestic court assumes jurisdiction, 
that court may find that a foreign law governs the substance of the dis-
pute between the parties.
This illustrates an important concept in private international law: 
The issues of jurisdiction and applicable law are independent of each 
other and are governed by separate sets of rules. Of course, experience 
shows that some national courts tend to apply their own substantive 
law without any further consultation of the choice-of-law rules because 
their substantive law is the law the judges are most familiar with.
2/13
2/14
Figure 9: Forum shopping. 
42 The International Dimensions of Private Law   
¶   Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law
However, this approach disrupts international legal harmony and 
gives the ( prospective ) claimant an unfair advantage: Skipping the test 
of choice-of-law allows the claimant to choose a court and thereby the 
substantive law of a specific jurisdiction which favours him or her as 
it, for example, awards significant damages or has a particularly ad-
vantageous system of evidence. In other words, the claimant may sway 
the substantive legal entitlements to his or her own advantage and, ac-
cordingly, to the disadvantage of his or her opponents. If this were per-
mitted, the law would not serve a neutral and predictable mediatory 
function between the parties and would in essence be unfairly biased 
against the defendant. The choice-of-law rules, commonly referred to 
as » meta-law « in that they are laws about law, prevent this kind of fo-
rum shopping by parties by rendering only one national legal system 
exclusively applicable to the case at hand regardless of where the claim 
is litigated and which court is deemed internationally competent ( see 
no. 2 / 10, figure 8, above ). By basing their decisions as to which law is 
applicable to cases with a foreign element on the same choice-of-law 
rules, all European courts in whichever national jurisdiction are thus 
ultimately referring to the same substantive law.
Figure 10: Application of choice-of-law rules irrespective of jurisdiction.
What are choice-of-law rules and what are rules on international juris-
diction ?
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D.  Cross-border contracts
Now that we have laid out the basic concepts of private international 
law, we move on to applying them to case studies.
Two companies enter into a contract of sale. The seller A is domiciled in 
Austria while the buyer B is domiciled in the United Kingdom. Accord-
ing to the contract of sale, the English company is to buy 200 bottles 
of Austrian wine and the Austrian company is to deliver the wine to a 
specified address in the United Kingdom. The application of the CISG 
has been excluded in the contract ( on the CISG, see no. 2 / 102 et seq., 
below ). The Austrian company delivers the wine but the English com-
pany refuses to pay and argues that the wine is of sub-standard quality.
The Austrian claimant consults with you on two questions: Which 
court is competent to hear the action of A against B ? Which law will be 
applied by this court ?
The needs of the common European market have meant that the Euro-
pean legislator has been particularly active in the area of international 
jurisdiction. As early as in 1968 the Brussels Convention on Jurisdic-
tion and the Enforcements of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters was adopted by the Member States of the European Community 
at that time and came into force in 1973. The Brussels Convention was 
subsequently amended by four accession conventions and was finally 
replaced ( for fourteen of the then fifteen EC Member States ) by Regula-
tion 44 / 2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcements of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters adopted by the EC Coun-
cil in December 2000. The » recast « of the Regulation entered into force 
on 1 January 2015 ( hereafter » Brussels I a Regulation « ).
The Regulation, like the earlier Convention, lays down rules on di-
rect jurisdiction, applicable by the court of first order to determine its 
own jurisdiction, and on the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments of other Member States of the European Union in which the 
Regulation applies. In contrast to the Convention, the Regulation is 
directly applicable in the Member States under art. 288 TFEU ( see 
no. 1 / 27, above ). According to art. 1, the Brussels I a Regulation deter-
mines which courts of European Member States are competent in civil 
and commercial matters.
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The basic rule concerning direct jurisdiction is enshrined in art. 4 
Brussels I a Regulation which provides that » persons domiciled in a 
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of 
that Member State. » The Brussels I a Regulation applies whenever the 
defendant is domiciled in a Member State regardless of whether or not 
the claimant is situated in the European Union.
The rationale of this long-standing rule in favour of the defendant’s 
domicile was outlined clearly by the CJEU in 17. 6. 1992, C-26 / 91, Handte 
v. TMCS, ECLI : EU : C : 1992 : 268, which noted that the rule reflects the 
purpose of strengthening the legal protection of persons established 
within a particular current » national « jurisdiction, and rests on the as-
sumption that a defendant can usually best conduct his defence in the 
courts of his or her domicile.
Another reason for favouring the defendant over the plaintiff is that the 
defendant’s assets are most likely at his place of domicile and enforce-
ment against person or property can thus most easily be effected there. 
Thus, the rule tends to concentrate both adjudication of the merits 
and enforcement of the judgment in the same country, thereby avoid-
ing unnecessary procedural complications.
As our defendant is an English company, the Regulation is prima vista 
applicable and the relevant provision is found in art. 4 Brussels I a Reg-
ulation. However, before we apply art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation to our 
illustration, it is useful to first have a closer look at the wording; spe-
cifically, the rule only mentions » persons «. Does it also pertain to com-
panies ? According to art. 63 Brussels I a Regulation, this question can 
be answered in the affirmative and, thus, we are dealing here with a 
claimant with an Austrian domicile and a defendant with an English 
domicile. According to art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation, the English courts 
would have jurisdiction in this matter and the Austrian company would 
thus have to bring proceedings in the United Kingdom.
An exaggerated preference for the defendant’s domicile does not 
provide the most appropriate solution in all situations, actions and 
claims in cross-border cases as this takes only the defendant’s interests 
into account. It seems odd to subjugate the interests of the plaintiff to 
those of the defendant in general and, accordingly, the Brussels I a Reg-
ulation provides for particular alternative jurisdictions if the defendant 
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is to be sued in the courts of a state other than that of his or her domi-
cile. In such cases, the plaintiff has the choice of court; none of the 
courts involved are permitted to override the plaintiff’s choice on any 
grounds, which at times results in an advantage for the plaintiff as he 
or she may bring proceedings at his or her domicile. According to the 
European legislator, this freedom of choice was introduced in light of 
the existence, in certain well-defined cases, of a particularly close rela-
tionship between the dispute in question and the court where it might 
be most convenient to adjudge the matter. Some exceptions, providing 
that a person domiciled in one Member State may be sued in another 
Member State, are of a general nature and concern almost all kinds of 
civil disputes.
One exception to the rule on general jurisdiction above is of inter-
est with regards to cross-border contracts such as the one in our illus-
tration. According to art. 7 no. 1 lit. b first limb Brussels I a Regulation 
a » person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, 
be sued … in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of 
performance of the obligation in question [ and ] for the purpose of this 
provision …, the place of performance of the obligation in question 
shall be … in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State 
where, under the contract, the goods were delivered … «.
The reason for this so-called special jurisdiction in art. 7 Brussels I a 
Regulation is rooted in the fact that one of the aims of the Regulation 
is to identify the court which can most easily take evidence of facts. 
In many disputes arising from contracts it is necessary to determine 
whether or not the contract was properly performed. It is usually easier 
to take evidence for this at the courts of the Member State which is the 
place of performance.
This background leads us on to the definition of the » place of 
performance «. When the general aim is to take evidence at the spe-
cific place where the good is situated, it refers to that part of the con-
tract which is the non-monetary performance. In our illustration, this 
would point to the Austrian courts as the sale of the wine was effected 
there. However, when the goods are delivered, according to art. 7 no. 1 
lit. b first limb Brussels I a Regulation, the all-important non-mone-
tary performance is not the sale but instead the delivery of the goods, 
again with a view to ensuring the ease of taking evidence. Here, the 
place of performance in our example is in the United Kingdom and, 
ultimately, jurisdiction is thus vested in the English courts. This, of 
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course, is most unfortunate for our Austrian claimants as their choice 
of possible courts is not broadened; both general as well as special ju-
risdiction are vested in the English courts.
We can thus answer the first question in our example, namely, the 
courts of which Member States are internationally competent to adju-
dicate the case ? According to art. 4 and art. 7 no. 1 lit. b first limb Brus-
sels I a Regulation the English courts are internationally competent to 
adjudicate the case.
To answer our second question – the applicable law – we need to dis-
tinguish between procedural and substantial questions and focus on 
the substance of the dispute, that is, the merits of the case at hand. In 
our illustration substantial questions would be, for instance, whether 
the quality of the wine was in accordance with the contract, whether 
the goods were provided on time and what purchase price the English 
company would be required to pay the Austrian company. Procedural 
questions, on the other hand, concern the composition of courts and 
the rules on taking evidence.
Procedural questions are always governed by the so-called lex fori. 
Lex fori refers to the domestic law of the competent court ( with lex – 
meaning » law «, and fori – » of the court « ). This means in essence that 
the competent court will apply its own rules of procedure. For instance, 
Austrian courts ( if competent ) must conduct proceedings in accord-
ance with Austrian procedural rules; English courts ( if competent ) 
must conduct proceedings according to English rules and so on.
Substantive law governs matters of substance. Choice-of-law rules 
and the above-mentioned meta-law effect apply only to the choice-of-
law of the substantive law and are called » lex causae «. Procedural law, 
as opposed to the substantive law, is determined by the » lex fori «. In 
our illustration, the lex fori is English law; the lex causae must be de-
termined by applying the relevant choice-of-law rules. Here, the rele-
vant conflict rules are part of EU law ( see no. 1 / 27 et seq., above ). They 
are contained within the Regulation ( EC ) No. 593 / 2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, the so-called Rome I Regulation. The Rome I 
Regulation thus determines which law governs the substance of dis-
putes arising from contracts with a foreign element.
To determine our applicable law according to the Rome I Regula-
tion we of course need to be sure that the Rome I Regulation is in it-
self applicable. According to art. 1 Rome I Regulation, which defines its 
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material scope, the Regulation applies in » situations involving a con-
flict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial mat-
ters «. The question is then according to which law the terms » civil and 
commercial matters « are to be defined, or in terms of private interna-
tional law, how the term should be characterised.
Three main schools of thought on this question emerged in the course 
of the last century. The so-called lex fori theory was proposed by Ger-
man and French writers, Franz Kahn ( 1861–1904 ) and Etienne Bartin 
( 1860–1948 ) respectively. It has been the prevailing theory on the Euro-
pean continent and was, by and large, also adopted by English courts. 
According to this theory the process of characterisation should be per-
formed in accordance with the domestic law of the forum: If the court 
has to characterise a conflict of laws rule, it should inquire how the 
corresponding or most closely analogous domestic law is character-
ised and apply that characterisation to the rule in question. Objections 
raised to the lex fori theory are that its application may easily result 
in a misinterpretation of the foreign law and render it inapplicable in 
cases in which the foreign law would apply it, and vice versa. Moreover, 
if there is no close analogy in domestic law, the theory simply does not 
work. A second approach argues that the process of characterisation 
should be performed in accordance with the lex causae, that is, the 
foreign internal law referred to by the conflict of laws rule itself. How-
ever, to say that the governing law dictates the process of characterisa-
tion is to argue in a circle, because how can we know what the govern-
ing law is until the process of characterisation is completed ? Neither 
approach, however, is adequate for the classification of supra-national 
rules like art. 1 Rome I Regulation. If every Member State interpreted 
the concept of civil and commercial independently – whether by its lex 
fori or the foreign lex causae – the unified rules would be interpreted 
separately and, therefore, applied incoherently.
The academic Ernst Rabel ( 1874–1955 ) was the first to draw attention to 
this deficiency in 1931, suggesting instead a comparative law method 
of characterisation. According to this approach, conflict of laws rules 
should use conceptions of an absolutely general character, and these 
conceptions must be based on studies of comparative law, which ex-
tracts essential general principles of professedly universal application 
rather than principles based on, or applicable to, the legal system of 
one country only. Taking Rabel’s approach, the rules in the Rome I Reg-
ulation – and, of course, in all other unified conflict rules – must ideally 
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be regarded as independent concepts to be interpreted by reference to 
the objectives of the unified rules themselves and to the general princi-
ples stemming from the corpus of the national legal systems.
The CJEU does not follow any specific national systematisation or ap-
proach, whether that of the lex fori or lex causae, but stated in 14. 10. 1976, 
C-29 / 76, LTU v. Eurocontrol, ECLI : EU : C : 1976 : 137 that » … the concept of 
civil and commercial matters must be given an autonomous meaning, 
derived from the objectives and schemes of the instrument and the 
general principles underlying the national systems as a whole «.
Regarding the term » civil and commercial matters «, the CJEU con-
ducted a thorough analysis of the current solutions in the Member 
States concluding that » civil and commercial matters « includes all 
disputes where neither party to the dispute is a public body. This does 
not include disputes between a private person and a public authority 
arising out of acts by the public authority in the exercise of its pow-
ers; it would, however, cover disputes between such parties where the 
public body was not acting in terms of its official powers. Of course, 
this is an extremely simplified definition as any superficial study of 
the exclusionary list in art. 1 para. 2 Rome I Regulation reveals, but, 
nevertheless, it shall suffice for our matter at hand. Because no public 
body is concerned in our illustrative example, the Rome I Regulation 
is applicable.
Of all the rules in the Rome I Regulation the foremost is the rule 
expressed in art. 3 para. 1 Rome I Regulation in terms of which the law 
chosen by the parties shall govern a contract. Thus, the parties to a 
contract are free to determine the law which shall apply to their dis-
pute. However, in our illustration, the parties have not chosen any law. 
Therefore, the applicable law must be determined in accordance with 
the choice-of-law rules of the Rome I Regulation.
In our illustration art. 4 Rome I Regulation applies. This rule em-
bodies two main principles of the Rome I Regulation, namely the prin-
ciple of the closest connection and the principle of characteristic per-
formance. Unfortunately, the rule is not presented logically and so to 
understand this provision it is best read as follows: Paragraph 4 stipu-
lates the main rule of any choice-of-law rule for contracts, namely that 
the contract shall be governed by the law of the state to which it is most 
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closely connected. According to paragraph 2, it is presumed that a con-
tract is generally most closely connected to the country where the char-
acteristic performer is located. Paragraph 3 makes clear that the rule of 
characteristic performance is merely a presumption designed to assist 
in identifying the closest connection which may be rebutted when a 
manifestly closer connection to another state exists.
Finally, and with a view to easy application in practice, paragraph 
1 stipulates clear-cut choice-of-law rules for specific types of contracts, 
which are essentially descriptions of characteristic performances in 
specific contracts. In our illustration, we have a sale and, according to 
art. 4 para. 1 lit. a Rome I Regulation, » a contract for the sale of goods 
shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has habit-
ual residence. « The habitual residence of the seller in our illustration 
is in Austria and hence Austrian law is applicable.
In conclusion, the dispute between the Austrian and English com-
panies will be litigated in front of English courts, which will conduct 
the proceedings in accordance with English procedural law. As to the 
substance of the dispute, the English courts will apply Austrian law.
What are procedural matters and what are substantive matters ? Which 
private international rules address each of them ?
What does the process of characterisation entail ? How is such charac-
terisation to be performed according to the comparative law method of 
characterisation ?
E.  Connecting factors
When a given private international law rule leads to the conclusion 
that a court in a given state is competent to adjudicate a private law 
dispute, that decision can usually be traced to the existence of a certain 
connection. These so-called » connecting factors « serve to provide a le-
gally sufficient link between the forum state ( and its courts ) on the one 
hand and the circumstances of the particular case on the other. Similar 
connecting factors are also at work when a competent court in a given 
state applies the substantive law of the forum or any other state as a re-
sult of the choice-of-law rules. The following closer scrutiny of the role 
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played by connecting factors might be helpful, as this aspect of con-
flict of laws provides the underlying core for literally all conflict of laws 
rules. We again make use of a real-life scenario. The facts are as follows.
A Swedish company and an Italian company enter into a contract of 
sale. According to this contract, the Italian company is to deliver scien-
tific research vessels and the Swedish company will pay a specified pur-
chase price. The Italian company shall deliver the scientific research 
vessels not to Sweden but to Finland. The contract contains neither 
a jurisdiction agreement nor a choice-of-law agreement. The Swedish 
company refuses to pay the purchase price and argues that the vessels 
are not in accordance with the specific terms of the contract. The Ital-
ian company consults you on two matters: Which court is competent 
to adjudicate ? And, which law will be applied by this court ?
As the defendant in this case is domiciled in a Member State ( Sweden ), 
the question of which court can adjudicate the dispute at hand is gov-
erned by the Brussels I a Regulation. As there is no jurisdiction agree-
ment in the contract, the provisions we have discussed in the first illus-
trations, artt. 4, 7 Brussels I a Regulation, are applicable.
Article 4 Brussels I a Regulation embodies the general jurisdiction. 
According to this provision, persons domiciled in a Member State shall 
be sued in the country of their domicile. With a view to the connect-
ing factors and their application, we can break down the jurisdictional 
analysis of this provision into its three key component parts, namely 
the reference, the fact setting and the connecting factor. First, one must 
clearly identify the question that you wish to answer with reference to 
the conflict of laws rule at hand. Regarding art. 4 Brussels I a Regula-
tion this would be the international competence of the specific court, 
phrased in the provision as » shall be sued «. Second, one must estab-
lish whether the fact setting in the provision fits to the real-life fact set-
ting. In art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation the defendant must be domiciled 
in a Member State, phrased in the provision as » person domiciled in a 
Member State «. Third, the provision will provide for a connecting fac-
tor, that is usually a geographical connection to a state. In art. 4 Brus-
sels I a Regulation the connecting factor is the domicile of the defend-
ant, which is phrased as » in the courts of [ the person’s domicile ] that 
Member State. « In our case, the defendant is a Swedish company. For 
the present purpose, according to art. 63 Brussels I a Regulation, the 
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defendant company is domiciled in Sweden. As a result, in accordance 
with art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation, the Swedish courts have general ju-
risdiction in this case.
Let us now turn to art. 7 no. 1 lit. b first limb Brussels I a Regulation 
providing for special jurisdiction for disputes arising from contracts. 
Breaking down this rule into its key components, you will encounter 
again the two-step approach from above: In para. 1 lit. a the reference 
is the international competence of the court seized, the fact setting the 
» performance of the obligation « – in other words, a contract – and the 
connecting factor the place where the obligation had to be performed. 
This connecting factor of the place of performance is then concretised 
by para. 1 lit. b first limb with the fact setting of a sale of goods, where 
the goods are to be delivered with the connecting factor of the place of 
delivery.
Accordingly, the Italian claimant may opt for bringing proceedings 
at the place of performance. As to the sale of goods, this place of per-
formance is defined as the place where the goods were delivered. In 
our case, the goods were delivered in Finland. Thus, Finland being the 
place of performance, it is up to the Italian company to decide whether 
to conduct proceedings in Sweden under art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation 
or in Finland under art. 7 no. 1 lit. b first limb Brussels I a Regulation.
Whatever the choice of the plaintiff, the court must subsequently 
determine the substantive law applicable to the rights and obligations 
of the parties in this contractual context in order to adjudicate the mer-
its of the claim, namely, Italian, Swedish or Finnish law. Clearly, there 
are several competent courts potentially available to the claimant.
As we have already seen, if a dispute arises, the internationally com-
petent court will apply choice-of-law rules in order to determine the 
applicable law. The need to determine one national substantive law 
assumes, of course, that there is a substantive conflict between the po-
tentially applicable laws. For instance, were Finland, Italy and Sweden 
to all have the same law of sales domestically – providing, for instance, 
for identical remedies for a given sales contract breach – there would 
be no need to choose between the states’ respective sales laws.
Although most states continue to maintain individual solutions re-
garding domestic sales contracts, a uniform substantive solution has 
emerged with respect to international sales in the form of the 1980 
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Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods 
( CISG, see no. 2 / 102 et seq., below ). Since Italy, Sweden and Finland 
have the same law as regards international sales contracts, neither 
Swedish nor Finnish courts need to resolve a sales law conflict in or-
der to reach a decision regarding our illustrative case dispute.
Later we will look in more detail at all questions concerning the CISG  
but for now it is enough to establish whether the CISG is applicable to 
our case or not. Article 2 lit. e CISG provides an answer in the negative: 
the CISG » does not apply to sales … of vessels. «
As there is no uniform substantive private law we need to consult the 
choice-of-law rules contained in the Rome I Regulation. As stated 
above, the pivotal choice-of-law rule is contained in art. 3 Rome I Reg-
ulation, and provides that the parties have the choice to apply a spe-
cific law. But our contract of sale does not provide for any such agreed 
choice of law. Indeed, the parties may not have given any thought to 
the matter at the time when the contract was concluded. In such a situ-
ation, the competent court will need to revert to the relevant default 
rule in the Rome I Regulation which designates a specific substantive 
contract law which the court is to apply; this default provision is set out 
in art. 4 Rome I Regulation.
Using our » reference, fact setting, connecting factor « pattern set 
out above, we can now take a closer look at the choice-of-law rule at 
hand. Under art. 4 para. 1 lit. a Rome I Regulation a contract for the 
sale of goods is governed by the law of the country where the seller 
has his or her habitual residence. Thus our reference is » the law appli-
cable to the contract «, our fact setting the » sale of goods « and finally 
our connecting factor is the » habitual residence « of the seller. We now 
need to look at how the » habitual residence « of a company is to be de-
termined under the Rome I Regulation. The answer is found in art. 19 
Rome I Regulation which dictates that the habitual residence of com-
panies is the place of central administration. Hence, our reference is 
the » habitual residence of a company «, our fact setting, » companies « 
and » all bodies, corporate or unincorporated « and the connecting fac-
tor the » place of central administration «.
As the habitual residence of our Italian company is in Italy, we can 
now answer both of the questions posed: The Italian company may sue 
either in Sweden under art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation or in Finland un-
der art. 7 para. 1 lit. b first limb Brussels I a Regulation. Independent of 
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whether Swedish or Finnish courts decide the case, the law applicable 
to the substance of the dispute is to be determined in accordance with 
the Rome I Regulation; in terms of art. 4 para. 1 lit. a of the Regulation, 
the merits of the case will be decided according to Italian law.
What is a reference ? What is a fact setting ? What is a connecting factor ?
What are the connecting factors of the private international law rules 
mentioned in this chapter so far ?
F.  Cross-border consumer contracts
When it comes to consumer claims against entrepreneurs, interna-
tional jurisdiction – and thus also the applicable procedural law ( see 
no. 2 / 8, above ) – is determined in the European context by the Brus-
sels I a Regulation. The Regulation provides for an adjudicatory juris-
diction, supplementing the general jurisdiction of the defendant en-
trepreneur’s habitual domicile; alongside the jurisdiction of the State 
where the obligation in question was to be performed – which usu-
ally coincides with the jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile ( see 
no. 2 / 19 et seq., above ) – the consumer has the right to sue the entre-
preneur in the courts of the State where the consumer is domiciled and 
may be sued him- or herself at these courts insofar as the entrepreneur 
» directs « his or her commercial activity to that State and the contract 
falls within the scope of the activity ( art. 17 para. 1 lit. c in connection 
with art. 18 Brussels I a Regulation ).
Such specific rules also exist in the provisions on the applicable law 
for consumer contracts laid down in art. 6 Rome I Regulation. Accord-
ing to recitals 7 and 24 of this regulation, they must be understood as 
consistent with art. 17 Brussels I a Regulation; in the following we will 
predominantly discuss the question of international adjudicatory ju-
risdiction.
In light of the continuing growth in online commerce and the ubiq-
uitous web presence of entrepreneurs, the debate has centred on the 
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phrase » directed to « the State where the consumer is domiciled in re-
lation to their commercial or professional activity. The question arose 
whether an online presence was sufficient to satisfy this criterion and 
establish the competence of the courts in the State where the consumer 
was domiciled. Here, the CJEU handed down a landmark decision in 
this respect in 7. 12. 2010, joined cases C-585 / 08 and C-144 / 09, Pammer 
v. Reederei Schlüter and Alpenhof v. Heller, ECLI : EU : C : 2010 : 740.
The first dispute in this case involved Mr Pammer – an Austrian resi-
dent, and the shipping company Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. 
KG, a company established in Germany. Mr Pammer ordered a cruise 
from Italy to the Far East. He booked the voyage online for 8,510 €; a 
contract was concluded between the Mr Pammer and the shipping 
company ( » voyage contract « ). On the day of departure Mr Pammer re-
fused to embark. The accommodation was far from what he had been 
promised online: Instead of a double cabin ( for which he had paid ), 
only a single cabin was available – and even there the air conditioning 
( or any other ventilation ) did not work. Contrary to prior promise on 
the website, there was neither an outdoor swimming pool nor a fitness 
room, neither a working television nor seating or lounging facilities 
on deck. The cruise ship was ( more or less ) a freighter. Mr Pammer 
sought reimbursement of the sum which he had paid for the voyage; 
the shipping company refunded a part of the sum he paid for the trip 
( 3,216 € ). Mr. Pammer brought an action before an Austrian court for 
the payment of the balance of 5,294 €. The Austrian Supreme Court 
( Oberster Gerichtshof ) decided to stay proceedings and referred to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling ( see no. 4 / 49, below ) as follows: Does the 
» voyage contract « constitute package travel for the purposes of art. 17 
Brussels I a Regulation ? If the answer is yes: Is the fact that an interme-
diary’s website can be consulted on the internet sufficient to justify a 
finding that activities are being » directed « to the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile within the meaning of art. 17 para. 1 lit. c Brus-
sels I a Regulation ?
The second ( joined ) dispute also concerns an online booking. In » Al-
penhof / Heller «, Mr Heller – a German citizen – reserved a number of 
rooms for a period of a week in January 2008 through the website of the 
Alpenhof GesmbH, a company which operates a hotel with the same 
name located in Austria. His reservation and the confirmation thereof 
were effected by email. After his stay in the hotel Mr Heller did not 
pay having found fault with the hotel’s services. The Hotel Alpenhof 
GesmbH sued Mr Heller for the provision of said hotel services before 
an Austrian court. The Oberster Gerichtshof was not sure on how the 
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CJEU would answer the previously submitted case » Pammer / Reederei 
Schlüter « and – the court’s judgment being dependent upon the find-
ings given by the CJEU – stayed proceedings and referred the following 
question to the CJEU: Is the fact that a website of the party with whom 
a consumer has concluded a contract can be consulted on the internet 
sufficient to justify a finding that an activity is being » directed « within 
the meaning of art. 17 para. 1 lit. c Brussels I a Regulation ?
The CJEU held that – within the meaning of art. 17 para. 1 lit. c Brus-
sels I a Regulation – any activity presented on a professional’s website 
( or on that of an intermediary ) can be considered to be » directing « its 
activity to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile when it is ap-
parent from those websites and the professionals’ overall activity that 
the professional was envisaging doing business with consumers domi-
ciled in one or more Member States, including the Member State of 
that consumer’s domicile, in the sense that it was minded to conclude a 
contract with the consumer. To underpin this finding, the court did not 
formulate any ( more ) abstract definition of the legal phrase » directed 
to «, but instead provided a list of indicia it considered suitable to deter-
mine how the activity in question is » directed «: Although the pure ac-
cessibility of the trader’s or the intermediary’s website in the Member 
State in which the consumer is domiciled and the ( mere ) mention of 
an email address and of other contact details, or of use of a language 
or a currency which are the language and / or currency generally used in 
the Member State in which the trader is established will not establish 
jurisdiction at the consumer’s domicile; the following matters – the list 
of which is not exhaustive – are capable of constituting evidence from 
which it may be concluded that the professional’s activity is directed to 
the Member State of the consumer’s domicile, namely:
 ▷ the international nature of the activity,
 ▷ mention of itineraries from other Member States for going to the 
place where the trader is established,
 ▷ use of a language or a currency other than the language or currency 
generally used in the Member State in which the trader is estab-
lished with the possibility of making and confirming the reserva-
tion in that other language,
 ▷ mention of telephone numbers with an international code ( for in-
stance, » +43 « ),
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 ▷ outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service ( e.g. google ) 
in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its interme-
diary by consumers domiciled in other Member States,
 ▷ use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State 
in which the trader is established ( for instance, » .com « instead of 
» .at « ), and
 ▷ mention of an international clientele composed of customers dom-
iciled in various Member States. It is for the national courts to as-
certain whether such evidence exists.
In practice the consumer, who bears the burden of proof due to the der-
ogation from the jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile ( art. 4 Brus-
sels I a Regulation, see no. 2 / 19, above ), will usually submit that he or 
she took notice, first, of the professional’s marketing activity directed 
at his or her State ( typically the website ), and in consequence con-
cluded the contract because of the » directed « marketing activity.
The dispute in CJEU, 17. 10. 2013, C-218 / 02, Emrek v. Sabanovic, 
ECLI : EU : C : 2013 : 666 was different: A German consumer, Mr Emrek, 
bought a car in France where it was possible to prove that the commu-
nication between the professional car retailer, Mr Sabranovic, and the 
consumer Mr Emrek was not linked to the retailer’s website, but to a 
recommendation given by an acquaintance of the consumer.
Mr Emrek, as a consumer, concluded a written contract for the sale of 
a second-hand motor vehicle with Mr Sabranovic at the latter’s prem-
ises. Mr Emrek only discovered the defendant’s website after the con-
tract was concluded, and then tried to rely on it in order to justify the 
jurisdiction of his domicile under art. 17 para. 1 lit. c Brussels I a Regu-
lation. Given the design of the website, there was no doubt that it was 
( also ) directed at foreign clients in the sense of the relevant rule. As 
the website had not in any way provided the motive for the consumer 
to conclude the contract, however, and instead the consumer had trav-
elled abroad on his own initiative and only learned of the website af-
ter the contract was concluded, there was, strictly speaking, no link 
between the entrepreneur’s activity in that sense and the actual con-
tract. In other words, the contact between the defendant professional 
and the claimant consumer could not be traced back to the entrepre-
neur’s website. The crux of the matter was, therefore, whether a restric-
tive causality requirement applied, or whether the mere co-existence 
of two elements not linked as cause and effect was sufficient to justify  
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the jurisdiction of the consumer’s State of domicile in accordance with 
art. 17 para. 1 lit. c Brussels I a Regulation.
To cut to the end of the case, the CJEU rejected a causation require-
ment. Since the consumer must be protected as the weaker party in 
contracts with professionals, he or she must not be exposed to difficul-
ties in proving his or her case, such as when the professional disputes 
causation. This might dissuade consumers from suing in their domes-
tic courts, ultimately weakening their protection.
For a court to be internationally competent to hear a claim of a con-
sumer at his or her domicile, must the consumer have concluded the 
contract before or after he or she has discovered the website ?
Assuming that the directed activity of the professional must be one of 
the causal reasons for the consumer to conclude a contract, what would 
have been the result in CJEU, 17. 10. 2013, C-218 / 02, Emrek v. Sabanovic, 
ECLI : EU : C : 2013 : 666 ?
G.  Cross-border delicts
If a party takes steps to commence litigation in a non-contractual mat-
ter, such as a tort or a delict, a two-step process similar to international 
contract disputes is likely to be involved: First, the court must deter-
mine whether it has international jurisdiction to adjudicate the dis-
pute. Then, assuming the court has competence, it must determine the 
law to be applied to the substance of the dispute.
To fully understand conflict of laws relating to non-contractual obliga-
tions, the German case of RGZ 54, 198 from 1903 ( in simplified form ) 
will be used as illustration.
On the French side of the river Rhine ( which demarcates the border 
between France and Germany ) a Frenchman is hunting birds. Shortly 
thereafter a German farmer on the German side of the river is found ap-
parently shot by a French hunting bullet. The grieving German widow 
seeking damages requires the answers to our two questions: 
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( 1 ) Which court is competent to adjudicate ? and, 
( 2 ) which law will be applied by this court ?
1.  International jurisdiction
In the context of modern law, the Brussels I a Regulation provides the 
answer to the question of international jurisdiction. First, the general 
rule of art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation also applies to non-contractual ob-
ligations. As a French hunter will most likely be the defendant in our 
case, the widow could commence proceedings in a French court. As in 
our contract case above, there are exceptions to this general rule rele-
vant to non-contractual obligations: Art. 7 no. 2 Brussels I a Regulation 
stipulates that in matters relating to torts, delicts or quasi-delicts, a 
person domiciled in a Member State may sue in another Member State 
» in the court of the place where the harmful event occurred «.
The application of this rule is unproblematic in cases where the 
harmful conduct, that is the action eventually leading to the damage, 
and its result, that is the damage, are located in the same country. How-
ever, the wording is not easily applied to cases like our hunting illus-
tration ( i.e. a so-called » delict over a distance « ) as it is unclear whether 
the courts of the Member State where the wrongful action took place 
( France ) or where the resulting damage arose ( Germany ) have jurisdic-
tion over the matter.
The CJEU dealt with such a matter in the case 30. 11. 1976,  C-21/ 7 6, Bier 
v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, ECLI : EU : C : 1976 : 166 where a horticultural 
company in the Netherlands, depending largely on the waters of the 
Rhine for irrigating its plants, suffered from the pollution of the river’s 
water by the discharge of saline waste from a potash mine in France.
The CJEU held that the provision must be understood as covering both 
the place where the damage occurred and the place where the event 
giving rise to the damage took place and, as a rationale, referred to the 
respective equal proximity of both courts to the wrongful conduct or 
the infringement sustained. Hence, the answer to our first question is 
that the defendant may be sued, at the choice of the plaintiff, either 
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in the courts at the place where the damage occurred or in the courts 
where the event giving rise to it occurred. These two options are not 
exclusive and do not deprive the plaintiff of his or her right to sue in 
the country of the defendant’s domicile pursuant to the general pro-
vision.
The rule may also pose problems in multi-state torts, such as cross-
border defamation, where the damage occurs not only in one but in 
( many ) different countries.
The implication of this on jurisdictional issues was demonstrated by the 
case of  CJEU, 7 .3. 1995, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, ECLI : EU:C : 1995 : 61 
Here, a libel action was brought by an English woman against the pub-
lisher of a French newspaper with 0.1 % distribution in the United 
Kingdom. Vesting jurisdiction in both the courts of the State where 
the harm occurred and at the place of wrongful conduct became highly 
problematic: First, as it was unclear whether a particular court was at 
the place where the harm occurred or where the wrongful conduct took 
place. And second, because at first glance the solution might amount 
to a situation where the victim had the right to sue in courts of both ju-
risdictions, that is, suing the publisher in France and England respec-
tively, and each time in respect of the full damage.
The CJEU became aware of the possibility of forum shopping and in 
response, introduced certain limitations on the choice of jurisdiction 
of the plaintiff: First, the court draws a distinction between the initial 
injury and consequential losses, and it refuses to permit a plaintiff to 
sue in the courts of any place where he or she has merely suffered con-
sequential loss arising from injury of his or her protected right that 
was sustained elsewhere. Hence, only the primary infringement of the 
protected right is relevant for the assessment of the competent court 
under art. 7 no. 2 Brussels I a Regulation. Second, this rule is extended 
to secondary victims who may only sue in the jurisdiction where the 
primary victim was harmed. Finally, with regard to the libel case above, 
the court held that the publisher could be sued at the place of his 
wrongful conduct, that is, at his establishment, for all harm caused by 
the defamation or before the courts of each country where the publi-
cation was distributed and caused damage. However, in the latter case, 
the courts of each country have jurisdiction solely in respect of the 
damage caused within their own territory.
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In the initial hunter example, where can the widow bring proceedings 
according to artt. 4 and 7 no. 2 Brussels I a Regulation ?
2.  Choice-of-law rules
In Europe, the law applicable to torts has traditionally been determined 
by national choice-of-law rules. In some Member States, these national 
rules are judge-made whereas in others, the choice-of-law rules have 
been laid down by statute. It is worth reiterating the basic concepts 
from the start: When only the rules on international jurisdiction are 
applied, the court applies its substantive national law, that is, its lex 
fori and the result of the case thus depends on in which jurisdiction the 
case is brought ( forum shopping, see no. 2 / 13 et seq., above ).
This set up has increasingly been considered unsatisfactory and, 
in particular during the past century, several attempts at the elabo-
ration of a unified legal act on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations on a European level were undertaken. This changed with 
the enactment of Regulation ( EC ) No. 864 / 2007 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations ( Rome II Regulation ). The Rome II Regulation 
covers all non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters 
having multi-state connections of the nature and extent that implicate 
the laws of more than one state. The scope of the Regulation is, how-
ever, restricted by a list of specific exclusions and the application of its 
general rule in art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation is further limited by a 
number of special rules covering product liability, unfair competition, 
environmental damage, infringements of intellectual property rights 
and industrial action. Furthermore, violations of privacy and rights re-
lating to personality are excluded.
According to the general default rule of art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regu-
lation, the applicable law is the law of the country in which the harm 
occurs » irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred «. The European legislator held that such » principle 
of the lex loci delicti commissi is the basic solution for non-contractual 
obligations in virtually all the Member States « though it admitted that 
the » practical application of this principle … varies «.
In our initial hunting case, the result would be the application of Ger-
man law.
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Consider art. 7 Rome II Regulation which applies to environmental 
damage. Where this Article has to be applied, the plaintiff has the 
choice between the application of the law where the damage occurred 
( in accordance with art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation ) and the law of 
the State where the tortious act occurred.
Could you apply this rule to the case in 30. 11. 1976,  C-21/ 7 6, Bier v. Mines 
de Potasse d’Alsace, ECLI : EU : C : 1976 : 166 ( see above no. 2 / 52 ) ? Why or 
why not ? Which law is applicable ?
H.  Cross-border road traffic accidents
By far the most common cross-border torts concern road traffic acci-
dents because cars have become a rather common good and people 
use their cars to go abroad, for instance on holiday or for business pur-
poses. As road traffic accidents feature a rather special regime with re-
gard to the rules on applicable law, this will be our last and our ( prob-
ably ) most difficult discussion on private international law.
1.  International jurisdiction
As earlier, we will start by ascertaining which courts are interna-
tionally competent to hear a claim in cases of a road traffic accident 
abroad ( or an accident in Austria involving a foreign driver ). Again, 
the above-discussed rule on general jurisdiction applies ( see no. 2 / 19, 
2 / 37, above ): The defendant driver will be sued in the country of his 
or her domicile. 
Additionally, art. 7 no. 2 Brussels I a Regulation, stipulating that, in 
matters relating to torts, delicts or quasi-delicts, a person domiciled in 
a Member State may sue in another Member State » in the court of the 
place where the harmful event occurred «, applies here: Usually, under 
this heading, the courts in the State where the road traffic accident oc-
curred have international jurisdiction.
As vehicles in Europe are subject to compulsory insurance, the 
claimant will usually not direct his or her action against the defendant 
driver but his or her liability insurer. We call this an action directe. For 
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this scenario the CJEU case 13. 12. 2007, C-463 / 06, FBTO Schadeverzeker-
ingen v. Odenbreit, ECLI : EU : C : 2007 : 792 has major relevance.
The facts of the case are as follows: The claimant, who is habitually res-
ident in Germany, suffered an accident in the Netherlands and brought 
a direct action in Germany against the other party’s insurer, domiciled 
in the Netherlands. Here the question arose whether German courts 
have international jurisdiction for this claim on the basis of artt. 13 
para. 2, 11 para. 1 ( b ) Brussels I a Regulation.
The CJEU ruled that the reference in art. 13 para. 2 Brussels I a Regula-
tion to art. 11 para. 1 lit. b of that regulation was to be interpreted as 
meaning that the injured party might bring an action directly against 
the insurer before the courts in the Member State where the injured 
party was domiciled, provided that such a direct action is permitted 
and the insurer is domiciled in a Member State. In other words, the 
claimant may sue the defendant driver’s insurer at the courts of his or 
her home country.
Figure 11: International jurisdiction in cases of road traffic accidents.
As a result, the victim of a road traffic accident can bring his or her 
claim in three different courts: Either at the domicile of the defend-
ant driver under art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation or at the place where the 
road traffic accident occurred under art. 7 no. 2 Brussels I a Regulation 
or, finally, at the courts of the victim’s domicile under artt. 13 para. 2, 
11 para. 1 ( b ) Brussels I a Regulation.
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2.  Choice-of-law rules
As you are well aware, such a situation may very well lead to forum 
shopping ( see no. 2 / 13 et seq., above ) which is ( usually ) prevented by 
choice-of-law rules rendering only one national legal system exclu-
sively applicable to the case at hand regardless of where the claim is 
filed. Thus, we would turn to the above-mentioned Rome II Regulation 
( see no. 2 / 58 et seq., above ) as road traffic accidents are non-contrac-
tual obligations in civil and commercial matters as envisaged by the 
Regulation.
However, before applying the Rome II Regulation, its art. 28 must 
be consulted.
Relationship with existing international conventions
1. This Regulation shall not prejudice the application of international 
conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the 
time when this Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict-of-
law rules relating to non-contractual obligations. 
2. However, this Regulation shall, as between Member States, take 
precedence over conventions concluded exclusively between two or 
more of them in so far as such conventions concern matters governed 
by this Regulation.
Article 28 para. 1 provides that the Rome II Regulation does not hinder 
the application of international conventions to which one or more Eu-
ropean Member States were parties at the time when the Regulation 
was adopted, and which lay down conflict rules relating to non-con-
tractual obligations. But, according to art. 28 para. 2 Rome II Regula-
tion, as between Member States, the Regulation takes precedence over 
conventions concluded exclusively between two or more of them.
One of the relevant conventions is the Hague Traffic Accidents Con-
vention of 4 May 1971 on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents. The 
parties to this Convention include the following European Member 
States: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
Other parties to that Convention are inter alia Belarus, Bosnia-Herze-
govina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland 
and Ukraine.
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Since the Convention is thus not in force in European Member States 
only ( see art. 28 para. 2 Rome II Regulation ), the effect of art. 28 Rome 
II Regulation is that in the Member States which are already party to 
the Convention, and in absence of denunciation, the Hague Road Traf-
fic Accidents Convention will prevail over the Rome II Regulation.
Figure 12:  The choice-of-law rules between Hague Road Traffic Accidents  
Convention and Rome II Regulation.
Depending on where the claimant brings his or her claim, either the 
Rome II Regulation or the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention will ap-
ply: Where the court seised lies in a state which has ratified the Hague 
Traffic Accidents Convention ( such as Austria ), the Convention applies. 
If the claimant brings his or her claim in a EU Member State which has 
not ratified the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention ( for instance, Ger-
many ), the Rome II Regulation applies.
Considering the fact that a number of EU Member States have not 
ratified the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention, the question is why 
some EU Member States refused to be party to the Convention. The 
easy answer is that the convention provides for rather out-dated and 
quite difficult rules.
The main choice-of-law rule of the Convention is found in its art. 3: 
The law applicable to claims for non-contractual damages is the law 
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of the country in which the accident occurred. However, a significant 
number of exceptions are laid down in art. 4 Hague Traffic Accidents 
Convention: First, the law of the country in which the accident oc-
curred does not apply but rather the law of state where the vehicle is 
registered if only one vehicle is involved in the accident and this vehi-
cle is registered in a state other than that where the accident occurred. 
Accordingly, the law of the state of registration is applicable to deter-
mine liability towards a victim who is a passenger and whose habit-
ual residence is in a state other than that where the accident occurred 
( art. 4 lit. a ) first hyphen Hague Traffic Accidents Convention ), or to-
wards a victim who is outside the vehicle at the place of the accident 
and whose habitual residence is in the state of registration ( art. 4 lit. a ) 
second hyphen Hague Traffic Accidents Convention ). However, where 
there are two or more victims, the applicable law ( either law of accident 
state or law of registration state of vehicle ) is determined separately for 
each of them.
Under the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention, where two or more 
vehicles are involved in an accident, the law of the registration state is 
only applicable if all vehicles are registered in that same state. Finally, 
if one or more persons outside the car ( s ) at the place of the accident 
are involved, the law of the registration state ( s ) is only applied if all 
these persons have their habitual residence there ( art. 4 b ) Hague Traf-
fic Accidents Convention ).
Compared to this, the Rome II Regulation seems almost ridicu-
lously easy: According to the default rule in art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regu-
lation, the applicable law is the law of the country in which the harm 
occurs, that is the law of the country where the accident occurred ( see 
2 / 68, above ). If both parties are habitually resident in the same coun-
try, the tort is governed by the law of that country ( art. 4 para. 2 Rome 
II Regulation ). If no such common habitual residence exists, the tort is 
governed by the law at the place of the accident. Finally, art. 4 para. 3 
Rome II Regulation provides the only exception in favour of the law of 
another country which has a manifestly closer connection with the tort.
Figure 13: The full picture of road traffic accidents in private international law. ▷
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Figure 13: The full picture of road traffic accidents in private international law.
To sum up, in cases of road traffic accidents, a number of international 
courts could have international jurisdiction. Each of these courts may 
either apply the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention or the Rome II 
Regulation ( if a EU Member State court ), thereby prescribing the appli-
cation of different national substantive laws. To illustrate this finding, 
let us have a look at a final case.
A Polish driver with his habitual residence in Germany crashes his car – 
which is registered in Germany – into a tree in Poland. His passenger, 
an Austrian resident, suffers various injuries and sues the liability in-
surer of the driver at the driver’s habitual residence in Germany. The 
liability insurer pays a ( out of court ) lump sum compensation amount 
of some thousand Euros.
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In the original case, German courts had international jurisdiction 
under art. 4 Brussels I a Regulation. As Germany has not ratified the 
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention, the Rome II Regulation applies. 
According to art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation, the law at the place of 
the accident is applicable. This law is Polish law and accordingly the 
insurer made a payment under Polish law.
Figure 14: German court’s perspective.
When the driver moves to Austria, this picture changes. Austrian 
courts now have international jurisdiction under art. 4 Brussels I a 
Regulation. The same applies ( even without a change of residence of 
the driver ) if the passenger, who is a habitual resident of Austria, had 
brought her claim in an Austrian court according to the judgment of 
the CJEU 13. 12. 2007, C-463 / 06, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen v. Odenbreit, 
ECLI : EU : C : 2007 : 792 under artt. 13 ( 2 ), 11 ( 1 ) ( b ) Brussels I a Regulation.
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As to the applicable law, Austria is a signatory state of the Hague 
Traffic Accidents Convention. According to art. 3 Hague Traffic Acci-
dents Convention, the law at the place of the accident applies as a 
general rule. However, the law of the state of the registration of the 
car ( Germany ) applies according to art. 4 Hague Convention, where 
the passenger had his habitual residence outside the state of the ac-
cident ( outside Poland ). Hence, art. 4 lit. a ) first hyphen Hague Traf-
fic Accidents Convention applies, the result being that German law is 
applicable – and the original payment has no influence on that case, 
with the overall result that the driver’s liability insurance has to pay 
( yet again ).
Figure 15: Austrian court’s perspective.
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II.  Comparative private law
Comparative private law is a discipline that addresses substantive pri-
vate law rules of foreign states and compares them. In this chapter the 
importance of this discipline in private international law cases is reit-
erated; additionally three important purposes will be outlined in detail.
Before you start studying this chapter please be sure to review no. 1 / 52 
et seq. above.
A.  Ascertaining the contents of foreign private law rules
In the introduction we outlined the basics of private law rules interna-
tionally, namely, that in principle all countries have their own rules of 
family law, law of succession, property law, contract law, tort law, etc. 
Each country’s rules differ more or less from the rules of another coun-
try. The choice-of-law rules dealt with in no. 2 / 6 et seq., above, tell us 
which of these national private law rules a domestic court must apply 
in a cross-border case. According to these rules, the domestic courts 
may be required to apply the substantive rules of a foreign country 
instead of those of their own domestic law. But how do the Austrian 
courts know about the content of the private law rules of the foreign 
country ? How can domestic courts gather information, for instance, 
concerning which remedies are available to the buyer of a defective 
good under French law ? How can the courts obtain information on In-
donesian law in the case of a car accident ?
Under §§ 3 and 4 of the Austrian IPRG, Austrian courts have the duty to 
determine the contents of the applicable foreign private law and to ap-
ply them in the same manner as they would be applied by a court of that 
particular foreign country. In determining the contents of the foreign 
legal rules, the Austrian court may be assisted by the Austrian Ministry 
of Justice, which usually requests the Austrian Embassy in the particu-
lar foreign country to provide the necessary documents and informa-
tion to assist the court in ascertaining the content of the foreign law 
and determining its application. The Austrian embassy in the foreign 
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country usually contacts a local domestic lawyer of confidence who in 
turn provides the necessary information about the particular foreign 
law available. The embassy then conveys this information to the Aus-
trian Ministry of Justice who in turn passes it on to the Austrian court. 
The Austrian court may additionally request the assistance of expert 
opinions.
Comparative legal researchers also serve as a source of information 
on foreign legal systems via their written work. Based on this informa-
tion, a judge may be in a position to ascertain, for example, the relevant 
French or Indonesian legal rules necessary for the case before him or 
her without requiring the assistance of the Ministry or an expert wit-
ness. The first step for a judge seeking to apply a foreign law is thus to 
look to relevant scholarly comparative legal writing.
B.  Legal families
Starting with Zweigert and Kötz, comparative law researchers have 
identified specific groups of legal systems the members of which are 
more closely related to one another than to other groups of legal sys-
tems ( » Rechtskreislehre « ). They distinguish between common law and 
civil law systems, and within civil law systems, between, for instance, 
Romanistic, Germanistic and Scandinavian groups ( see no. 2 / 83, be-
low ).
Common law systems include the English, US-American, Austral-
ian and Canadian private law systems. Common law systems histori-
cally derive most of their legal rules not from statutes, but rather from 
court decisions, which were understood as the main sources of private 
law. Civil law systems, on the other hand, such as most of the European 
continental systems, derive their legal rules from statutes: among this 
statutory law the codifications of private law are of pivotal importance, 
for instance the Austrian » ABGB «, the German » Bürgerliches Gesetz-
buch « ( BGB ), the French » Code Civil «, the Italian » Codice Civile «, the 
Spanish » Código Civil «, the Swiss » Obligationenrecht « ( OR ) and the 
Swiss » Zivilgesetzbuch « ( ZGB ) and the Dutch » Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wet-
boek « ( NBW ). Court decisions are not considered to be sources of law 
in civil law systems as civil law courts are largely competent only to in-
terpret and apply the law of the codifications and statutes and not to 
create new legal rules themselves.
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The civil law systems of Europe can be further divided into three 
» legal families « or » Rechtskreise «: the » Germanic « family, including 
the private law systems of Austria, Switzerland and Germany; the » Ro-
manic « family, including the private law systems of France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the old Dutch Code, Italy, Spain and Portugal; and the 
» Nordic « family including the private law systems of Iceland, Norway, 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark.
The historically different sources of law in common and civil law 
systems respectively are the root of a number of basic differences be-
tween the methodology and the legal culture of common and civil law 
systems today. For instance, common law lawyers make use of a so-
called » inductive « method to determine a just solution to a case. In 
deciding a case, the courts first look to similar previously decided mat-
ters for guidance ( » stare decisis « ). If the earlier case is regarded as sig-
nificantly different from the matter before them, they will render a 
» new «, different decision. Thus, they gradually develop rules by decid-
ing cases. Civil law courts, on the other hand, make use of the so-called 
» deductive « method. That is, they take a general rule laid down by the 
legislator and apply it to the case before them. They » deduce « their sin-
gle case decision from statute with a rigid syllogism, whereby the legal 
rule is the major concern and the facts, the minor concern.
These different approaches are, however, gradually converging. 
Nowadays, common law systems also contain a considerable number 
of private law statutes. This development is strengthened by the legis-
lation of the European Union with respect to the English private law 
systems and driven by the fact that statutes provide a certain degree 
of clarity and certainty that is necessary in many fields of private law 
and cannot be provided by court decisions alone. Similarly, civil law 
systems no longer derive their private law rules from the provisions 
of statutes and codifications alone but instead, to an increasing ex-
tent, from court decisions too. Thus, their decisions serve as » quasi « 
sources of law. In the future, it is expected that the European Union 
will bring about an even stronger » rapprochement « of the common 
and civil law systems.
The distinction between common law and civil law systems can 
only partially explain the private law reality in the states of the world. 
First, there are additionally a number of private law systems which are 
unrelated to either of the two groups, for instance, the partially reli-
gious private law of Arabic countries, spheres of African law, Chinese 
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law and the law of other Asian countries. Second, many of the former 
colonies of European states imported the colonialist’s law. This is the 
case, for instance, with Dutch law in Indonesia and British law in India 
and various African countries. Such » legal transplants « also took place 
outside of colonisation; for instance, Swiss private law significantly 
influenced Turkish law, British common law has been to some extent 
exported to Israel and the German BGB to Greece and Japan. In the 
» receiving « countries, older sources of law, customs and traditional at-
titudes towards law also exist, overlapping with the transplanted rules 
to create a blend of rules and attitudes. This mixture of different rules 
and traditions lends itself to different practical outcomes as compared 
to the country that exported their Codes or private law systems.
A further heterogeneous group of countries have characteristics of 
both the common law and civil law systems; we speak of » mixed « or 
» hybrid systems «. The Nordic countries, South Africa, Quebec ( in Can-
ada ), Louisiana ( in the US ) and Israel belong to this group.
Accordingly, the distinction between different groups of legal sys-
tems offers only a starting point; practitioners and comparative re-
searchers will need to dig deeper to determine the precise legal rules 
and practices of the legal system under examination.
C.  Interpretation of choice-of-law rules
The provision of information about foreign legal systems is not the 
only assistance that comparative law provides in international cases. 
Additionally, comparative law aids in the interpretation of rules of pri-
vate international law ( see no. 2 / 30, above ), the preparatory work for 
the unification of private law rules and the uniform interpretation of 
such rules ( see no. 1 / 66 et seq., above ).
D.  Uniform law and its interpretation
The need for uniform private law arises from the variety of solutions to 
common problems offered by various national laws and the inability of 
private international law to always find a middle ground. This is most 
evident in international trade and transport issues but also arises in 
other fields of private law.
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International traders are thus not able to predict the outcome 
of potential legal disputes in the face of no internationally uniform 
source of law. As we have discussed earlier ( see no. 2 / 41, above ) several 
states’ courts may be potentially competent to adjudicate the dispute 
and may arguably interpret the choice-of-law rules differently with the 
result that the law applicable may be less predictable than initially as-
sumed. But even when the parties have taken all necessary precautions 
by, for instance, electing which law is applicable to their contract, non-
contractual aspects of their dispute may still be governed by a different 
law. Even once it has been established which law will apply, standard 
difficulties such as limited access to foreign law or the knowledge of 
the statutory language may still persist. The lack of legal certainty cre-
ates in itself a risk in cross-border transactions and thus undeniably 
constitutes a barrier to international trade and exchange.
If uniform legal rules exist in a certain field these legal hazards 
can be avoided. The parties of an international transaction will know 
from the outset that the uniform rules apply to their ( prospective ) 
legal dispute. It is easy for them to ascertain the contents of the uni-
form legal rules as these are usually translated into many languages. 
Courts in all countries in which the uniform legal rules are in force 
will apply them. This may explain why international practitioners and 
researchers find uniform private law rules for international cases ex-
tremely desirable.
How does comparative law assist the creation of uniform law ? Out-
side the European Union, which provides various possibilities for cre-
ating uniform law ( see no. 1 / 38, above and no. 3 / 23 et seq., below ), the 
most important sources of internationally uniform private law are in-
ternational conventions. However, it is difficult to reach unanimous 
agreement on the text of the uniform rules of a convention. It is, how-
ever, imperative that the greatest number of countries agree to these 
rules as the success of a convention depends on its acceptance and 
later ratification by these countries ( see no. 3 / 22, below ). The more 
contracting countries a convention has the more effective it is and the 
more » uniform « the law in the particular field becomes.
As a result, the texts of international conventions are usually based 
on extensive comparative studies of the national rules of the prospec-
tive contracting states in a particular field. These studies are normally 
conducted by specialised working groups of international organisa-
tions.
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Examples of international organisations that prepare uniform private 
law are:
 ▷  UNCITRAL ( UN Commission on International Trade Law, New 
York / Vienna; established by a General Assembly Resolution in 
1966 ),
 ▷ UNIDROIT ( private organisation, Rome ),
 ▷ ICC ( International Chamber of Commerce, Paris ),
 ▷ Hague Conference ( The Hague, Netherlands ).
When, for instance, a convention on the international assignment of 
claims is prepared by an international organisation, the organisation 
first gathers information on how the assignment of claims is currently 
addressed in the different national systems of private law. Usually, rep-
resentatives of the respective countries who assist the work of the in-
ternational organisation provide this information. It then compares 
and evaluates the different national solutions and looks for a common 
denominator that would be acceptable to all countries. The interna-
tional organisation then formulates a draft text proposing the possi-
ble common solution, which is subsequently subject to comments and 
criticism by the representatives of the different countries. The draft 
will be amended until the majority of countries are satisfied that their 
concerns have been addressed. The final text of the convention is rati-
fied by the politically competent institutions of the respective coun-
tries ( see no. 3 / 23 et seq., below ). Through this ratification process the 
uniform rules enter into force in the ratifying countries.
As noted above ( no. 1 / 67, above ) as with all other legal texts, the 
rules of the uniform law convention have to be interpreted. Unlike do-
mestic legal rules, however, the convention cannot be interpreted in 
the light of a single country’s legal system alone. Comparative studies 
are crucial to ensure uniform interpretation.
E.  Other purposes of comparative law
Apart from aiding in the solutions to multinational private law cases, 
comparative law has broader uses. Studying a foreign legal system and 
comparing it to your own often helps you to properly understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of the rules of your own system. Comparative 
law therefore increases the quality of legal studies ( see no. 1 / 61, above ).
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Comparative law might also be a useful device for national legisla-
tors. If they intend to reform particular national rules, they may find it 
helpful to assess how other private law systems deal with the same is-
sue. The legislator can thus learn about alternative solutions and study 
the practical impacts of different rules and, thereby, make a well in-
formed decision on how to reform their own law ( see no. 1 / 61, above ).
III.  Uniform private law
A.  Binding and non-binding sources of  
Uniform Private Law
International conventions that have entered into force are binding 
sources of law for the participating states and are applied indepen-
dently of the intention of the individual parties. Aside from the bin-
ding character of conventions, other non-binding sources of law exist 
and can be deliberately incorporated into a contract by the parties. For 
instance, documentary credits, guarantees, arbitration agreements, 
etc. can be made subject to the rules of uniform customs and prac-
tices published by the ICC ( International Chamber of Commerce ) in 
Paris; arrangements of transporting sold goods and the passing of the 
risk can be included in terms of the INCOTERMS, and a wide array of 
model laws and recom mendations published by UNCITRAL and other 
international organisations can be included. Despite their non-binding 
character, these non-binding rules greatly influence the practice of in-
ternational commerce, as a great number of parties choose to include 
them into their contracts.
Finally, internationally uniform customs – being neither part of a 
convention nor a non-binding legal text of an international organisa-
tion – may also significantly influence cross-border commerce. These 
rules are often referred to as » customs of international trade « or » lex 
mercatoria « ( law merchant ) of international trade. It is alleged that 
these customs are binding sources of law as they are applicable even if 
parties do not make express reference to them in their contract.
Do not confuse the » customs of international trade « ( lex mercatoria ) 
with the » customary public international law « in no. 1 / 7, above and 
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no. 3 / 18, below. The » customs of international trade « are created by 
the long-standing practice of private actors in international commerce, 
and are binding only on these private actors on the international trade 
market.
In stark contrast » customary public international law « is created by the 
long-standing practice of states and is binding on states only.
The customs of international trade are part of uniform private law, 
whereas the customary law binding states is part of public interna-
tional law.
However, the validity and the contents of the lex mercatoria are widely 
disputed among national courts and among commentators. This lack 
of clarification regarding whether a national court will accept certain 
international customs or not is highly unsatisfactory. As a result, inter-
national parties often opt for a non-state arbitration procedure when a 
dispute requires resolution in terms of which party-appointed private 
arbitrator will settle the disputes outside formal court proceedings. Ar-
bitrators are usually more willing to apply all international customs 
in a certain branch of trade or in the whole of international trade. The 
international parties, therefore, can usually rely on the application of 
international customs or lex mercatoria in an arbitration procedure.
B.  The UNCITRAL Sales Convention ( CISG )
From the perspective of cross-border commerce, uniform private law is 
enormously advantageous ( see no. 2 / 42, above ). As mentioned above, 
the number of internationally uniform sources of substantive private 
law is steadily increasing. Alongside the CISG many other uniform 
sources of private exist, but the CISG remains the most pivotal. Thus, 
as an introduction to uniform private law, we begin with an examina-
tion of this Convention.
In July 2013, an Austrian firm A that produces a special type of com-
puter chips that are combined with other hardware concludes a con-
tract of sale with a Portuguese manufacturer M, who needs the seller’s 
products for his high tech machinery. The contract provides that A will 
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deliver 10,000 units of XY ( name of the goods ) within 14 days after the 
conclusion of the contract, and that the price of € 80,000,– is due one 
month after the delivery of the goods. The contract contains the follow-
ing stipulation of the applicable law: » The law applicable to all parts of 
this contractual agreement is the Austrian law «.
16 days after the conclusion of the contract, M realises that A’s goods 
have not yet been delivered. M needs A’s products to prepare the open-
ing of a new section of his plant. For every day that the opening of the 
plant section is delayed, M suffers damages of € 2,000,– due to addi-
tional expenses and € 10,000,– b y loss of profits.
Which law is applicable to the legal questions raised ? What remedies 
does M have ?
1.  Scope of application
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods ( CISG ) is one of the most successful private law conventions 
in existence. Currently, it has 83 parties including all European coun-
tries; the number is constantly growing with new members joining 
every year.
The recent ratification status can be found online at < http: / /www.un 
citral.org / uncitral / en / uncitral_texts / sale_goods / 1980CISG_status.html >.
As discussed above, the CISG was prepared and drafted by the UNCI-
TRAL which has its headquarters in Vienna and New York. The UNCI-
TRAL has also produced a number of other important conventions and 
model laws in the field of commercial ( private ) law. The uniform sales 
rules of the CISG replace the rules on contracts of the Austrian ABGB 
and the Austrian UGB entirely if the seller and the buyer are located in 
different countries and the buyer is not a consumer.
The CISG rules apply automatically when the seller and the buyer 
have their places of business in two different contracting states. A stip-
ulation of the CISG rules by the parties is not necessary for their appli-
cation. The CISG also applies when the parties are not located in two 
contracting states provided that the rules of private international law 
lead to the application of the law of a contracting state.
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In our above illustration Austria is a party to the CISG whereas Por-
tugal is not. As a result, we have to determine whether the choice-of-
law rules stipulate the law of the contracting state, here Austrian law. 
As the parties have not chosen any law applicable pursuant to art. 3 
Rome I Regulation ( see no. 2 / 32, above ), art. 4 para. 1 lit. a Rome I Reg-
ulation applies. As the agreement between A and M is a sale, the con-
tract will be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his 
or her habitual residence which, in our case, is A’s habitual place resi-
dence and, accordingly, Austrian law ( see no. 2 / 34, above ). As a result, 
the CISG is applicable.
If the parties do not want the CISG to apply to their contract, but 
rather a domestic legal system, they must state this expressly in their 
contract. For that purpose, it is not sufficient to include a term provid-
ing » The Austrian law shall apply to our contract «. Austria is a signatory 
state of the CISG and, therefore the CISG is part of Austrian law and, 
indeed, supersedes the rules of the ABGB. In other words, the CISG is 
Austrian law. As a result, the judge will apply the CISG in the absence of 
the parties’ express exclusion of its application in favour of the applica-
tion of some other law. In order to exclude the CISG, the parties would 
have had to provide a more precise formulation, such as » The Austrian 
ABGB rules shall apply to our contract « or » The CISG shall not apply to 
our contract: The law applicable to the contract shall be the law of the 
Italian Codice Civile. «
The CISG does not apply to sales contracts in which the buyer is a 
consumer purchasing the goods for personal, family or household use, 
unless the seller neither knew, nor ought to have known that the goods 
were bought for any such use. The CISG is also not applicable to service 
contracts and contracts to manufacture goods if the party who orders 
the goods supplies a substantial part of the materials necessary for the 
production of the goods. Both alternatives are not applicable to our 
case and, as an interim result, the CISG is applicable.
2.  Scope of application of the CISG
The CISG applies to
 ▷ the formation of the sales contract ( artt. 14–24 CISG ),
 ▷ the duties of the parties under the sales contract ( artt. 30–37, 53–60 
CISG ),
 ▷ the passing of the risk ( artt. 66–70 CISG ),
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 ▷ the duty of the buyer to examine the goods and to give notice to the 
seller of any lack of conformity within a reasonable time ( artt. 38–44 
CISG ) and, last but not least,
 ▷ all legal consequences that are triggered by a breach of contract 
( artt. 45–52, 61–65 CISG ). 
For instance, the buyer’s remedies in case of the seller’s breach of con-
tract mentioned in artt. 45 et seq. CISG would include specific perfor-
mance ( art. 46 para. 1 CISG ), delivery of substitute goods ( art. 46 para. 
2 CISG ), repair ( art. 46 para. 3 CISG ), avoidance of the contract ( art. 49 
CISG ), price reduction ( art. 50 CISG ), damages ( artt. 74 et seq. CISG ), 
and restitution of the price already paid after avoidance or price reduc-
tion ( artt. 81 et seq. CISG ).
The CISG does not, however, apply to questions of validity of the con-
tract, such as the capacity of the parties to conclude the contract, repre-
sentation or agency, the violation of mandatory law or of good faith and 
mistake ( with the exception of mistake regarding the characteristics of 
the goods ). Moreover, the CISG does not apply to the passing of property.
3.  Rules for breach of contract
A comparison of the rather complicated Austrian sales law under the 
ABGB and the CISG rules reveals one of the major achievements of 
the CISG. Whereas, under the ABGB, a distinction is drawn between 
delay, » initial « and » subsequential non-performance «, » positive « mis-
performance and » non-performance due to initial defect « the CISG 
provides for only one general category: the » breach of contract «. This 
general category features only two subdivisions, namely » fundamen-
tal breach of contract « and » non-fundamental breach of contract «. The 
complicated doctrinal jungle of national legal rules is thus replaced by 
a clearer, simpler concept for both parties and judges alike.
As remedies available under the CISG differ between a fundamen-
tal breach and non-fundamental breach, it is best to start our discus-
sion of art. 25 CISG by providing a definition of these two concepts. Ac-
cording to this provision, a breach is fundamental » if it results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he 
is entitled to expect under the contract «.
The text of art. 25 CISG is, of course, only a vague circumscription 
that must be further interpreted by the courts. Recent court decisions 
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show that the notion of » fundamental breach « is construed rather nar-
rowly. For instance, the breach is not necessarily fundamental if the 
seller delivers goods which the buyer cannot utilise because they lack 
an important characteristic that was part of the contractual agreement. 
However, if the goods are completely worthless and cannot be resold 
by the buyer, this does amount to a fundamental breach. Further, if the 
goods are unusable only for the buyer, but could be utilised by other 
people, the buyer is required to sell the goods and demand a price re-
duction and / or damages from the seller. In this case the breach will not 
be considered fundamental.
This narrow conception of a fundamental breach can be explained 
or justified by the exceptionally high costs of transport that are usually 
incurred by the restitution of goods in international trade. In the case 
of a fundamental breach of contract ( art. 25 CISG ) by the seller, the 
buyer has the following remedies:
 ▷ the right to demand delivery ( art. 46 para. 1 CISG ),
 ▷ the right to demand the delivery of substitute goods ( art. 46 para. 
2 CISG ),
 ▷ the right to demand repair of the goods ( art. 46 para. 3 CISG ),
 ▷ the right to demand price reduction ( art. 50 CISG ),
 ▷ the right to declare the contract null and void ( art. 49 CISG ),
 ▷ the right to claim damages ( artt. 74 et seq. CISG ), and
 ▷ the right to claim restitution of the price already paid ( artt. 81 et seq. 
CISG ) as a consequence of price reduction ( art. 50 CISG ) or avoid-
ance ( art. 49 CISG ).
The buyer may choose any of these remedies according to his or her 
preferences. However, the choice is limited by various factors. The 
buyer cannot, for example, have the same detriment remedied twice or 
claim remedies that are contradictory by their character; the buyer can-
not, for instance, demand price reduction ( art. 50 CISG ) and damages 
for the lower value of the goods ( art. 74 CISG ) at the same time or claim 
specific performance and avoid the contract at the same time.
In the case of a non-fundamental breach of contract by the seller, 
all the above-mentioned remedies are available to the buyer save two: 
He or she cannot claim the delivery of substitute goods according to 
art. 46 para. 2 CISG nor can he or she avoid the contract according to 
art. 49 CISG as these are the only two remedies that result in re-trans-
port of the goods back to the seller ( see no. 2 / 115, above ).
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Moreover, in cases of a non-fundamental breach, the CISG stipu-
lates a priority of repair in favour of the seller. If the defective goods 
can be repaired and the repair does not create an unreasonable burden 
or delay for the buyer, the buyer must agree to repair the goods within 
a reasonable time period. Accordingly, the buyer may only resort to 
price re duction, restitution or damages if the seller does not repair the 
goods within that reasonable period of time or if the seller declares 
that he or she will not repair the goods. Even if the seller repairs the 
goods in time, the buyer can, of course, claim all the damages that were 
caused to him by the delay.
It should be noted that further conditions to the buyer’s remedies 
apply. This includes
 ▷ an examination of the goods according to art. 38 CISG » within as 
short a period as is practicable in the circumstances « and
 ▷ notice of their lack of conformity to the seller according to art. 39 
CISG » within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought 
to have discovered it «.
If the buyer does not examine the goods and / or does not give notice 
of the defects of the goods to the seller within the time periods pre-
scribed, he or she cannot base any right or remedy on the lack of con-
formity of the goods, no matter how poor the state of the goods is. In 
essence, the buyer forfeits all his or her rights if he or she fails to exam-
ine and notify the seller of the defects timeously. However, according 
to art. 44 CISG, the buyer retains his or her right to price reduction and 
to claim damages except for loss of profit if he or she has a reasonable 
excuse for failure to give due notice.
International court decisions determine the length of these two pe-
riods according to the circumstances of the particular case. The regu-
lar length is about one to two weeks for examination and two weeks 
for notice; that is, three to four weeks as a maximum total period. If 
the goods are perishable or the defects of the goods are evident to the 
buyer on receiving delivery, the period of examination may only be one 
to two days and the period for notice may accordingly be much shorter 
too. If the defects are difficult to determine, for instance when techni-
cal expertise is required, the period of examination may be extended 
by two weeks.
In most cases it is not sufficient to simply state that » the goods are 
defective «, as art. 39 CISG requires that the notice must » specify the 
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nature of the lack of conformity «. This means that only a sufficiently 
precise notice in respect of the kind of defect discovered by the buyer 
will be effective.
If the seller does not deliver defective goods but, rather, there is 
a delay in delivery, the buyer may declare the contract null and void. 
However, he or she may
 ▷ fix an additional period of time for the delivery of the goods ( art. 47 
CISG ) and
 ▷ if the seller does not deliver the goods within that additional period 
of time or if he or she declares that he or she will not deliver within 
that period, the buyer may declare the contract avoided ( art. 49 
para. 1 lit. b CISG ).
However, if the contract stipulates delivery on an exact date and the 
delivery is not effected accordingly, the buyer can declare avoidance 
without fixing an additional period of time. The same applies where 
the seller has declared that he or she will not deliver at all.
Unlike for instance, Austrian rules of contractual damages, the CISG 
rules of damages for breach of contract ( artt. 74–79 CISG ) do not require 
any fault on the part of the breaching party. The breaching party is li-
able for all foreseeable damage suffered by the other party as a conse-
quence of the breach ( art. 74 CISG ). The only exception to this, stipu-
lated in art. 79 CISG, is if the breach was » due to an impediment beyond 
his control and he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the 
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
or overcome it or its consequences «. Such impediments are events like 
the outbreak of war, a riot, a natural catastrophe, or an import or export 
ban issued by the state authorities. The mere fact that the supplier of 
the seller delivers defective goods without the fault of the seller does 
not constitute an impediment in the sense of art. 79 CISG.
Thus the legal requirements of a claim of damages under the art. 74 
CISG are as follows
 ▷ the occurrence of damage to the claimant,
 ▷ the breach of a contractual duty by the defendant,
 ▷ the causation of damage by the breach of that particular duty, and
 ▷ the foreseeability of the damage for the defendant.
A defendant may prove that the breach of his contractual obligation 
was due to an impediment beyond his or her control in the sense of 
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art. 79 CISG. Only if this is successfully proven will he or she not be li-
able for the damage caused by his or her breach. In all other cases com-
pensation is due for all the losses the claimant has suffered as a conse-
quence of the breach including lost profits.
Coming back to our illustrative case above, we may now answer the 
questions raised. As already discussed, the CISG is applicable. As a re-
sult of the two-day delay, M’s opening of the plant section is delayed 
and he suffers damage amounting to € 2,000,– and a loss of profits of 
€ 10,000,– per day. As the delay itself is unlikely to be seen as funda-
mental, only the remedies according to art. 46 para. 1 CISG and art. 74 
CISG are available to M. As a result M can demand performance from A 
and claim damages for the breach of contract in the amount of a total 
€ 24,000,– for damage and lost profits.
To consolidate our understanding of the application of the CISG, 
we shall modify our illustration above to a more real life scenario.
A finally delivers the goods. M’s employees immediately unpack them 
and start to install them into the machinery. After one week of testing, 
the employees report to M that the machinery cannot be set to work 
due to an unexplainable defect in the hardware delivered by A. After a 
day of discussion with the computer experts of his company M informs 
A of the alleged defects of the goods by fax, exactly ten days after the 
delivery of the goods. The next day, A sends the following statement by 
fax: » The products were free of any defects when sent to you. Your ma-
chinery is defective and is therefore not compatible with our products. 
In any case, the discussion about the defects of XY is obsolete as you 
have not rendered timely notice of the defects. Ten days exceeds the 
statutory time period within which you were required to give us notice 
of any defects regarding our products. Hoping that you will soon be 
able to get your machinery started. Yours sincerely, A. «
After receiving the statement, M approaches a lawyer and a computer 
expert to further investigate the case. They establish that the XYs do 
not have a certain quality that was part of the product description in 
the sales contract. The XYs therefore cannot be used in combination 
with M’s machinery. A repair of the XYs is possible, but it would be very 
expensive, amounting to 40 % of the contract price. The 10.000 XYs are, 
however, not entirely worthless. They could be resold with relative ease 
to other manufacturers who do not need the special quality the XYs 
lack.
What remedies does M have ?
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As in the previous illustration, the CISG is applicable to this con-
tract ( see no. 2 / 108 et seq., above ). The crucial question in this illus-
tration is then whether the breach of the contract is fundamental. 
According to art. 25 CISG ( see no. 2 / 113 et seq., above ), the breach is 
fundamental if it results in detriment to the buyer that substantially 
deprives him or her of what he or she was entitled to expect under the 
contract, unless the seller was not able to foresee such a result.
Two possibilities for advice are possible here. As a defence lawyer 
you may argue that, according to recent court decisions, the term » fun-
damental breach « is narrowly construed and, thus, the facts of the par-
ticular case cannot be considered as a fundamental breach. Accord-
ing to art. 39 CISG, the remedies available to M are then dependant 
on whether or not he examined the goods and gave timely and precise 
notice of their defects ( see no. 2 / 119 et seq., above ). Here, just ten days 
have passed from delivery until the notice and the referral to the lack 
of compatibility is sufficiently precise. As an interim result A’s objec-
tion may not be taken into regard when assessing M’s remedies. Conse-
quently M has a right to demand repair, price reduction and damages.
The result above is based on the assumption that the breach of con-
tract was non-fundamental. What are M’s options if you were to argue 
for a fundamental breach ?
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Chapter 3
 Public International Law
I.  Purposes and development of  
public international law
A.  The historical development of public international law
Before studying this chapter, please repeat the initial orientation on 
public international law in no. 1 / 1 et seq., above.
The traditional system, which is the basis of today’s system of public 
international law, is built on the assumption that the nation-state is the 
primary actor. The modern nation-state is a relatively recent product of 
political development in Western Europe. It can be traced back to the 
time of the Renaissance and Reformation, the expansion of trade in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the European » discoveries « 
of the New World. Intellectually, the doctrine of sovereignty and the 
idea of the secular, territorial state are intimately associated with the 
creation of the » modern « system. Of course there were well-organised 
political units in Europe prior to this period and great empires had ex-
isted for millennia in China, Japan, India, Africa, Southeast Asia and 
the Middle East. These empires interacted with other societies and, 
hence, there were systems of law in place that pre-dated » modern « in-
ternational law. Today, even though the majority of the more than 190 
states worldwide are non-European, the contemporary system of pub-
lic international law is based on the European model which has devel-
oped, roughly speaking, over the past four centuries.
Some commentators perceive this Western European orientation and 
origin of public international law as highly problematic. They contend 
that the contemporary public international law system is a continuation 
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of Western colonialism and imperialism which offers little understand-
ing of non-Western and non-European countries, in particular the devel-
oping countries or the so-called » Third World «.
With the growth of a number of independent states in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, the process of formation of customary rules of 
public international law based on the usages and practices followed by 
states in their mutual relations was initiated. The influential fact was 
that by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, jurists had begun to con-
sider the evolution of a community of independent sovereign states. 
They thus began contemplating different problems regarding the law 
of nations, realising the necessity of a body of rules to regulate cer-
tain aspects of the relations between such states. Where no established 
customary rules existed, these jurists were obliged to fashion working 
principles by reasoning or analogy. They had recourse to precedents of 
ancient history and to the semi-theological concept of the » law of na-
ture «, a concept which for centuries exercised a profound influence on 
the development of public international law. The greatest of the early 
writers on public international law was the Dutch scholar, jurist, and 
diplomat Hugo Grotius ( 1593–1645 ) with his systematic treatise » De 
jure Belli ac Pacis «. One central doctrine in his treatise was the accept-
ance of the » law of nature « as an independent source of rules of the law 
of nations, apart from custom and treaties. The Grotian » law of nature « 
was to some extent a secularised version, rooted primarily in the dic-
tates of reason and the rational nature of men as social human beings. 
It went on to become a potent source of inspiration to subsequent ju-
rists and to the doctrine of public international law.
In the eighteenth century, there was a growing tendency among ju-
rists to seek the rules of international law mainly in custom and trea-
ties, and to relegate to a minor position the » law of nature « or reason 
as source of principles. Scholars who attached primary or significant 
weight to customary and treaty rules were known as » positivists «. In the 
nineteenth century international law further expanded. This was due to 
a number of factors, including the further rise of powerful new states 
both within and outside Europe, the imposition of European civiliza-
tion overseas ( colonialism ), the modernisation of world transport, the 
greater destructiveness of modern warfare, and the influence of new in-
ventions. These factors heightened the urgent need for the international 
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society of states to develop a system of rules by which the conduct of in-
ternational affairs could be regulated in an ordered manner. There was 
remarkable development in the law of war and neutrality and a signifi-
cant increase in adjudications by international arbitral tribunals during 
the century. Additionally, states acquired the habit of negotiating gen-
eral treaties in order to regulate affairs of mutual concern.
Other important developments took place in the twentieth cen-
tury. The Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 established the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice was set up in 1921 as an authoritative international judicial tri-
bunal, subsequently succeeded in 1946 by the present International 
Court of Justice in the Hague. Additionally, there was the creation of 
permanent international organisations whose functions were in effect 
similar to that of a world government of sorts, seeking to promote the 
interests of peace and human welfare, such as the League of Nations 
and, following the traumatic experiences of World War II, its present 
successor – the United Nations Organisation ( UNO ). Most remarkable 
has been the widening scope of international law, which has extended 
to cover, by multilateral treaties or conventions, not only every kind 
of economic or social interest affecting states, but also fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals.
B.  Alternative views of public international law
When comparing the chapter on public international law to other fields 
of law you have already studied in the course of your first semesters 
you will notice that the rules of public international law have a some-
what special characteristic that distinguishes them from all other fields 
of law. For example, they seem to lack precision; they seem to be in a 
constant state of development and discussion which makes it very dif-
ficult to pin down what the law demands from the legal actors; they 
do not seem to really direct the conduct of states; they often cannot be 
directly enforced and seem to invite breaches by legal actors; and it is 
sometimes hard to distinguish mere political deliberations from legal 
rules of public international law. In essence, the rules of public interna-
tional law might leave one with the uneasy feeling that they are simply 
too vague for proper comprehension. Some critics have thus raised the 
questions of whether public international law really has the character 
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of law and why it should be binding on sovereign states at all. In other 
words, is public international law » law « at all or merely politics ?
There are two traditional explanations to the binding force of pub-
lic international law: The » positivists « contend that states have con-
sented to be bound by public international law and are thus bound by 
force of their consent ( express consent to treaties and acquiescence in 
customary law ). The adherents of » natural law « ( like Grotius and many 
jurists of public international law after him ) believe in the pre-exist-
ence of a set of rules – also including the rules of public international 
law – that originates from the commands of God, or later on in a secu-
lar form, from the demands of reason. Accordingly, states are bound by 
public international law rules because they are compelled to do so by 
God or by force of the nature and reason of mankind.
The New Haven School of law rejects both the positivist and the nat-
ural law approaches to public international law. The adherents of this 
school contend that the concentration on the formulation and appli-
cation of » rules « of public international law makes us blind to the real 
nature of the problems that are to be solved by public international 
law, that is, the real problems that stand behind the » rules «. In their 
opinion, the really important questions in this field concern power 
and politics. They, therefore, propose a » policy-oriented « approach to 
public international law, which they distinguish from traditional » rule-
oriented « approaches. The broad outlines of this policy-oriented ap-
proach include:
 ▷ the establishment of an observational standpoint;
 ▷ the formulation of problems;
 ▷ the delimitation of the focus of inquiry;
 ▷ the explicit postulation of public order goals; and
 ▷ the performance of intellectual tasks.
The adherents of the New Haven School contend that, in approaching 
international legal problems on a global scale, it is essential to first 
take the standpoint of an observer. They criticise what they regard as 
the usual standpoint of public international law, that is, the primacy of 
a particular group, namely the prosperous and powerful nations in the 
world. Rather, they contend the appropriate observational standpoint 
is that of the perspective of the citizens of the world community which 
is inherently linked to the future of mankind as a whole. They recom-
mend that both the scholarly inquirer and the established decision-
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maker should take a standpoint as remote from parochial interests and 
cultural biases as possible to enable them to ascertain and clarify com-
mon interests of the active participants in the different world commu-
nities. This perspective in turn influences every other aspect of related 
inquiries including how problems are defined, what goals are postu-
lated, and what intellectual skills are employed.
Recognising the important bearing of the formulation of problems, 
the New Haven School has developed an economical and compre-
hensive way of categorising problems to ease study through time and 
across community boundaries. It seeks to make problems operational 
and manageable by adopting a set of value categories borrowed from 
ethical philosophies and other normative specialists: respect ( freedom 
of choice, equality, recognition ), power ( making and influencing com-
munity decisions ), enlightenment ( gathering, processing, and dissem-
inating information and knowledge ), well-being ( safety, health, com-
fort ), wealth ( production, distribution, the consumption of goods and 
services and control of resources ), skill ( acquisition and exercise of ca-
pabilities in vocations, professions and the arts ), affection ( friendship, 
intimacy, loyalty and positive sentiments ), and rectitude ( participation 
in forming and applying norms of responsible conduct ). This compre-
hensive set of values can be characterised as representing the basic val-
ues of human dignity or of a free society.
Admittedly, the propositions and suggestions of the New Haven 
School are somewhat abstract and difficult to grasp. What do they ac-
tually suggest ? You will notice that none of the five elements of their 
policy-oriented approach mentions the category of law. They do not 
concern themselves with the question of whether the rules of public in-
ternational law are rules of law or not. They see the rules of law as an in-
strument of policy for promoting a preferred social order; the law and 
legal rules are not an end in themselves but rather dynamic, adjusting 
to reflect the policies of decision-makers. The key, then, is to focus on 
the appropriate policy and value decisions rather than on the content 
of changeable rules.
In an article in the Stanford Law Review ( 42 [ 1990 ] 811, 833 et seq.), 
Phillip R. Trimble, another US-American critical of public interna-
tional law, writes: » A quick look at the ›rules ‹ of international law shows 
why governments love international law. Contrary to the realist / ideal-
ist view of law as a restraint on unruly governments, international law 
confirms much more authority and power than it denies …. The rules 
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of international law are accordingly very congenial to governments. 
They mostly justify or legitimate the practical exercise of state power. « 
Trimble criticises traditional » rules « of public international law ( he 
doubts that they are rules in the legal sense ) as attributing too much 
power to states and legitimating the free exercise of this power, while 
conversely giving too little attention to other concerns including the 
interests of private persons and citizens, the common interest of the 
community of citizens as described by the New Haven School and the 
comprehensive set of values of mankind mentioned above.
To what extent are the rules of public international law different from 
legal rules in other fields ( criminal law, private law, constitutional law, 
etc ) ? What are the important features of a rule or norm which qualify 
it as » legal « or » law « ?
Which theory do you prefer – natural law or positivism ? Why should a 
state not be bound without its consent ? What is the basis for natural 
law – whose god or whose moral or political system ?
Do you think that the criticism by the New Haven School and Trimble 
is justified ? Are power and politics the real nature of public interna-
tional law ? Is contemporary public international law really not in the 
interest of the citizens but rather in the interest of the states and politi-
cal elites ? If you share their criticism or parts of it: how could public 
international law be improved ?
II.  Public international law and  
Austrian domestic law
Having studied some of the intellectual foundations of public inter-
national law, let us now turn to more practical questions such as: the 
relationship between domestic Austrian law and the sources of public 
international law, the role and rank of customary public international 
law as part of the Austrian legal system or rather as an independent 
source of law and finally, the role of Austrian state institutions in the 
conclusion of an international treaty and its ratification.
Public International Law
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There are two concepts explaining the relationship between the 
nature of public international law and domestic law. The concept of 
» dualism « contends that public international law and domestic law are 
two separate, different legal systems which co-exist in the realm of law. 
According to the concept of » monism «, there is only one legal system: 
one school of monism views public international law as domestic law 
in as much as it cannot come into existence without the assistance of 
domestic law whereas the other school of monism contends that do-
mestic law is nothing more than a special form of public international 
law as public international law is superior to domestic law and is the 
basis and foundation of the existence of domestic law. If one shares the 
view of » monists «, either accepting that public international law is per 
definition domestic law or that domestic law is per definition public 
international law, one needs to address the further issue of how public 
international law becomes part of the domestic legal system and how 
it can be applicable in the domestic legal system.
Only the dualistic approach raises the question of how public in-
ternational law can be valid under the domestic legal system. There 
are three possible answers to this question: First, the rule of public 
international law may be assimilated into the domestic legal system 
by a statutory act of transformation performed by a domestic state in-
stitution, normally the parliament. Second, states and their govern-
ments are involved in the creation of public international law rules 
( state practice, conclusion of a treaty by executive organs of the state ). 
They also have authority to create domestically valid law by giving their 
consent to the creation of public international law. The rule of public 
law is then automatically incorporated into domestic law ( » adoption « ). 
There is no need for a transformation statute. Domestic courts have to 
apply the rules of public international law once they are in force in the 
public international law arena. According to a third theory, the rules of 
public international law are neither absorbed into domestic law by an 
act of transformation nor automatically incorporated into the domes-
tic system ( adoption ) but remain independent rules of public interna-
tional law. The rules of public international law only become applica-
ble in the domestic legal system via an order of application.
One of the key differences between the first and second theories ( ac-
cording to which the rules of public international law are transformed 
into norms of domestic law ) and the third theory ( according to which 
the rules remain rules of public international law ) is that once the rule 
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has become a domestic rule it can be amended and repealed like any 
other norm of domestic law by, for instance, the enactment of a domes-
tic statute to this effect. This change, of course, only takes effect within 
the domestic system, not within public international law and the state 
effecting this change will accordingly be in breach of its duty under the 
international treaty. According to the third model, the national legisla-
ture cannot change the rule of public international law by passing a stat-
ute. The rule remains a rule of public international law and can only be 
changed by means of public international law, for instance, by conclud-
ing an amended treaty among the signatory states. The national institu-
tions can only apply the rules of public international law, but they can-
not change them in the same way as they can change a domestic rule.
Moreover, the third theory results in difficulties in ranking the 
rules of public international law vis-à-vis the national rules. If a do-
mestic statute cannot change the rule of public international law, is the 
latter thus superior to the domestic statute, even if it addresses matters 
that are usually regulated by ordinary domestic statutes ? According to 
the theories of transformation and adoption, the rule of public inter-
national law becomes part of the domestic legal system and thereby as-
sumes the rank of a regulation, an ordinary statute or a constitutional 
statute. But the rule of public international law can itself declare its 
own supremacy over domestic law.
As mentioned in no. 1 / 79, above, this is the case in European law. The 
treaties of the EU ( TEU and TFEU ) always have supremacy over the 
rules of domestic law – no matter according to which theory they are 
applied in the domestic system.
The Austrian approach makes a distinction between the rules of cus-
tomary international law and the rules of international treaties.
A.  Customary public international law
According to art. 9 para. 1 B-VG ( Austrian Constitution, Bundesverfas-
sungsG ), » [ t ]he generally recognised rules of international law are re-
garded as integral parts of Federal law «. This renders customary public 
international law part of Austrian federal law. No special act of trans-
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formation is necessary. Courts and administrative authorities are thus 
automatically required to apply customary public international law. 
Within the Austrian legal system, the rules of customary law have the 
rank of an » ordinary « domestic statute.
Customary rules of public international law originate from usages 
or practices which have evolved under one of three sets of circum-
stances. First, diplomatic relations between states – acts or declara-
tions by statespersons, opinions of legal advisers to state governments, 
bilateral treaties, and press releases or official statements by govern-
ment spokespersons may all constitute evidence of usages followed 
by states; second, practice of international organisations – the prac-
tice of international organisations, whether by conduct or declarations, 
may lead to the development of customary law concerning their sta-
tus, powers and responsibilities. The International Court of Justice, for 
example, based its opinion that the United Nations had international 
legal personality partially on the practice of the UN in concluding con-
ventions. Third, state laws, decisions of state courts, and state military 
or administrative practice – a concurrence of state laws or judicial deci-
sions of state courts or of state practice may suggest the general recog-
nition of a principle of ( customary ) law.
A general, although not inflexible, working guide is that before a 
usage may be considered as amounting to a customary rule of public 
international law, two tests must be satisfied: These tests relate to the 
material and the psychological aspects involved in the formation of the 
customary rule. As regards the material aspect, there must be a long-
standing consistent recurrence or repetition of the acts to give birth 
to a customary rule. The psychological aspect is better known as the 
» opinio juris « or the mutual conviction that the recurrence is the result 
of a compulsory rule.
The importance of customary public international law is, generally, 
diminishing, whereas the number and importance of international 
treaties is continuously rising. Rules of customary law deal, among 
other things, with the duties of neutrality as between states, the status 
and powers of international organisations, and questions of sovereign 
immunity.
Recall what was said in no. 1 / 9 et seq., above about the difficulty of en-
forcement of public international law. One of the main characteristics 
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of public international law is the identity of legislators and those sub-
jected to legislation. The duties of the states can normally not be en-
forced because there are no superior institutions to enforce them, and 
state courts cannot adjudicate over other states based on the latter’s 
state immunity.
B.  International treaties
International treaties are the most important and most frequently 
used source of public international law. Classical treaties of public in-
ternational law only established rights and duties among states. It is 
not important to know how these state duties were incorporated into 
domestic legal systems as state courts or agencies were not able to en-
force these duties in any case due to state immunity. However, a vast 
number of treaties not only create rights and duties among states but 
also oblige states to create directly enforceable rights and duties of pri-
vate persons in their own legal systems. The aim of these treaties is to 
create uniform ( public or private ) law within the domestic systems of 
the contracting states.
If, for instance, Austria signs a treaty on uniform technical standards 
of motor vehicles, it is obliged to incorporate these standards into its 
domestic legal system and ensure compliance with them. Another ex-
ample is the Vienna Sales Convention ( CISG ): By signing this Conven-
tion Austria was obliged to establish rights and duties of the parties of 
international sales contracts, as prescribed in the CISG, which can be 
directly enforced by the contract parties in Austrian courts. The ques-
tion thus arises: how can Austria comply with these duties of transfor-
mation, incorporation or adoption of the uniform law rules of interna-
tional treaties ?
Note, however, that not all public international law treaties – even 
those dealing with rights of individuals – intend to create directly en-
forceable rights for those individuals or create rights of individuals at 
all. Such treaties – even once they have been incorporated into the Aus-
trian legal system – are not directly enforceable by Austrian courts or 
administrative authorities. The effect of direct applicability thus only 
arises if the treaty itself intends to create this direct applicability.
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According to the rules of the Austrian Constitution ( B-VG ), the Aus-
trian federal state has the general power to conclude international trea-
ties with all countries worldwide and with international organisations. 
The Austrian federal President is competent to conclude international 
treaties on behalf of the Austrian federal state. If, however, the treaty 
changes or supplements Austrian statutory law, the President needs 
the consent of the Austrian parliament ( s ) ( » Nationalrat « with respect 
to federal statutory law or » Landtage « with respect to » Landesrecht « ). 
If the treaty changes or supplements » ordinary « statutory law, a ma-
jority decision of the parliament is required, whereas if it changes or 
supplements constitutional law, a two-third majority is necessary. Con-
sequently, treaties that do not change or supplement Austrian statu-
tory law do not need the consent of the Austrian parliament ( s ). In such 
cases, the President can delegate his or her competence to conclude the 
treaty to the federal government or even to a specific federal minister.
Figure 16: International treaties.
Generally, an international treaty that has been concluded by the com-
petent state organs ( usually President and Parliament ) is immediately 
applicable in the Austrian legal system. Depending on whether or not 
it amended existing domestic or constitutional statutes the treaty is 
treated like a regulation, an ordinary statute or a constitutional stat-
ute. Treaties that amend or supplement an administrative regulation, 
an ordinary statute or a constitutional statute have to be published in 
the » Bundesgesetzblatt « or » Landesgesetzblatt «.
There is, however, an exception to that general rule of immediate 
applicability which is stipulated in art. 50 para. 2 B-VG. In the course 
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of the conclusion of an international treaty, the competent institutions 
can decide that the treaty shall not be directly applicable in Austria un-
til it is specifically incorporated by an appropriate act. In the case of 
a treaty changing or supplementing statutory law, the Parliament can 
give its consent to the conclusion of the treaty, but determine that the 
treaty shall not be applicable until it has been adopted by a specific 
transformation statute. In such a case, Austrian courts and administra-
tive authorities can apply the provisions of the treaty only after the rele-
vant transformation statute has been passed and has entered into force. 
If no parliamentary consent to a specific treaty is necessary, the Presi-
dent or Minister him or herself can decide on a » Erfüllungsvorbehalt «.
How is customary public international law created ? How does custom-
ary public international law become applicable in the Austrian legal 
system ?
Are all international treaties part of public international law ? Which 
are the other fields of law that the rules of a treaty can be considered 
part of ?
Explain the two different models for the conclusion and transforma-
tion of a treaty in the Austrian B-VG.
Why is it important to determine whether the domestic legal system 
follows the theory of ( a ) transformation, ( b ) incorporation or ( c ) order 
of application ? Consider the three models of how ( a ) customary pub-
lic international law, ( b ) treaties without » Erfüllungsvorbehalt « and ( c ) 
treaties with » Erfüllungsvorbehalt « become applicable in the Austrian 
legal system and try to link them to the different approaches ( a ) ( b ) 
and ( c ) mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.
III.  The United Nations and its organs
A.  Introduction
The United Nations, which formally came into existence in 1945, is the 
principal international organisation designed to prevent military con-
frontations among its members and to help resolve international dis-
putes. It has also embarked on numerous other tasks, from simplifying 
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international air travel to the eradication of malaria and smallpox. The 
preamble to the UN Charter expresses the ideals and common aims of 
all those whose governments together create the United Nations.
Membership of the United Nations is open to all peace-loving na-
tions which accept the obligations of the United Nations Charter and, 
in the eyes of the organisation, are able and willing to carry out these 
obligations. Today, almost all states of the world are members of the 
UN. New Member States are admitted by the General Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Security Council. The Charter provides for the 
suspension or expulsion of a member for violation of the principles of 
the Charter, but no such action has ever been taken since the establish-
ment of the Organisation.
B.  Organs of the United Nations
The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the UN. It is 
composed of representatives of all Member States with each Member 
State having one vote. Decisions on important questions, such as rec-
ommendations on peace and security, the admission of new members 
and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority. Decisions on 
other questions are reached by a simple majority.
According to the Charter, the functions and powers of the General 
Assembly include the following:
 ▷ to consider and make recommendations on the principles of coop-
eration in the maintenance of international peace and security, in-
cluding the principles governing disarmament and the regulation 
of armaments;
 ▷ to discuss any question relating to international peace and secu-
rity and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being dis-
cussed by the Security Council, to make recommendations on it;
 ▷ to discuss and, with the same exception, make recommendations 
on any question within the scope of the Charter or affecting the 
powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations;
 ▷ to consider and approve the United Nations budget and to appor-
tion the contributions among Members;
 ▷ to elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the 
members of the Economic and Social Council and those members 
of the Trusteeship Council that are elected;
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 ▷ to elect jointly with the Security Council the Judges of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice; and
 ▷ on the recommendation of the Security Council, to appoint the Sec-
retary-General.
In accordance with the » Uniting for Peace « resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1950, the Assembly may take action if the Security 
Council, as a result of a lack of unanimity of its permanent members, 
fails to act in the face of an apparent threat to peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression. The Assembly is empowered to consider the 
matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to mem-
bers for collective measures, including, in the case of a breach of the 
peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.
There is one regular session of the General Assembly annually 
( from mid-September till mid-December ). The work of the United Na-
tions year-round derives largely from the decisions of the General As-
sembly – that is to say, the will of the majority of the members as ex-
pressed in resolutions adopted by the Assembly. That work is carried 
out by committees and other bodies established by the Assembly, in-
ternational conferences called for by the Assembly and by the Secretar-
iat of the United Nations ( the Secretary-General and his or her staff of 
international civil servants ).
On 15 March 2006, the General Assembly adopted the resolution 
A / RES / 60 / 251 to establish the Human Rights Council as a subsidiary 
organ of the General Assembly. The United States, the Marshall Is-
lands, Palau, and Israel voted against the Council’s creation, claiming 
that it would have too little power and that there were insufficient safe-
guards to prevent human rights-abusing nations from taking control. 
The Human Rights Council is based in Geneva and replaces the Com-
mission on Human Rights.
The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Char-
ter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. It con-
sists of 15 Member States: five permanent members – China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – and 10 members 
elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Each member of 
the Council has one vote. Decisions on substantive matters require 
nine votes including the concurring votes of all five permanent mem-
bers. This is the rule of » great power unanimity «, often referred to as 
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the » veto « power. All five permanent members have exercised the right 
of veto at one time or another. However, if a permanent member does 
not support a decision but does not wish to block it through a veto, it 
may abstain.
Under the Charter, all members of the United Nations agree to ac-
cept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other 
organs of the United Nations make recommendations to national gov-
ernments, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which 
Member States are obliged to comply with in terms of the Charter.
Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Coun-
cil are:
 ▷ to maintain peace and security in accordance with the principles 
and purposes of the United Nations;
 ▷ to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to interna-
tional friction and to recommend methods of adjusting such dis-
putes or the terms of settlement;
 ▷ to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggres-
sion and to recommend what action should be taken;
 ▷ to call on members to apply economic sanctions and other meas-
ures not involving the use of force in order to prevent or stop ag-
gression;
 ▷ to take military action against the aggressor;
 ▷ to recommend the admission of new members and the terms on 
which states may become parties of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice;
 ▷ to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the 
Secretary-General; and
 ▷ together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International 
Court.
The Economic and Social Council ( ECOSOC ) was established by the 
Charter as the principal organ to coordinate the economic and social 
work of the United Nations and the specialised agencies and institu-
tions – known as the » United Nations family « of organisations. The 
ECOSOC has 54 members who serve for three years. Each year 18 mem-
bers are elected for a three-year term to replace 18 members whose 
three-year term has expired.
Under the Charter, the ECOSOC may consult with non-governmen-
tal organisations ( NGOs ) which are concerned with matters within the 
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Council’s competence. The Council recognises that such NGOs should 
have the opportunity to express their views and that they are frequently 
in possession of special experience or technical knowledge of value to 
the Council and its work. Today, over 3,000 NGOs have consultative sta-
tus with the Council. NGOs which have been given consultative status 
may send observers to public meetings of the Council and its subsidi-
ary bodies and may submit statements relevant to the Council’s work.
The Charter sets up an International Trusteeship System to pro-
mote the advancement of the inhabitants of trust territories and their 
progressive development towards self-government and independence. 
In November 1994, the Trusteeship Council temporarily suspended op-
eration due to the independence of the last UN trust territory. Although 
the Trusteeship Council remains one of the principal organs of the UN, 
it will no longer meet on an annual basis but, rather, only if a situation 
requires its attention.
The International Court of Justice or ICJ in The Hague ( Nether-
lands ) is designated to be the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations ( see artt. 92–96 UN Charter ). The activities of the ICJ are also 
based on the separate Statute of the International Court of Justice. The 
ICJ is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of nine 
years. Every three years, one third of the Court is elected, or re-elected. 
The UN General Assembly and Security Council are responsible for 
electing the judges from a list of candidates provided to the Secretary-
General by national groups appointed by the individual governments. 
No two judges may be nationals of the same state. The parties to a dis-
pute in front of the ICJ have, generally, no influence on the composi-
tion of the Court. However, if none of the judges is a national of the 
state which is a party to the dispute, this state has the right to elect a 
judge who becomes an ad hoc member of the Court only with respect 
to that dispute. The Court decides with majority decision.
Only states can be parties in cases before the ICJ. A case involving 
private persons can never be brought before the ICJ. The court has ju-
risdiction over two types of cases – contentious cases and cases seek-
ing an advisory opinion. The jurisdiction in contentious cases is based 
on the consent of the parties, either express or implied. Non-Member 
States of the UN can also become parties by voluntarily subjecting 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Consent may be given on 
an ad hoc basis or by prior agreement, for example by provision in an 
international agreement granting the court jurisdiction over a dispute 
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between parties to that agreement concerning its interpretation or ap-
plication. Contentious cases may also be brought under the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the court between states that have made a general 
declaration to recognise the jurisdiction of the court as compulsory in 
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation. Austria has 
made such a general declaration.
Usually, the court is called upon to decide » legal disputes «, for in-
stance, disputes regarding the interpretation and application of inter-
national treaties. But the Court may also accept a case submitted to 
it by the parties even though it involves a political rather than a legal 
dispute. In such a case the Court is in effect asked to decide the case 
» ex aequo et bono «, and not according to international legal principles 
which do not exist in such cases as the question is a political and not 
a legal one.
While the advisory opinions of the ICJ are not binding, the judg-
ments that the ICJ renders in contentious cases are binding upon the 
parties. If a party fails to comply with the judgment of the court, any 
other party may call on the Security Council to enforce the judgment. 
The council may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or 
decide upon measures – such as economic measures provided for in 
art. 41 of the Charter – to give effect to the judgment. Members of the 
UN have agreed to accept and carry out any such decision of the Secu-
rity Council.
The ICJ should not be confused with, for instance, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone ( SCSL ) – in part also situated at The Hague, which is 
not a permanent court but rather an ad hoc court that was set up by the 
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to adjudicate in-
ternational criminal cases that have occurred in the territory of Sierra 
Leone since 30 November 1996. For instance, on 26 April 2012 this court 
ruled unanimously that the former Liberian president Charles Taylor 
was guilty of several counts of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. In the preceding trial former model Naomi Campbell gave evidence 
that she was handed so-called » blood diamonds « by men working for 
Charles Taylor.
The International Criminal Tribunal ( ICT ) decides on accusations 
against individuals who have allegedly committed one of the criminal 
offences defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal. 
These criminal offences were partly derived from international con-
ventions on international criminal law, from customary public inter-
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national law, for example, in the case of genocide, or crimes against 
humanity or newly defined, such as several types of severe war crimes.
Neither the ICT nor the SCSL should be confused with the permanent 
International Criminal Court ( ICC ) which was also established in The 
Hague. It is based on a Convention ( the » Statute of Rome « ) and has no 
connection with the UN. The Statute of the Court – which was approved 
by a vote among the 120 states participating in the Rome meeting – en-
tered into force after ratification by 60 states. As of today, over 100 states 
have joined the Convention. The USA, China and Israel voted against 
the Convention and the Statute of the Court and declared that they 
would not ratify it. The abstention of the USA is generally considered 
a serious concern for the development of the jurisdiction of the Court.
The criminal offences that can be brought before the ICC are defined in 
the Statute of the Court. They include genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, such as widespread or systematic extermination of 
civilians, enslavement, torture, rape, forced pregnancy, persecution on 
political, racial, ethnic, or religious grounds, and enforced disappear-
ances. An alleged criminal can be accused and brought before the ICC 
if he or she is either a national of a ratifying state or the crime was al-
legedly committed in the territory of a ratifying state. Additionally, the 
UN Security Council can refer the situation to the Prosecutor, irrespec-
tive of the location of the crime or the nationality of the accused. How-
ever, the jurisdiction of the ICC covers only events which took place 
after 1 July 2002.
It is noteworthy that the ICC may deal with cases that occurred exclu-
sively on the territory of one state and that involved only private indi-
viduals. The crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICT and the 
ICC are of such severity that they are regarded as concerning not only 
the state of occurrence but the whole community of nations. Thus, the 
enforcing institutions are of international as opposed to national char-
acter. The ICC operates according to the principle of » complementa-
rity «, that is, only when national courts are unable or unwilling to pros-
ecute the respective crimes. The SCSL, however, can claim primacy and 
is thus permitted to take over national proceedings at any time if it is 
considered that this would be in the interests of international justice. 
The criminal law defining the relevant crimes is considered to be a part 
of public international law.
The Secretariat assists the other organs of the UN and administers the 
programs and policies laid down by them. The head of the Secretariat 
is the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the General Assembly 
on the recommendation of the Security Council. As one of his many 
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functions, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Se-
curity Council any matter which, in his or her opinion, threatens in-
ternational peace and security, and may use his or her good offices to 
help resolve international disputes. The over 25.000 civil servants of 
the Secretariat in the UN Headquarters in New York and in offices and 
centres all around the world take an oath not to seek or receive instruc-
tions from any government or outside authority. Under art. 100 of the 
UN Charter, each Member State undertakes to respect the exclusively 
international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General 
and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
duties.
What are the functions and powers of the General Assembly of the UN ?
What is the content of the » Uniting for Peace « Resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly ?
Which states are members of the Security Council and how do they 
vote ?
What is the Economic and Social Council and what does it do ?
Which are the competences of the ICJ ? Which states are bound by its 
decisions ?
Which are the differences between the SCSL and the ICC ?
What are the functions and powers of the UN Secretary-General ?
IV.  The protection of peace and security
It is generally accepted that the main spheres of contemporary pub-
lic international law are the protection of peace and the international 
economic order, the protection of human rights, and the creation and 
support of sustainable development. The following two chapters are 
dedicated to two of these main areas, namely the protection of peace 
and security and the protection of human rights, which are also key 
purposes of the UN as enumerated in art. 1 UN Charter.
Public International Law
The protection of peace and security
Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law
Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law
3/44
?
104 Public International Law   
¶   Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law
A.  The prohibition of the use of force
The general prohibition of the use of force is laid down in art. 2 para. 4 
UN Charter.
» All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations. «
According to the general scholarly view, the prohibition of the use of 
force under art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter can only be violated by a legal 
subject of public international law. The classical subjects of public in-
ternational law are states and international organisations, not private 
groups, individuals or companies. The latter are regarded as subjects 
of public international law only in particular fields of this area of law, 
particularly in the area of human rights, and in this context are en-
dowed with certain rights against states or international organisations 
rather than being burdened with duties of public international law.
On 3 October 2012 a shell fired from Syria into the Turkish town of 
Akçakale killed five Turkish citizens and wounded several others. The 
Turkish military retaliated within the next 2 hours by firing artillery 
salvos against Syrian targets over 3 days.
However, subsequent reports made clear that the shells fired into Tur-
key were of NATO origin and assumedly not launched by the Syrian 
military but rebel groups. As these groups cannot be associated with 
the Syrian state the question arises whether the attack falls within the 
scope of art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter.
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in 
New York and several other targets were carried out by private groups 
rather than by a particular state. Again it is unclear whether such at-
tacks also fall within the scope of art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter.
The general prohibition of the use of force also includes measures of 
force against a state that do not amount to war-like operations. Arti-
cle 2 para. 4 UN Charter therefore applies to all kinds of measures di-
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rected against a state that are carried out by arms, including the deliv-
ery of arms or the logistical support of the delivery of arms which may 
amount to such a measure of force. It is disputed whether economic or 
political pressure in this regard is also included in the ambit of art. 2 
para. 4 UN Charter.
The prohibition of the use of force is generally not applicable to the 
use of force by a state against members of its own population within 
the boundaries of that state. An exception is where such internal use 
of force amounts to a threat to or breach of international peace and se-
curity in the sense of art. 1 para. 1 UN Charter. In this case the prohibi-
tion of the use of force under art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter may be violated.
B.  The right of self-defence
There are two important exceptions to art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter, namely 
the right of self-defence according to art. 51 UN Charter and the system 
of collective security under artt. 39–50 UN Charter.
The right of self-defence is laid down in art. 51 UN Charter: » Nothing in 
this Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Mem-
bers in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. «
The right of self-defence exists only under the following circumstances:
 ▷ There must be an armed attack against a Member State of the UN;
 ▷ The act of self-defence must follow the armed attack directly and 
must be proportionate to the attack; and
 ▷ The measure of self-defence taken by a state must be immediately 
reported to the UN Security Council. The defending state must give 
the Security Council the possibility to deal with the incident and in 
the system of collective security ( artt. 39–50 UN Charter ).
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On the face of the retaliation attacks within 2 hours, the line taken by 
the Turkish government in the Akçakale incident was arguably that its 
actions were an » immediate reaction « to the Syrian attacks in the sense 
of art. 51 UN Charter.
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which were attributed 
to Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban-government of Afghani-
stan, the USA reacted via an air attack against Afghanistan on 7 Octo-
ber 2001. The USA justified its reaction as an » immediate reaction « to 
the terrorist attacks in the sense of art. 51 UN Charter. Many scholars, 
however, doubt that the requirement of a direct and immediate reac-
tion was met. It is argued that the USA first amassed allies to support 
its military operation against Afghanistan and made other necessary 
preparations which resulted in delay in its reaction.
Any measure of force that does not amount to an » armed attack « in the 
sense of art. 51 UN Charter does not give the attacked state the right 
to defend itself. Therefore, the terms » force « used in art. 2 para. 4 UN 
Charter and » armed attack « in art. 51 UN Charter are not synonymous.
The requirement of a direct and immediate reaction to the armed 
attack is generally defined with reference to a 1837 British / US-Ameri-
can case ( Caroline case ) where it was stated that the necessity for self-
defence must be » instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation «.
The requirement of proportionality limits the kind and intensity of 
the defence measure. The measure must be determined by the need to 
defend one’s self and should not exceed the means and intensity neces-
sary for defence. The traditional approach forbids measures that exceed 
the needs of self-defence as these aim to punish the attacking state.
In that sense it is certainly questionable whether the US military opera-
tions against Afghanistan – leading to the removal of the Taliban-re-
gime – were proportionate in the sense of art. 51 UN Charter. Certainly, 
in the original sense of the proportionality requirement, they were not. 
The removal of a generally dangerous regime ready to use force inside 
and outside its territory may, however, be interpreted as a measure 
of » preventive self-defence « ( see no. 3 / 56, below ). It is argued that its 
removal was necessary to maintain international peace and security, 
which is one of the main purposes of the UN ( see no. 3 / 44, above ).
Since 2004 the US military makes use of unmanned robots, so-called 
» drones « to strike at suspected Taliban fighters not only in Afghani-
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stan but also in Pakistan and elsewhere. The US administration upheld 
that the US has been subjected to an armed attack by another nation, 
namely Afghanistan and thus responds militarily in self-defence.
The proponents of these drones say that it offers a precision way of 
hitting targets without the potentially disastrous deployment of US 
manpower abroad. However, critics point out that drone strikes fre-
quently cause civilian casualties; the London-based Bureau of Inves-
tigative Journalism tracks drone casualties, and estimates that in Pa-
kistan alone 366 strikes have killed up to 3.581 people, with 884 being 
innocent civilians.
Again, with regard to these numbers, it is questionable whether these 
drone strikes are proportional – especially as they are not limited to the 
state against which the US arguably defends itself.
The duty to report every measure of self-defence to the Security Coun-
cil expresses the priority of measures of collective security ( artt. 39–50 
UN Charter ) over the right of self-defence of single states. Unilateral 
self-defence shall only be applied if measures of collective security 
are not taken or would come too late. This view is, however, disputed 
because the right of self-defence is based on customary public inter-
national law ( » inherent right « ) and accordingly exists independently 
of the UN Charter as a customary right. It is argued that this custom-
ary right of self-defence may therefore not depend on a confirmation 
by the Security Council. According to this view, the right of self-de-
fence may be exercised independently of the UN system of collective 
security.
In the case of an armed attack, the attacked state may defend itself 
or may be assisted by other states in defending itself. Art. 51 UN Char-
ter expressly allows such measures of collective self-defence ( » right of 
individual or collective self-defence « ). It is on the basis of this article 
that many international treaties which oblige their contracting states 
to assist each other in cases of armed attacks by other states have been 
concluded. The most important of these military assistance treaties is 
the NATO-Treaty.
In the example of the Akçakale incident, the Turkish government re-
ferred to its right to self-defence under art. 51 of the UN Charter. Fol-
lowing Ankara’s invocation of the respective artt. in the NATO treaties, 
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NATO’s North Atlantic Council stated that the alliance: » … demands 
the immediate cessation of such aggressive acts against an ally, and 
urges the Syrian regime to put an end to flagrant violations of interna-
tional law … «. On 9 October 2012, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen reported that NATO has completed making plans to defend 
Turkey from Syrian attacks.
It is highly disputed whether the UN Charter and customary public 
international law permit measures of » preventive self-defence «. Pre-
ventive self-defence takes place when a state ( or a number of states ) 
applies ( apply ) measures of force against another state which has yet 
to carry out an armed attack against the first state ( s ) but which is as-
sumed to be a threat ( imminent danger of attack ) to such states. The 
wording of art. 51 UN Charter, namely, » if an armed attack occurs « 
seems to exclude preventive self-defence. State practice with respect 
to such a right of preventive self-defence is not uniform, but, follow-
ing the Iraq war in 2003, the majority opinion seems to deny the exist-
ence of such a right. The right of preventive self-defence would endan-
ger the aim of the UN Charter’s system of collective security to reduce 
the unilateral application of force by single states to a minimum as it 
would leave it up to each individual state to evaluate whether a threat 
of an armed attack exists which would justify a defence measure. If 
such self-evaluations and the resulting applications of force were al-
lowed, a single state could confront the Security Council with a fait ac-
compli leaving to it no further possibility to decide.
The US military drone strikes on Islamic militants’ hideouts in Paki-
stan since 2004 arguably exceeding the self-defence permitted under 
the proportionality requirement of art. 51 are currently justified by the 
US administration as acts of preventive self-defence, that is, the pre-
vention of future terrorist attacks which might occur in the USA and 
other states in the world as well as the US assumption that the US can 
act in preventive self-defence to protect US and the coalition soldiers in 
Afghanistan, if neighbouring countries such as Pakistan are unwilling 
or unable to crack down on militants.
As explained above, the self-defence of a single state and its allies 
against terrorist attacks faces a number of legal problems:
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 ▷ It must be possible to attribute the terrorist attacks, which are nor-
mally carried out by private groups, to a particular state. If this ter-
rorist group ( like Islamic militants ) has its central organisation in 
a certain state ( formerly Afghanistan, today more likely also else-
where ), but is not actively supported by this state, there is no » armed 
attack « by this state. If the terrorist attack cannot be attributed to a 
certain state, the defending states are not permitted to direct their 
defence measures against this state under art. 51 UN Charter.
 ▷ One must determine whether the terrorist attack was an » armed 
attack « in the sense of art. 51 UN Charter. If we take the example 
of the Pakistan drone strikes, it is questionable whether the opera-
tions of Islamic militants in Pakistan amounts to an armed attack 
under art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter against the USA.
 ▷ One must also determine which self-defence reaction is justifiable. 
Traditionally, the self-defence measure must constitute an immedi-
ate and proportionate reaction. The drone strikes resulting in civil 
casualties are likely not a proportionate measure.
 ▷ Measures of preventive self-defence, where a single state or a num-
ber of states determine for themselves what constitutes a threat to 
» international peace and security « in the sense of art. 1 para. 1 UN 
Charter and decide to prevent such a threat by the use of military 
force, are not covered by the UN Charter ( art. 51 ) or by customary 
public international law.
C.  The system of collective security
The system of collective security ( art. 39–50 UN Charter ) is based on 
the absolute prohibition of force in art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter. The sys-
tem directs the collective powers of the Members of the system against 
a potential or actual aggressor from outside or from within the sys-
tem. In this respect the Security Council has two basic competences. 
It determines whether a certain use of force by a state is a violation of 
the general prohibition of force and it decides which sanctions will be 
taken by the system against the aggressor.
These two competences of the Security Council are laid down in art. 39 
UN Charter.
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» The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Artt. 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. «
The » act of aggression « is defined by Resolution 3314 ( XXIX ) of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the UN. However, in practice the » threat to the peace « 
and the » breach of the peace « in the sense of art. 1 para. 1 UN Char-
ter plays the most important role. These notions comprise » armed at-
tacks « in the sense of art. 51 UN Charter as well as violations of the 
prohibition of force in art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter. In addition they also 
comprise situations of » threat to the peace « which precede a potential 
breach of the peace. A threat to the peace may also comprise internal 
measures of a state against its own population or arise in civil wars 
resulting in, for instance, extreme suffering by the population or vio-
lations of human rights. In these cases, particularly where there is a 
mass movement of refugees to neighboring countries, there is the pos-
sibility of destabilisation of the entire region, which could in turn be-
come a serious concern for international peace and security. According 
to the resolutions of the Security Council, international peace and se-
curity may also be threatened by internal conflicts that do not cause se-
rious negative effects on other states if they include serious violations 
of public international law, such as ethnic cleansing or other severe 
violations of human rights and crimes against humanity.
This broad interpretation of art. 39 UN Charter ( » threat to the 
peace « ) by the Security Council confirms the widely held conviction 
in modern public international law that severe domestic violations of 
basic duties of public international law, such as crimes against human-
ity and extreme violations of human rights, are no longer viewed as 
the private affair of the particular state in question in the sense of the 
» domaine réservé « described in art. 2 para. 7 UN Charter. Rather, such 
violations constitute a concern for the world community and impose a 
duty on the UN ( Security Council ) to react. Thus art. 39 UN Charter em-
powers the Security Council to adopt measures in pure domestic situ-
ations of conflict in cases of, for example, race discrimination, ethnic 
cleansing and other severe violations of human rights: these measures 
are called » humanitarian interventions «.
Where Chapter VII of the UN Charter is applicable according to its 
art. 39, the Security Council may order two types of sanctions to be ex- 
ecuted:
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 ▷ » measures not involving the use of armed force « ( art. 41 UN Char-
ter ) and
 ▷ » action by air, sea, or land forces « ( art. 42 UN Charter ).
Peaceful measures, according to art. 41 UN Charter, may be partial or 
complete economic boycotts, the interruption of traffic by rail, sea and 
air, the interruption of communication facilities like postal services, 
telegraphs, radio, etc. or the severance of diplomatic relations. If the 
Security Council is of the opinion that peaceful measures would be 
inadequate or if such measures prove to be ineffective, it can resort to 
measures involving the use of military force according to art. 42 UN 
Charter. The UN does not have its own military forces. On the basis 
of artt. 42 and 48 UN Charter, the Security Council thus regularly au-
thorises one or a number of Member States to carry out the military 
sanctions required by the respective Security Council Resolution. The 
Security Council also frequently uses its power to order measures to 
be executed in so-called » post-conflict situations «. Examples are the 
foundation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ( SCSL ) ( see no. 3 / 42, 
above ), arms control by the Security Council in the wake of a war and 
the indemnification for consequences of a war.
When the Security Council acts, under chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter, to restore international peace and security in the case of a breach 
of peace, threat to peace, or act of aggression, it can depart from the 
rules of public international law such as the prohibition of the use of 
force or the prohibition to interfere with the home affairs of a state as 
far as this is necessary to achieve the higher goal of international peace 
and security. The Security Council has to date not sanctioned the use 
of armed force against an aggressor directly, but has approved various 
humanitarian interventions or collective measures of Member States 
in or against a state contrary to the general prohibition of interference 
in domestic affairs. It has, however, never approved such measures di-
rected against one of the permanent Members of the Council.
As you can see, the deficiencies of the system of collective security 
primarily arise from the veto-power of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council ( USA, Great Britain, France, Russia and China ). 
It is impossible for the Security Council to take measures or sanctions 
against violations in the sense of art. 39 UN Charter which were com-
mitted by one of its permanent members or a country one of the per-
manent members has an interest in protecting. Thus, in many cases, 
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sanctions under Chapter VII UN Charter which would be necessary 
and just according to the rules of public international law, cannot be 
ordered by the Security Council. The system of collective security can 
at any time be completely blocked by one of the permanent Member 
States of the Council, even if the overwhelming majority of all other 
Member States supports the action proposed by the Security Council. 
The actions of the Security Council raise two sets of concerns. First, 
can the Security Council endorse any measure taken by one or more 
Member State ( s ) against an aggressor even if this measure manifestly 
violates rules of public international law ? Is there any legal limit to its 
activities ? How far can the Security Council go in endorsing or toler-
ating the abuse of the right of self-defence by single states ? Second, 
the dominance of the five permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil results in unequal treatment of nations by the acts of the Security 
Council, on the one hand, and a paralysation of the Council as an 
organ of a community-oriented system of collective security, on the 
other hand. This is illustrated by the inability to include Germany, Ja-
pan and Brazil as permanent members due to the veto of certain per-
manent members.
D.  » Interventions « without authorisation  
by the Security Council
As described above, the relationship between ordinary self-defence in 
the sense of art. 51 UN Charter and the system of collective security is 
not entirely clear. Some argue that the » inherent « customary right of 
self-defence is more or less independent of the system of collective se-
curity in Chapter VII UN Charter, while others give priority to the Secu-
rity Council in exercising its powers according to Chapter VII. It is clear, 
however, that where the Security Council is notified of a measure of 
self-defence and it does not react to the armed attack against a state by 
ordering the appropriate measures according to Chapter VII UN Char-
ter, the defending state can defend itself, either alone or together with 
its allies ( collective self-defence ).
But what if the Security Council remains inactive in a case where 
there is a » threat to the peace « ( art. 39 UN Charter ) which does not in-
volve an » armed attack « against another state in the sense of art. 51 UN 
Charter ?
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In the example of the drone strikes, the US administration assumes 
that Pakistan is unwilling or unable to crack down on Islamic militants. 
Do single states have the right to intervene without the Security Coun-
cil’s authorisation ? In the case of Pakistan no such authorisation by 
the Security Council for military action exists.
Syria’s widening civil war and the growing toll on civilians have raised a 
debate about the international community’s responsibility to mount a 
humanitarian intervention by outside forces. However, Russian ( along 
with Chinese ) officials have vowed to block further efforts at Security 
Council-endorsed interventions even amid humanitarian suffering. 
Again, could single states or a group of states intervene on humanitar-
ian grounds ?
Neither art. 51 UN Charter nor the collective security provisions of 
Chapter VII UN Charter provide such a right of single- or collective-
state-intervention in internal conflicts, usually, however, only for hu-
manitarian purposes. It is argued that severe internal violations of ba-
sic rules of public international law constitute a threat to international 
peace and security in the sense of art. 1 para. 1 UN Charter and it is one 
of the UN’s main goals to maintain international peace and security. 
Accordingly, such violations may well constitute a violation of the gen-
eral prohibition of force in art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter. If, however, the 
Security Council is blocked by one of its permanent members and thus 
cannot carry out the goal of art. 1 para. 1 UN Charter, it is argued that 
the Member States should have the right to step in and carry out its job. 
If such unauthorised interventions by the USA occur frequently and 
are accepted by the community of the UN Member States, a customary 
right to carry out such interventions might develop.
The disadvantage of such a new customary right is the danger of 
abuse by states as states normally act more in their own interest than 
in the interest of the community of all states. They might, for example, 
determine a need to intervene when it is convenient to intervene and 
destabilise a regime for ulterior political purposes. If an unauthorised 
humanitarian intervention does not constitute such an abuse, it can be 
said that such an intervention is » technically illegal « because no right 
to intervene exists neither on the basis of the UN Charter, nor on the 
basis of customary public international law, but seems to be » morally 
legitimate «.
Questions ▷
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To whom is the general prohibition of threat and use of force in art. 2 
para. 4 UN Charter addressed ?
What are the two important exceptions to art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter ?
What are the requirements for legal measures of self-defence under 
art. 51 UN Charter ?
What is collective self-defence and is it permissible ?
What is preventive self-defence and is it permissible ?
What are the requirements for the application of Chapter VII UN Char-
ter ( collective security ) ? Who determines whether these requirements 
are met ?
What measures can the Security Council adopt under Chapter VII UN 
Charter ?
Why is the system of collective security under Chapter VII UN Charter 
considered » ineffective « ?
May interventions be carried out by states without authorisation by the 
Security Council ?
V.  The protection of human rights
A.  The historical development of human rights  
in public international law
Although the idea that human beings are inherently entitled to certain 
fundamental rights and freedoms has its roots in early human think-
ing, the concept that human rights are an appropriate subject of pub-
lic international law is relatively new. Throughout most of human his-
tory, the way one government treated its own citizens was considered 
solely its own business and not a proper concern of any other nation 
( see no. 3 / 1 et seq., above ). States, therefore, had certain public inter-
national law duties regarding the treatment of foreign citizens on their 
territory, but no public international law duties with respect to their 
own citizens.
Most of what we now regard as » international human rights law « 
has emerged only since 1945, when, in the wake of the holocaust and 
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other Nazi denials of human rights, the nations of the world decided 
that the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms should 
be one of the principal purposes of the new United Nations Organisa-
tion. To implement this purpose, the UN Charter established general 
obligations requiring UN Member States to respect human rights and 
provided for the creation of a Human Rights Commission to protect 
and advance those rights. UN concern with and involvement in human 
rights has expanded dramatically since its origins in 1945.
Numerous international instruments have been adopted, including 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( UDHR ) and the Genocide 
Convention in 1948; the Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
in 1952; the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in 
1957; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination in 1965; and the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966.
Increased UN involvement in human rights matters during this period 
was mirrored by growing regional interest in human rights questions, 
as illustrated by the entry into force in 1953 and subsequent evolution 
of the European Convention on Human Rights ( ECHR ), the formation 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1960, and the 
entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights in 1978.
The rapid growth of UN membership in the early 1960s due to the ac-
cession of a significant number of African and other developing nations, 
who brought with them problematic issues concerning self-determina-
tion and racial discrimination, particularly in southern Africa, and the 
growing emphasis by Arab countries on human rights aspects of the Pal-
estine question, resulted in these human rights issues assuming a lead-
ing role in UN politics. US congressional action, based on international 
human rights principles, and the US Presidents’ position post Jimmy 
Carter that international human rights should play a leading role in US 
foreign policy raised interest in human rights, not only in the USA, but 
also in the rest of the world. The international human rights movement 
received further attention when the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1977 was 
awarded to Amnesty International for its human rights work for » prison-
ers of conscience «. Since then, many individual human rights activists 
have received the Nobel Prize for Peace over the years.
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B.  The sources of human rights
Public international human rights law is derived from a variety of 
sources and involves many kinds of materials, both international and 
national. The following examples illustrate the many different types of 
materials.
1.  Multilateral treaties
There are now over twenty important multilateral treaties in force in 
the field of human rights law which create legally binding obligations 
for those nations that are parties to the treaties. The system of enforce-
ment of the established human rights is, however, different from treaty 
to treaty. Some treaties, like the ECHR, establish institutions of their 
own ( European Court of Human Rights ) which guarantee relatively ef-
fective enforcement through individual claims. Other possible means 
of enforcement include complaints filed with the appropriate political 
or juridical institutions by states against other states that have alleg-
edly violated the human rights provisions of the respective convention; 
some complaint systems also permit human rights organisations to 
act as complainants.
As mentioned above, the ECHR, which establishes human rights that 
can be directly enforced by individuals against Member States in na-
tional courts as well as before the European Court of Human Rights 
( ECtHR ) in Strasbourg, is an important example of an international hu-
man rights treaty. The person alleging a violation of his or her human 
rights under the ECHR must first bring the claim to the court of last 
resort in the national court system before he or she can appeal to the 
ECtHR. Other examples of key human rights treaties include the UN 
Charter, which is binding on almost every country in the world, and the 
various UN sponsored human rights conventions ( see no. 3 / 70, above ).
2.  International declarations, resolutions and 
recommendations
Other » sources « are the international declarations, resolutions, and 
recommendations regarding international human rights that have 
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been adopted by the UN or other international organisations or con-
ventions. While these international instruments are not directly bind-
ing in the legal sense, they establish broadly recognised standards 
that are frequently invoked in connection with human rights issues. 
Under certain circumstances these standards could develop into cus-
tomary public international law and, thereby, assume a legally binding 
character. Instruments which do not develop into customary law are 
not legally binding but they nevertheless exercise a certain practical 
or moral authority in international and state politics: they are not for-
mal » sources of law « but rather so-called » soft law «. » Soft law rules « are 
rules which, while not legally binding sources of law, nevertheless exer-
cise significant influence in legal practice in the specific field of public 
international law.
The most important of these » soft law « instruments is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1948, which has provided a framework for much of the UN’s subsequent 
work in this sphere. Other examples are the 1975 Final Act of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( Helsinki Accord ); the 
UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected 
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment; the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child; and the Stand-
ard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
3.  National statutes and constitutions
Another layer of human rights sources are national statutes and con-
stitutions. Some of the fundamental rights in national law sources 
are not understood as » human rights « in the universal sense that they 
are granted to all human beings living in that state, but rather as fun-
damental or constitutional rights of the citizens of the state. Funda-
mental rights which pertain only to citizens do not bind the state with 
respect to its treatment of foreign nationals. Thus, while the human 
rights protected by international treaties, like the ECHR, generally 
guarantee rights to all persons, the fundamental rights and freedoms 
granted by national sources do not always do so.
4. Jurisdiction ▷
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4.  Jurisdiction
Finally, you also have to take into account the jurisdiction of national 
and international institutions relevant to the protection of human 
rights, in particular, the jurisdiction of the ECtHR where the court con-
strues the human rights provisions of the ECHR.
C.  The enforcement of human rights
The effective enforcement of human rights is the key to ensuring that 
the system of public international human rights law is effective but has 
to date proven difficult. Not all human rights can as easily be enforced 
as those in the ECHR before the ECtHR. A key effect of human rights 
treaties is the considerable reduction of the sovereign powers of the 
Member States. This is a delicate subject in public international law 
and, thus, even a human rights court with relatively extensive compe-
tence to adjudicate in this field, such as the ECtHR, is at times reluc-
tant to give the human rights a wider scope and meaning than a na-
tional court in the same situation would have done in order to interfere 
with the sovereign powers of the Member States no more than is abso-
lutely necessary. International human rights courts and other similar 
institutions, therefore, tend to be rather conservative in the interpreta-
tion of human rights.
Treaties other than the ECHR generally have a much less effective 
enforcement system. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for 
example, has only received consent to its jurisdiction by a few states, 
whereas the jurisdiction of the ECtHR is accepted and respected by all 
Member States of the ECHR. Moreover, international courts – unlike 
the ECtHR – are generally open only to states as complainants and 
not to individuals. Finally, even if international courts are in some 
cases granted jurisdiction to render judgments against nations vio-
lating human rights, there is no international executive power to en-
force such orders. Some human rights treaties have not established 
any specific courts or other enforcement institutions. Consequently, 
international human rights law, like almost all public international 
law, must rely heavily on voluntary compliance by states, buttressed 
by moral or other types of pressure that other nations are prepared 
to exert.
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One way of examining enforcement or implementation options is 
in terms of the » level « at which enforcement or implementation oc-
curs. International human rights obligations can be implemented, 
first, within the national systems of the state concerned ( the ECHR is, 
for instance, directly applicable before and by the national courts of 
the Member States ), secondly, by other states in the course of interna-
tional relations ( one state trying to directly exercise its influence on the 
violating state ) or, thirdly, by international bodies ( institutions like in-
ternational courts, commissions or committees created by the human 
rights convention to deal with complaints by states, human rights or-
ganisations and / or individuals ).
1.  Enforcement within the national system
The easiest and most effective way to implement human rights is via 
one’s own domestic legal system. As in all other fields of public inter-
national law, direct applicability of an international norm in the na-
tional legal system ( see no. 3 / 13 et seq., above ) accords the strongest 
protection to the bearer of the rights, namely, the individual. But not 
all international human rights treaties provide for direct effect; the 
ECHR, however, is directly applicable by national courts.
2.  Enforcement in the course of international relations
Enforcement can also occur at interstate level. Thus, one nation may 
express disapproval directly to another nation with regard to the lat-
ter’s alleged breach of human rights obligations and can bring formal 
or informal diplomatic pressure to bear on that nation to cease such 
violations. The United States, for example, has employed » quiet diplo-
macy «, public criticism and denial of military and economic assistance 
in attempts to persuade other nations to conform to their international 
human rights obligations.
3.  Enforcement by international bodies
Enforcement can also occur at the level of international organisations. 
There is a variety of international forums in which complaints of hu-
man rights violations can be raised, either by states or, in some cases, 
by individuals. Examples are:
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 ▷ the ECtHR established under the ECHR ( see no. 3 / 94 et seq., below ),
 ▷ the institution of the American Human Rights Convention and,
 ▷ state complaints under the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights.
Some international institutions – for instance UN bodies including the 
General Assembly, Security Council, Human Rights Council, or Council 
for Namibia, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and 
the review conference periodically held under the provisions of the Hel-
sinki Accord – are empowered to consider human rights matters on 
their own initiative without any formal state-to-state or other complaint.
VI.  The problems of human rights
The main treaties and declarations of international human rights are 
frequently criticised for their Western individualistic approach to the 
topic of human rights. This reflects the difficulty in reaching agree-
ment as to the nature and content of fundamental human rights 
among the more than 190 nations of the world with different cultures, 
religions, political systems, and ideologies, and at different stages of 
economic development.
Differences in perspective have emerged in the past, for example 
between Western nations, which have generally emphasised the im-
portance of civil and political rights, and the developing and social-
ist nations, which have generally emphasised the importance of eco-
nomic and social rights. Typical individual social and economic rights 
are labor law rights, rights to a certain minimum income, to social se-
curity, to affordable medical treatment, and to a healthy environment. 
The demand for economic and social fundamental rights can be ex-
plained with reference to the fact that individuals can only take advan-
tage of their political and civil freedoms if they possess the appropri-
ate economic and social means. For example, the respect for private 
property and the freedom of profession are without meaning for peo-
ple who have no property and no chance of employment. At an inter-
national level, there is growing agreement that human rights must be 
considered in their entirety and that civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights are closely linked.
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This is related in part to the practical obstacles to the enforcement 
of social and economic rights: In the Austrian legal system, there are 
no fundamental social or economic rights; ordinary Austrian statutory 
law, however, provides for a certain standard of social benefits, as well 
as for the protection of employees, tenants, and consumers, and the 
support of the unemployed. But there is no fundamental right ena-
bling citizens or individuals to demand that protection and support 
from the Austrian state. This is explained by reference to the limited 
means of the state to provide economic and social benefits. It would, 
for instance, not make sense for an individual to exercise a right to 
employment against the state because most jobs are not created by 
the state but, rather, by the private sphere, over which the state has no 
direct control. The granting of social benefits is considered a political 
question, not a legal one. Law is, therefore, not intended to restrict the 
political discretion of the legislature and the government to grant cer-
tain benefits or by imposing on it the obligation to meet fundamental 
individual rights to such benefits. In developing countries the pressure 
to provide a certain level of basic social and economic welfare to the 
citizens is much stronger than in many Western states like Austria, as 
the citizens of the former countries are more likely unable to take ad-
vantage of their civil and political rights as a result of economic con-
straints. But here again, albeit for very different reasons, the enforce-
ability of social and economic rights faces obstacles: citizens of less 
wealthy countries who are granted fundamental socio-economic rights 
against the state may well struggle to have these rights realised given 
the limited economic means of the state itself.
Some nations have pressed for greater recognition of » collective « hu-
man rights, such as the right of self-determination, the right to develop-
ment, and right to peace. Others, however, regard » collective « human 
rights as ill-defined and inconsistent with the concept of individual hu-
man rights. More generally, they express concern that international or-
ganisations have tended to label too many aspirations as » human rights «, 
which in turn detracts from the concept of human rights as a claim of 
individual freedom and dignity against the authority of the state.
Can one expect government officials to support human rights ob-
jectives and efforts impartially even if this poses foreign policy risks, or 
will they in practice only give such support selectively, when it serves 
their nation’s pragmatic policy interests ? It is apparent that many 
states apply a » double standard « in their attitudes towards human 
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rights, harshly condemning violations by political opponents, but ig-
noring equally serious violations on the part of nations with whom they 
wish to maintain good relations ( for political or economic reasons ). An 
example of the application of this double standard is the position of 
the US vis-à-vis human rights violations by Russia, China or Iraq.
Can one hope that through public international law and institutions 
the way that governments behave towards their own citizens can be pos-
itively affected or do the roots of repression, discrimination, and other 
denials of human rights lie in deeper and more complex political, social, 
and economic problems ? And as humanity faces an increasingly uphill 
struggle against the relentless pressures of population growth, resource 
depletion, environmental degradation, and economic scarcity, can one 
ever hope to ensure conditions of economic well-being in which social 
competition will become less intense and human rights can flourish ?
These problems must be taken seriously. It is neither realistic nor 
useful to pretend that public international human rights law can pro-
duce an immediate change in the way human beings and their govern-
ments behave or that it can facilitate speedy, dramatic improvement in 
the human condition. But there is some basis for modest optimism. For 
example, it is evident that the concept of international human rights 
has taken firm root and has acquired significant momentum. Even if 
governments do not often take international human rights seriously, 
the citizens of countries throughout the world are aware of these rights 
and do take them seriously. Even though in some cases governments 
have employed international human rights concepts hypocritically 
and for selfish political purposes, overall, their actions have served to 
reinforce human rights principles and establish important and con-
tinuing precedents. International human rights institutions have been 
established which, once in place, have acquired their own momentum 
independently of the states which established them, expanding their 
human rights activities in ways that governments are unable to curb. A 
few significant victories have been won and many small advances have 
been made. At least, international human rights law has succeeded in 
exerting some checks on government actions and largely managed to 
curb an increase in human rights violations.
What are different types of sources of international human rights ? 
What is meant by the term » soft law « ?
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Which international treaties containing international human rights do 
you know ? What is the legal character of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights ? Does the Universal Declaration contain civil and po-
litical human rights, economic and social human rights or » collective « 
human rights ?
Where can you identify the application of human rights in the Austrian 
domestic system ? Are all these rights » human rights « in the sense that 
they are granted to Austrian nationals as well as foreign citizens ? Are 
there any economic and social fundamental rights in the Austrian sys-
tem or » collective « human rights ?
What is the main effect of international human rights with respect 
to states ? Can human rights only be enforced against states or also 
against private persons or groups of private persons ?
Human rights are created to benefit individuals, i.e. private persons 
( except » collective « human rights ). Can those private persons who find 
their international human rights violated always enforce their human 
rights themselves ? Where can they enforce them ( if they can ) ? How 
( where ) can one enforce a human right based on the ECHR against 
the Austrian state ? How ( where ) can one enforce a human right based 
solely on Austrian constitutional law and not on the ECHR against the 
Austrian state ?
What are the reasons for not including directly enforceable economic 
and social human rights in the constitutions of states or in international 
treaties that are directly enforceable ? What are the reasons not to in-
clude collective human rights in the various human rights instruments ?
Why is the protection of human rights in public international law not 
as effective as one would wish ? ( Think of enforcement problems, the 
attitudes of states, and economic, social and other reasons for the vio-
lation of civil and political human rights by states, etc.)
VII.  Theory in practice:  
Human Rights and Mass Media
A.  The Mass Media as the › fourth estate ‹
In the following chapter we will discuss a specific problem within the 
realm of Human Rights. The technique ( » Theory in Practice « ) employed 
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in this chapter – in which changing your point of view might evolve your 
understanding of the underlying legal problems – is hugely successful 
when discussing supranational legal paradigms ( see no. 1 / 73, above ).
Thomas Carlyle ( 1795–1881 ) described the power of the press as » the 
fourth estate « in 1841. He elaborated in his famous book » Heroes and 
Hero-Worship « that » there were three estates in Parliament; but, in the 
Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a fourth estate far more important 
than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal 
fact. «
Since Carlyle, the » fourth estate « has traditionally been regarded as 
one of the classic checks and balances in the division of powers, or as 
Thomas Jefferson said, » Where the press is free and every man able to 
read, all is safe. «
Unsurprisingly all Western states’ constitutions contain provisions re-
specting rights to freedom of speech and the freedom of the media. 
The rights granted by supranational conventions ( see no. 3 / 74 et seq., 
above ) serve the same intentions. The guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion is recognised as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 ( see no. 3 / 70, above ) and – 
most important to our European perspective – in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.
The ECHR borrowed almost word for word from Art 19 UDHR to 
construct art. 10( 1 ) ECHR – it provides that » everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. This right shall include to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by pub-
lic authority and regardless of frontiers. «
B.  Enforcement under the ECtHR regime
Due to three peculiarities of the Convention, it seems correct to assume 
that the findings of the European Court of Human Rights ( ECtHR ) 
dealing with the ECHR have the final say in any questions relating to 
the mass media.
Firstly, the ECHR requires the Signatory States of the Council of Eu-
rope to provide an effective remedy against human rights violations; see 
in this regard art. 13 ECHR: » Everyone whose rights and freedoms as 
set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy 
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before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.« Amongst the in-
struments used by the Signatory States to discharge this duty to provide 
for an effective remedy are tort and criminal law.
Secondly, any such remedy must be provided regardless of whether 
the violation was due to governmental, corporate, or an individual’s 
conduct. Violations, and accordingly remedies, concern not only the 
» vertical « relationship between public body and individuals, but also 
the » horizontal « relationships between individuals.
Thirdly, and in stark contrast to the enforcement of other treaties 
of public international law ( see no. 1 / 11 and 3 / 22, above ), the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR are not limited to inter-state affairs, but are 
open to court actions by citizens of Signatory States; applications to 
the ECtHR against Signatory States can be made by any individual citi-
zen of a Signatory State.
As a result of these three characteristics, affected citizens and me-
dia outlets can bring any noteworthy action in civil or criminal law to 
the ECtHR, alleging that the Signatory State does not provide an effec-
tive remedy for violations of freedom of expression; any national law 
in which the ECHR’s jurisdiction is engaged is ultimately measured 
and interpreted against the standards of the ECHR, against which the 
ECtHR will carry out a very careful scrutiny of interferences with press 
coverage and publications.
C.  Protection of the Press
The ECtHR has interpreted art. 10 para. 1 ECHR broadly and inclu-
sively; no attempt has been made to restrict those who are entitled to 
rely on art. 10 ECHR, and » everyone « does indeed mean » everyone «, in-
cluding publishers, newspapers, and journalists.
The ECtHR has frequently emphasised that the freedom of expres-
sion extends to the freedom of the press, as the latter arguably affords 
the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opin-
ion on the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders.
The ECtHR highlights this special nexus when describing the role of 
the mass media as a » public’s watchdog «. Concordantly, not only the 
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substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form 
and means of dissemination by which they are conveyed is protected. 
The ECtHR has delivered many judgments declaring that national laws 
or court decisions have infringed art. 10 ECHR and has begun to de-
velop a jurisprudence tailored to the particular needs of the news me-
dia. Over the years, it has crystallised its freedom of expression case 
law into a number of basic principles.
Arguably the most important one was formulated in 1976 in Handyside 
v. United Kingdom, ECtHR 07. 12. 1976, no. 5493 / 72 where the ECtHR 
held that: » Freedom of expression … is applicable not only to » informa-
tion « or » ideas « that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. «
Given the specific reference to » opinions «, art. 10 ECHR protects the 
right to criticise, speculate and make value judgements. As a result, 
polemic, aggressive, exaggerated, provocative and even insulting ex-
pressions have been found to fall within the scope of art. 10 ECHR and, 
with regard to the press, it results in a situation where opinions are not 
delivered in a sensitive manner, but more often than not in a most in-
sulting manner as » comment is free «.
As the press is seen as the » public watchdog «, this already significant 
latitude in communications is extended even further for publications 
criticising politicians. The free speech infringements most commonly 
struck down have been in relation to those who wield political power. 
Here the ECtHR grants a very extensive freedom to comment upon 
their performance.
In the case of Peter Lingens v. Austria, ECtHR 08. 07. 1986, no. 9815 / 82, 
who accused the Austrian Chancellor of » the basest opportunism « and 
» immorality « for seeking a political alliance with a party led by a right-
wing politician, the ECtHR declared that » [ t ]he limits of acceptable 
criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician than as regards 
a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and know-
ingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by 
both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently dis-
play a greater degree of tolerance. «
3/101
127  Theory in practice: Human Rights and Mass Media
¶Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law  
In essence, politicians, when acting in an official capacity, run the 
risk that their reputations may be sullied in the most reprehensible 
manner in the interests of open discussion on political issues. Addi-
tionally, the ECtHR may take into account the prior conduct of a poli-
tician: If he or she has been party to harmfully worded attacks on po-
litical opponents, he or she cannot expect delicate treatment in return.
This was, for instance, the case in a provocative attack on the politician 
Jörg Haider ( 1950–2008), where a journalist – accusing Haider of openly 
endorsing Neo-Nazi attitudes – was protected from private prosecution. 
The ECtHR emphasised that a » greater degree of tolerance « must be 
applied in respect of a politician, » especially when he himself makes 
public statements that are susceptible of criticism « ( Oberschlick v. 
Austria, ECtHR 23. 05. 1991, no. 11662 / 85 ).
To sum up, the ECtHR allows journalists massive latitude in their 
method of presentation, including exaggeration or even provocation. 
The scope for comment on wielders of political power is even wider 
than that for private individuals; the need for open comment on poli-
tics is seen as prevailing over the protection of reputation.
D.  Reporting of Facts
Of course, the mass media are not only concerned with commenting 
on politics; their real bread and butter is the reporting of facts. Where 
journalism is concerned with objectively verifiable statements of fact, 
their validity is crucial to the recipient. Phrased in terms of law: Does 
an untrue statement of fact give rise to liability of the media outlet and 
the journalist ? In the Goodwin v. United Kingdom, ECtHR 11. 7. 2001, 
no. 28957 / 95 decision, the ECtHR answered this question in the nega-
tive when it held: » The safeguard offered … to journalists in relation to 
reporting on articles of general interest is subject to the proviso that 
they are acting in good faith … «. In other words, journalists are enti-
tled to fight any claim brought against them if they merely acted in 
good faith. Arguably with a view to the urgency in reporting news, the 
journalist has merely to fulfil the duty to endeavour to report as truly 
as possible; the requirement of diligent information is sufficient. The 
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second core principle in this context, i.e. » the reporting on articles of 
general interest «, was set forth in Bergens Tidende v. Norway, ECtHR 
2. 5. 2000, no. 26132 / 95.
The failures of a local surgeon in inserting breast implants were high-
lighted in a newspaper article, and his incompetence was pilloried. In 
reality, the surgeon was not even remotely inept; he had conducted 
thousands of successful cosmetic operations. Obviously the article had 
clearly damaged his professional reputation, resulting in pecuniary 
loss. Nevertheless, the ECtHR submitted that this was not sufficient to 
override the freedom of the press to impart information on a matter of 
public concern, as the newspaper had reported on an important con-
troversy relating to public health.
With regard to statements of fact, two lessons can be learnt here. First, 
in the view of the ECtHR, no absolute duty to establish the truth of a 
report can be imposed on the media. Facts are only to be verified as far 
as reasonable and appropriate. Second, the ECtHR is inclined to make 
a broad-brush public interest judgement.
E.  Limitations applicable
Let’s change perspective ! Oscar Wilde ( 1854–1900 ) wrote – in another 
era, certainly, but his words still resonate – that » the public have an in-
satiable curiosity to know everything, except what is worth knowing. «
From this perspective, the assumption of the strong position supporting 
mass media seems to be unfounded. Crucially, freedom of the media is 
not an end in itself, and the sentiments behind art. 10 para. 1 ECHR are 
subject to a number of exceptions contained in art. 10 para. 2 ECHR.
» The exercise of this freedom, since it carries with it duties and respon-
sibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
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society, in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or pub-
lic safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of oth-
ers, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. «
When do any of the exceptions override the freedom of expression and, 
accordingly, the freedom of the press ? Only when the state providing a 
restricted remedy against the violation of expression can rebut the pre-
sumption of art. 10 para. 1 ECHR erected in favour of free expression.
In the words of the ECtHR in Observer and Guardian v. United King-
dom, ECtHR 26. 11. 1991, no. 13585 / 88: » This freedom is subject to excep-
tions, however these must be strictly construed and the need for any 
restrictions must be established convincingly. «
On this basis the » burden of proof « is reversed. First, the Signatory State 
defending the restriction of freedom of expression bears the burden 
of proving its » necessity in democratic society «, which in turn implies 
the existence of a » pressing social need « for the restriction in question. 
But even when social needs are found » pressing «, they are not per se 
overriding, as, secondly, the ECtHR held that » [ e ]ven when the social 
need is pressing, the particular infringement, looking at the context 
and the content of the banned communication, must be » proportion-
ate to the legitimate aims pursued « and the Government bears the bur-
den of passing the proportionality test by adducting sufficient reasons «. 
This » proportionality test « is important – it means that the ECtHR will 
strike down the restriction in question if its particular application or an 
aspect of it is nonetheless so disproportionate as to breach the Conven-
tion. This is so if, in all the circumstances of the case, the restriction 
was ineffectual in advancing the value contained in an art. 10 para. 2 
ECHR exception, or was irrelevant to it, or insufficiently justified. The 
ECtHR proceeds in this regard on a case-by-case basis.
For instance, in Tolstoy v. United Kingdom, ECtHR 13. 7. 1995, no. 18139 / 91, 
the ECtHR held that, although the law of civil libel might in general 
terms respond to the social need to protect reputation from untruths, 
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the lack of proper judicial control over damages at that time lacked all 
proportion and constituted a breach of the Convention.
Having addressed the high standards for any restriction of the free-
dom of expression, it seems useful to scrutinise more closely some of 
the explicitly mentioned values in art. 10 para. 2 ECHR. For the first 
value, the restriction to protect one’s » reputation « in relation to the 
publication of value judgements, we can only refer to the principle al-
ready mentioned ( see no. 3 / 101, above ), namely » comment is free «. The 
restriction is only ever available when the opinion published amounts 
to an abusive insult without any meaning for a public discourse on the 
topic – a standard hardly ever found in any sizeable media outlet.
As explicitly mentioned in art. 10 para. 2 ECHR, the rights or free-
doms granted by the ECHR to the other party may restrict the right to 
freedom of expression. This includes the most important right to re-
spect for private and family life under art. 8 ECHR.
Resonating with the aforementioned quote of Oscar Wilde, this fre-
quently concerns public figures such as politicians, leading business-
men, artists, sportspeople, entertainment stars and actors, as the pub-
lic seems keen to gather extensive information on their private lives.
The leading case in this regard is Caroline von Hannover v. Germany, 
ECtHR 24. 06. 2004, no. 59320 / 00, where pictures were published depict-
ing this member of the Monacan monarchy in everyday situations such 
as playing sports, walking, on holiday and having dinner with friends.
The German Federal Constitutional Court ( BVerfG, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht ) held that Caroline, as a public figure of contemporary 
society, enjoyed the protection of her private life even outside her 
home, but only if she was in a secluded place out of the public eye » to 
which the person concerned retires with the objectively recognisable 
aim of being alone and where, confident of being alone, behaves in a 
manner in which he or she would not behave in public. « The Constitu-
tional Court attached decisive weight to the freedom of the press, even 
the entertainment press, and to the public interest in knowing about 
Caroline’s private life.
3/109
3/110
3/111
131  Theory in practice: Human Rights and Mass Media
¶Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law  
In contrast to previous case law, which was largely in favour of the 
media, the ECtHR disagreed and placed significant emphasis on the 
protection of privacy. It held that any violation of the right to respect 
for private and family life is only justified when the published photo-
graphs and articles make a contribution to a debate of general public 
interest. As Caroline exercised no official function, the photographs 
and articles related exclusively to details of her private life and made 
no such contribution to any public debate.
The ECtHR concluded that the German courts had not struck a fair 
balance between the freedom of expression and the right to respect 
for private and family life, and, therefore, that art. 8 had been violated. 
Thus, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court was 
revised and Caroline was ultimately awarded a considerable sum in 
damages.
The ECtHR’s approach, to which the Signatory States must adhere, 
had considerable implications for the tabloid press in Europe, and in 
an immediate reaction German chief-editors composed an open let-
ter to the German chancellor heralding the end of western democracy 
as known if the censorship prescribed by the ECtHR was not stopped. 
They argued that, as a result of the judgment, the hands of all serious 
journalists were tied and that they would now be prevented from rap-
ping the knuckles of powerful people.
To sum up, three conclusions must be drawn regarding restrictions on 
the freedom of expression of the mass media. Firstly, restrictions of an 
opinion are hardly available. Secondly, the latitude for the mass media 
in standards of publication of facts is under pressure. European legal 
science no longer accepts lax duties on journalists when disseminating 
false information. Finally, the ECtHR makes exceptions to freedom of 
expression when the right to private and family life is violated and the 
resulting publication does not contribute to a relevant public debate 
but satisfies only the prurient interests of the consumer.
How is the media protected by the ECHR ? Which limitations apply ?
What is the difference between the statement of facts and an opinion ?
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VIII.  Current and future challenges to  
public international law
A.  From a state-oriented to a community-oriented 
approach
It may be argued that the most significant development in the field of 
public international law in the post-war period after 1945 is the addition 
of a new and growing field of international cooperation and organisa-
tion to the traditional system of the law of nations. Traditional interna-
tional law had strong liberal individualistic features. It was a law cre-
ated by, and for, prosperous nations. The primary purpose of this law 
was to reconcile the freedom of one state with the freedom of another 
state. The main problem during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, when the law was developed, was to ensure peace between states 
which operated largely independently of one another and evolved their 
policies within the framework of traditional diplomacy.
Now, however, technological revolution has transformed interna-
tional society into a fully interdependent world community in times 
of both peace and war. This development led to the proliferation of in-
ternational organisations for cooperative purposes. Unlike the League 
of Nations, the United Nations family of organisations was not con-
ceived mainly as an organ to facilitate the settlement of international 
disputes but, rather, as one to promote co-operation in all fields. The 
numerous specialised agencies of the United Nations and other inter-
national organisations, both at regional and universal levels, marked 
the transition of public international law from the traditional system 
of formal rules of mutual respect and abstention among sovereign 
states to a system of organised joint efforts for co-operation. These in-
ternational organisations deal with such diverse subjects as interna-
tional monetary control, international development aid, problems of 
food production and distribution, universal standards of health, co-
operation in means of communication, control of environmental and 
marine pollution, and the unification of international trade law ( see 
no. 2 / 99 et seq., above ), etc.
The dramatic increase in the number of new states in the interna-
tional community has accounted for important new developments in 
public international law and has seen a significant increase in both its 
scope and complexity. The large majority of the new world community 
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comprises underdeveloped nations which are in some instances de-
pendent on assistance from the rest of the world community. Tradi-
tional public international law focused on co-existence and diplomatic 
relations unconcerned about the divergences of the social and political 
systems. It was based on respect for national sovereignty, observance of 
promises, and the right to use force in pursuit of national objectives. Its 
new focus, however, is on developing a law of cooperation, social justice 
and welfare, whereby states actively collaborate at different levels for the 
common welfare of all mankind. In other words, public international 
law has passed from the phase when it was primarily a law of co-exist-
ence to a new law of cooperation. The paradigm of public international 
law is gradually changing from a » state-oriented « to a » community-ori-
ented « approach. As we have seen in no. 3 / 5 et seq., above, this » commu-
nity-oriented « or » cooperation-oriented « approach is supplemented by 
the direct inclusion of the individual in the sphere of operation of in-
ternational law. The extent of such inclusion of private persons is at its 
greatest in highly integrated international organisations like the EU. But 
it can also be observed in public international law more broadly.
The establishment of a community of nations in which the states 
surrender a significant portion of their sovereign powers to a supra-na-
tional community is, however, not yet a reality. Nevertheless, increas-
ing movement in this direction is reflected in all fields of public in-
ternational law. In contemporary public international law, elements of 
the old state-oriented approach and of an incipient community of na-
tions thus co-exist.
One can view the gradual change of public international law from 
a state-oriented approach to a community of nations from various per-
spectives.
The traditional public international law of co-existence with its 
main independent actors – states – frequently borrowed concepts from 
private law. Private parties concluding contracts enjoyed a wide range 
of freedoms – at least according to the liberalistic concept of private 
law dominant in the nineteenth century – which could be considered 
similar to the freedom and independence of sovereign states in their 
relations to each other. The concept of an » international treaty «, there-
fore, draws heavily on the private law concept of a » contract « between 
individuals. And the requirements for the development of customary 
public international law ( » repeated practice « and » opinio juris « ) are de-
rived from the concept of customary law in private and commercial law.
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It is not a coincidence that contemporary public international law, 
which focuses heavily on the gradual construction of a constitution for 
the community of nations which will reduce the sovereign powers of 
states, finds its analogies in public law, particularly constitutional law. 
This is particularly evident in the use of the implied-powers doctrine of 
US constitutional law to construe the rules of competence in the char-
ters of international organisations, and in a general comparison of the 
charters of highly integrated international organisations to the consti-
tutions of national states.
Amongst jurists and politicians, there are differing views on where 
contemporary public international law is positioned between the two 
poles of exclusive state-orientation and a powerful community-orienta-
tion. Some – one could arguably refer to them as realists – regard the 
state-oriented approach as still being dominant with only weak influ-
ence of a community-orientation approach. According to that view, in 
cases of doubt or where no clear rule of public international law de-
manding community-orientation exists, public international law in no 
way diminished the sovereign powers of states. States are accordingly 
justified in acting along the lines of the old state-oriented approach.
Others – one could call them idealists – argue that the international 
actors ( that is, states ) should emphasise the incipient community-ori-
entation of public international law whenever possible. Therefore, in 
cases of doubt or where no clear rule of public international law de-
manding community-orientation exists, states should infuse a commu-
nity-oriented approach. The state should downplay their sovereign in-
terests and act in the interests of the wider community of states, thereby 
promoting the creation of such a rule and enhancing the development 
of public international law into a more community-oriented direction.
An excellent example contrasting the realistic state-oriented and the 
idealistic community-oriented approach is the use of self-defence and 
the system of collective security, as described in no. 3 / 58 et seq., above: 
when are states – according to contemporary public international law – 
allowed to make use of military force in self-defence ? The realists would 
argue that military force plays the dual role of opposing a severe threat 
of disorder and providing an indispensable antidote to disorder in inter-
national relations ( military force or the threat of the use of military force 
as a means to deter the use of military force on the other side which, in 
turn, acts as a means to secure peace and a policy of deterrence ). Order 
will prevail if ( state ) power checks ( state ) power.
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On the other hand, in an idealistic system, the possession and use 
of power would not be eliminated but centralised. Public international 
law would express the concern of the community for control of dis-
order by prohibiting the ( illegal ) use of military power by states and 
vesting the authority to use or cause the use of law-enforcing military 
power ( concept of » collective security «, see no. 3 / 58 et seq., above ) in 
community organs. The United Nations Security Council represents 
a first attempt to realise such an ideal system of centralised military 
power. But it is far from being effective, as illustrated by numerous in-
cidents of war during the last decades. It can, therefore, be said that no 
such » ideal system « exists at the international level at present. Realists 
are not concerned with how to achieve this end but, rather, with how 
best to proceed in its absence, that is, via the use of military force by 
states ( in self-defence ) against states that unlawfully make use of their 
military powers.
What changes in the functions of public international law can be ob-
served in the twentieth century ?
What are the reasons for these changes ?
What are the main aims of public international law today and what are 
the fields of its activities ?
Why does the traditional approach of public international law share 
similarities with the concept of freedom of contract ( private law ) 
whereas the modern approach has similarities to concepts of public 
law ?
The present position of public international law is somewhere between 
state-orientation and community-orientation. What would be the » re-
alist’s « view on this situation ?
What would be the » idealist’s « view on this situation ?
B.  Reforming the United Nations system
Due to the new and diverging global issues and challenges that the 
United Nations face in the 21st century, a thorough reform of the UN 
organisation and its capacities is required. Arguably, the restructuring 
and upgrading of the UN would greatly enhance its relevance and effec-
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tiveness, and has thus been a priority concern of the Member States, as 
well as of the current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and his prede-
cessor, Kofi Annan, for several years now. Due to increasing global in-
terdependences, the maintenance of peace, security and development 
cannot be achieved without multilateral cooperation.
At the 2005 World Summit, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan out-
lined in his report » In Larger Freedom « several areas in which the UN 
needs to advance and emphasised the importance of collective action:
» In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each coun-
try’s self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the 
cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sus-
tained global cooperation among states. Such cooperation is possible 
if every country’s policies take into account not only the needs of its 
own citizens but also the needs of others. This kind of cooperation 
not only advances everyone’s interests but also recognises our com-
mon humanity. «
According to this report, one area which requires particular attention 
is that of developmental challenges. Priority areas, designated as such 
by Kofi Annan, are the enhancement of national development strate-
gies by developing countries and the securing of the financing of de-
velopment by developed countries. The fulfilment of the Millennium 
Development Goals ( MDG ) is also central to this agenda. Given that, in 
particular, the majority of African countries are still far from attaining 
the MDG, the Secretary-General of the UN launched a partnership ar-
rangement ( MDG Africa Steering Group ) in 2007 tasked with, amongst 
other things, the improvement of aid predictability to facilitate more 
effective long-term planning for African governments and the creation 
and identification of synergies at country level.
Other areas that need attention are the collective security system 
of the UN, improvement in the overall maintenance of peace and se-
curity, as well as the changing face of humanitarian crises. It is gener-
ally known that the current range of threats and security challenges 
includes not only open conflict, but also poverty, infectious diseases, 
environmental degradation, terrorism and transnational organised 
crime. In order to address these challenges efficiently, the UN needs to 
improve its ability to play its role in conflict prevention, peace-making, 
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peace-keeping and peace-building. Hence, the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations will be restructured in order to provide more ef-
fective mission management, and supplemented by Field Support, 
which will offer logistical, personnel and financial support. Partner-
ships with other UN and non-UN actors, especially regional organisa-
tions, will be fostered. This will include reinforced presence of the UN 
on the ground. Besides international and internal conflicts, organised 
crime and acts of terrorism endanger global development and the lives 
of people worldwide. Therefore, the securing of peace and security also 
comprises the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which includes 
the creation of global legal foundations and joint actions to prevent ter-
rorist acts. As far as other humanitarian crises are concerned, extreme 
weather and climate change require enhanced attention by the global 
community. UN measures in this area focus on effective communica-
tion and joint training on disaster preparedness and response.
The further dissemination and acceptance of human rights, espe-
cially through the expansion of the work of the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR ), is also on the agenda of the 
UN. Several objectives in this area have already been achieved: the pres-
ence of the OHCHR in almost 50 countries; the creation of the Human 
Rights Council, which replaced the Human Rights Commission as it 
was suffering from declining credibility and professionalism, and the 
establishment of a Special Representative for the Prevention of Geno-
cide. Whether these modifications will actually improve the global hu-
man rights situation and create long-term improvements remains to 
be seen.
Finally, the management and structural reform of the UN, which 
should result in an ameliorated application of resources and staff, is 
continuously at the centre of global interest. Since the 1990s then-Sec-
retaries-General Boutros-Ghali and Annan struggled to reform the Sec-
retariat, reduce costs and improve internal and external communica-
tion. After the 2005 summit additional steps were taken to render the 
Secretariat, as the administrative centre of the UN, more mobile and 
multi-skilled, for instance by limiting the amount of time a staff mem-
ber can spend in the same post and facilitating career advancement. A 
new decentralised system of internal justice, which is designed to ad-
dress work-related conflicts and includes an Ombudsman’s office, has 
also been in place since July 2009. Unlike its predecessor, the newly cre-
ated first-instance body can issue binding decisions that are open to 
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appeal. However, other changes that were envisaged by the Secretary-
General in 2005 ( and before ) are still far from being realised. This in-
cludes in particular the reconfiguration of the Security Council which, 
in its current form, no longer represents the realities of power in to-
day’s world and faces significant difficulties in decision-making due to 
the veto-power of the permanent members.
When considering the need for reform of the UN system, given its 
inefficiency and assertiveness, one should always keep in mind that 
the UN is a complex, multicultural system consisting of over 190 Mem-
ber States, each with its own particular point of view on how issues 
should be handled in international relations. In this sense, the unique 
character and constitution of the UN inherently entail limitations.
Figure 17: Timeline of EU Law.
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Chapter 4
 European Law
I.  What is the European Union ?
The European Union ( EU ) is a community of public international law 
whose actions are governed by two treaties: the Treaty on the European 
Union ( TEU ) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion ( TFEU ) ( see no. 1 / 21 et seq., above ). The TEU and the TFEU were 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 De-
cember 2009. Due to the growing number of Member States and the 
consequential deficiencies of the Treaties, especially with regard to the 
institutional framework and the decision-making process, the latest 
amendment was deemed necessary to preserve the operability of the 
EU with 28 Member States. Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon abolished 
the European Community ( EC ) as a distinct organisation; now, instead 
of two organisations ( EU and EC ) only the » new « European Union ( EU ) 
remains, which, in addition to its original tasks, has now also absorbed 
the tasks and competences of the EC. For the timeline of EU Law please 
refer to figure 17 on the prior page.
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has explicit legal personality. 
This means that the EU, just like states or certain international organi-
sations, can act as a legal entity of public international law and can, for 
example, conclude international agreements with other states or inter-
national organisations of its own accord.
The aims of the EU are cited in art. 3 TEU. They are as follows:
1.  The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being 
of its peoples.
2.  The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
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respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime.
3.  The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market econ-
omy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.
  It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall pro-
mote social justice and protection, equality between women and 
men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights 
of the child.
  It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and sol-
idarity among Member States.
  It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall en-
sure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.
4.  The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose 
currency is the euro.
5.  In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection 
of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protec-
tion of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as 
to the strict observance and the development of international law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
6.  The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means com-
mensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in 
the Treaties.
Likewise, art. 2 TEU applies to all elements of the EU:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, free-
dom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.
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The objectives and values cited in artt. 2 and 3 TEU comprise all ac-
tivities of the EU.
Since 2009 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European has 
equivalent legal value as the Treaties. Its catalogue of fundamental hu-
man rights is thus legally binding on the EU. The organs of the EU 
may also be obliged to consider the European Convention on Human 
Rights ( ECHR ) and the fundamental rights common to all Member 
States in the exercise of their roles.
Due to an additional protocol to the ECHR enabling the EU to accede 
to the Convention together with art. 6 para. 2 TEU which permits the 
EU to accede, the accession of the EU as a party to the ECHR was dis-
cussed and a draft agreement has been reached.
Notably, the CJEU delivered an opinion in December 2014 where the 
court assesses whether the legal arrangements proposed in respect of 
the EU’s accession to the ECHR are in conformity with the require-
ments laid down in the Treaties and submits that they are not for five 
principle reasons: Firstly, the Court holds that the draft agreement 
reached thus far does not take into account the specific characteristics 
and autonomy of EU law as it does not restrict Member States having 
the possibility to apply higher human rights standards than the EU 
Charter. Additionally, the Court holds that the draft agreement would 
» require a Member State to check that another Member State has ob-
served fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation 
of mutual trust between those Member States. « The Court continues 
that in this manner » accession is liable to upset the underlying bal-
ance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law «. Moreover, 
the Court submits that the agreement, if implemented, would circum-
vent the preliminary ruling procedure under art. 267 TFEU as the draft 
agreement did not rule out that national courts could ask the ECtHR 
to rule on EU law issues under Protocol 16 of the Convention. Further, 
the Court highlights that the draft agreement allows for the possibil-
ity that the EU or Member States might submit an application to the 
ECtHR, under art. 33 of the ECHR, concerning violations in conjunc-
tion with EU law. According to the Court this would violate art. 344 
of the TFEU, which gives the CJEU monopoly on inter-state dispute 
settlement regarding EU law between Member States. Thirdly, the co-
respondent mechanism allowing for the EU and a Member State to 
intervene in an ECtHR case would allow the ECtHR to interpret EU 
law when assessing admissibility requests as well as the criteria for 
the attribution of their acts or omissions. According to the Court this 
would risk adversely affecting the division of powers between the EU 
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and its Member States. Fourthly, in terms of the » prior involvement « 
procedure in the draft agreement, the CJEU notes that the draft agree-
ment allows the ECtHR to rule on whether the Court has already given 
a ruling on the same question of law, something which is solely within 
the CJEU’s competence. Finally, the draft agreement would allow the 
ECtHR to rule on the compatibility with the ECHR of certain acts, ac-
tions or omissions performed within the context of the Common For-
eign and Security Policy ( CFSP ). Consequently, the Court holds that 
the ECtHR, a non-EU body, would have exclusive judicial review of 
CFSP acts, actions or omissions, which would go against the CJEU’s 
previous finding that » judicial review of acts cannot be conferred ex-
clusively on an international court which is outside the institutional 
and judicial framework of the EU. «
In light of this reasoning the CJEU finds that the draft agreement is not 
compatible with art. 6 para. 2 TEU on the accession of the Union to the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.
Artt. 2, 7 TEU provide for a procedure to assess severe and persistent 
violations of one or more of its principles which can result in the sus-
pension of membership rights, including voting rights. The Council 
can declare, on the basis of a proposal by one third of the Member 
States, of the Parliament or with a majority of 4 / 5 of the Commission’s 
members as well as with the additional consent of the Parliament, that 
a clear risk of a severe violation of fundamental rights by a Member 
State exists and can approach that Member State with suitable recom-
mendations to rectify the situation. The exclusion of a Member State is, 
however, not foreseen by the Treaties. In any case, according to art. 49 
TEU, compliance with these principles and values is a requirement for 
a state’s admission into the EU.
As already mentioned, the EU has legal personality vis-à-vis Mem-
ber States and has the same legal capacity granted to legal entities by 
national law within these national legal systems. It is globally recog-
nised as being a subject of public international law. In fact, however, 
its status as a subject of public international law extends only so far as 
necessary for the performance of its tasks and achievement of its aims. 
The subject of legal personality and legal subjectivity is the EU itself 
and is represented by its organs.
Although artt. 3 et seq. TFEU primarily stipulate the competences 
of the EU, these provisions also provide an overview of the policies and 
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activities of the EU. One of the most important activities is the establish-
ment of an internal market characterised by the abolition of obstacles 
to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between 
Member States and the establishment of a system ensuring that compe-
tition in the internal market is not distorted. Additionally, many other 
policies exist in the fields of agriculture, protection of the environment, 
consumer protection, health protection, transport, the promotion of re-
search and technology, and economic, social and territorial cohesion.
Despite a large field of EU activities and policies, the EU is only 
permitted to act within the boundaries of the objectives set and com-
petences assigned to it by the Treaties. According to this » principle of 
conferral « ( that is limited singular competence ), EU-organs can only 
act within the limited areas of competence assigned to them by the 
Treaties. In other words, no general competence for EU organs ex-
ists which would allow them to act at their discretion whenever they 
deemed it fit.
There are three different categories of competences of the EU 
mentioned in artt. 2 et seq. TFEU: exclusive competence ( art. 3 TFEU ), 
shared competence ( art. 4 TFEU ) and supporting, coordinating and 
complementary competence ( artt. 5 and 6 TFEU ). In general, any com-
petence conferred to the EU, which is not an exclusive or supporting 
competence, is a shared competence regardless of whether it is men-
tioned in art. 4 TFEU or not. In areas of exclusive competence of the 
EU – for instance, customs, the common commercial policy and the 
monetary policy for the Euro countries – only the EU may legislate and 
adopt legally binding acts. The Member States are no longer compe-
tent to legislate in these areas with the logical exception being legisla-
tion required to implement an EU directive.
In matters of shared competence – for instance, internal market, 
environment, energy and consumer protection – both the EU and the 
Member States are authorised to act. However, once the EU has ex-
ercised its competence by the way of a directive or a regulation, the 
Member States’ competence lapses. Nevertheless, whenever the EU is 
acting according to a shared competence, the so-called principle of 
subsidiarity in art. 5 para. 3 TEU applies. In the area of exercise of non-
exclusive competences – being by far the largest set of competences – 
the EU is only authorised to act if it can be ascertained that the en-
visaged goals could not be sufficiently accomplished by the activity of 
the Member States alone and that these aims can be better achieved at 
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EU level. This principle of subsidiarity was initially introduced into the 
TEC by the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. It was met with scepticism by the 
Member States with regards to the competences of the EU who felt that 
the competences granted were too extensive. Finally, art. 6 TFEU gives 
the EU the competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States.
The measures taken by the EU, according to the principle of sub-
sidiarity or otherwise within the scope of exclusive competences, must 
also conform to the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, no meas-
ures may be taken that go beyond what is necessary.
According to the obligation to loyalty of the Member States en-
shrined in art. 4 para. 3 TEU all Member States are obliged to fully sup-
port the EU in the accomplishment of its tasks and to refrain from 
taking any measures which could endanger the realisation of the aims 
of the Treaties. This obligation to loyalty has always been construed 
inclusively by the CJEU and has, at times, been used by the CJEU as a 
basis for its own » quasi-legislative measures «.
The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, com-
monly known as the Brexit referendum took place on 23 June 2016. The 
referendum resulted in a vote to leave the EU. In order to start the pro-
cess to leave the EU, the British government will have to invoke art. 50 
TFEU.
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in ac-
cordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the Euro-
pean Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by 
the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agree-
ment with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, tak-
ing account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.
II.  The Organs of the EU
The organs of the EU, as listed in art. 13 TEU, are the European Coun-
cil, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament ( EP ), the 
Court of Justice of the European Union ( CJEU ), the European Central 
Bank ( ECB ) and the European Court of Auditors.
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A.  The European Council
The European Council is an EU organ concerned with the development 
of the EU. As stated in art. 15 para. 1 TEU, it is tasked with determining 
the general political directions and priorities for such development. It 
comprises all Member States’ heads of state or government as well as 
the President of the Commission. The heads of state or government may 
request assistance by one of their ministers while the President of the 
Commission can ask a member of the Commission for assistance. Fur-
thermore, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council is presided 
over by a permanent President who is elected by a qualified majority 
and remains in office for two and a half to five years ( art. 15 para. 5 TEU ).
Since December 2014 Donald Tusk is the President of the European 
Council. His tasks include the chairmanship of the European Council, 
the preparation of meetings, the facilitation of cohesion and consen-
sus within the European Council and the external representation of 
the EU without prejudice to the powers of the EU High Representative 
of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The so-called High Representative of the EU ( HR ) also participates at 
the meetings of the European Council which must take place at least 
twice every six months, but is, however, not a member of the European 
Council. For further details regarding the office of the HR see no. 4 / 28, 
below.
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Figure 18: European Council.  
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 Figure 19: The Council.
The European Council must be distinguished from the Council of the 
EU which will be described in no. 4 / 18 et seq., below and the Council 
of Europe which is an international organisation mentioned in no. 1 / 15, 
above, and entirely independent from the EU.
B.  The Council
The Council of the EU, the role of which is set forth in art. 16 TEU and 
artt. 237 et seq. TFEU, is the decisive legislative organ of the EU and si-
multaneously possesses executive competencies.
» The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legis-
lative and budgetary functions. It shall carry out policy-making and co-
ordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties. « ( art. 16 para. 1 TEU )
It consists of representatives of the Member States on a ministerial 
level ( generally, one minister per Member State ) who are authorised to 
act for the Member States’ governments. Accordingly, the Council, un-
like the European Council, which also consists of the President of the 
Commission and the permanent President, is a body exclusively com-
posed of representatives sent by the Member States. Thus, the Council 
consists of 28 members at present. It is an organ concerned with the 
protection of Member States’ interests.
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Even though the Council is a unitary organ, it does not always act 
in the same composition. In respect of general and foreign affairs mat-
ters, the Council is composed of the foreign ministers, whereas in other 
specific fields of, for instance, the economy and finance, justice and in-
ternal affairs, development, agriculture, budget, employment and so-
cial affairs, transport and fisheries, each Member State dispatches its 
relevant competent minister to the Council.
Contrary to the European Council, which is presided over by a per-
manent President, the presidency of the Council is held consecutively 
by the Member States for a period of six months at a time.
According to art. 16 TEU, the Council, unless otherwise provided 
for, makes its decisions on the basis of a qualified majority of its 
members. In some cases, however, the Council decides with simple 
majority or, for instance, in matters of common security and defence 
policy, unanimously. If a qualified majority decision is necessary, the 
votes of the Council members are » weighed « according to a specified 
ratio.
Given that the definition of a » qualified majority « was a highly conten-
tious issue during the negotiations of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Mem-
ber States agreed on three phases. Up until 31 October 2014 the » old « 
definition was applied in terms of which Germany, France, Italy and 
Great Britain had 29 votes each; Spain and Poland 27 votes each; Ruma-
nia 14; the Netherlands 13; Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary 
and Portugal 12 votes each; Austria, Sweden and Bulgaria have 10 votes 
each; Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland have 7 votes 
each; Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia had 4 votes 
each and Malta, being the smallest Member State, had 3 votes. This 
amounts to 345 votes in total. Decisions based on a qualified majority 
usually required 255 votes of 345 votes in total as well as the consent of 
the majority ( in some cases two-thirds ) of the Member States and the 
representation of at least 62 % of the EU population.
Since 1 November 2014, significant changes occured regarding the cal-
culation of the qualified majority and a new blocking minority provi-
sion is introduced. Decisions made by the council have to be taken by 
55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU’s pop-
ulation ( cf. art. 16 para. 4 TEU ). Up until 1 April 2017, however, every 
Member State may demand the application of the » old « procedure. 
From 2017 onwards, only the new procedure will be applied without 
exceptions.
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Arguably, the Council is the significant legislative organ in the EU. 
However, the legislative activities of the Council are not carried out en-
tirely independently of the other EU organs. Instead, they are closely 
linked with the Commission and the European Parliament ( EP ). For 
instance, the Council can only become active as a legislator on the pro-
posal of the Commission. Nevertheless, it can require the Commission 
to prepare appropriate proposals. The forms of participation of the EP 
in the creation of and decision to adopt a legislative act range from 
a ( rare ) hearing to the ( usual ) co-decision as with the Lisbon Treaty 
the co-decision procedure became the standard legislative procedure. 
Within the scope of application of the ordinary legislative procedure, 
no legal act can be established against the will of the EP thus strength-
ening the democratic aspect of the EU legislative process. The form 
of participation required is stipulated by the relevant provision con-
cerning the respective competence on which the legislative act is based. 
The central provision of competence, art. 114 TFEU for the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market, for example, provides 
for the resolution of directives and regulations ( » measures « ) by means 
of the ordinary legislative procedure in accordance with art. 294 TFEU 
thus pre-empting the co-decision procedure.
The most important legal acts of EU Secondary Law are, according to 
art. 288 TFEU, the regulation and the directive. These are enacted by 
the Council with the participation and co-decision of the EP. The reg-
ulation is binding in all its parts and has direct effect in the Member 
States, that is, no act of implementation is required.
A directive is only binding in respect of its targeted and defined aims. It 
leaves the details of the implementation of these aims to the Member 
States including the form and means of implementation. Unlike a regu-
lation, a directive is never addressed at the citizens of the Member States 
themselves and does not directly establish citizens’ rights and duties. 
Rather, it addresses only the Member States which must in turn create 
these rights and duties by means of an act of implementation in order 
to achieve the aims of the directive. Thus, a directive is usually not ac-
corded direct effect in the Member States; only the measures of imple-
mentation taken by the Member States are directly effective. As will be 
explained more closely in no. 4 / 60 et seq., below, the non-implementa-
tion of a directive by a Member State may, however, result in Member 
State liability in favour of the aggrieved citizens and the so-called » ver-
tical direct effect « of directives. Furthermore, the practice of legislating 
4/23
149  The Organs of the EU
¶Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law  
by means of issuing directives has revealed that the text of the directives 
regulates the » aims « to be achieved by it in such a detailed manner that 
there is little difference between the texts of directives and regulations. 
Accordingly, in reality, Member States are left with little discretion re-
garding the choice of the form and means for implementation.
C.  The Commission
The European Commission is essentially an executive organ which, ad-
ditionally, has limited legislative competences at its disposal. As it has 
a de-facto monopoly of legislative initiative and controls compliance of 
Member States and other EU organs with EU law, the Commission is 
often referred to as the motor of the EU and the guardian of the Trea-
ties. To counterbalance the Council, which protects the interests of the 
Member States, the Commission’s task is to protect the interests of the 
EU. With respect to its position in the EU, its role in common foreign 
and security policy is less distinctive, but the uniform institutional 
framework of the EU is underlined by its full participation in intergov-
ernmental fields of activity. According to art. 17 para. 1, 2 TEU
» The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and 
take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application 
of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant 
to them. It shall oversee the application of Union law under the con-
trol of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It shall execute the 
budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise coordinating, execu-
tive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. With the 
exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases 
provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union’s external rep-
resentation. It shall initiate the Union’s annual and multiannual pro-
gramming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements. 
Union legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commis-
sion proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. Other acts 
shall be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal where the 
Treaties so provide. « 
The Commission consists of 28 members who are elected on the ba-
sis of their general competency ( as well as political background ) and 
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must fully guarantee their independence from their respective Member 
States. The members of the Commission must be citizens of the Mem-
ber States. The commission’s current president is Jean-Claude Juncker.
According to art. 17 para. 5 TEU, since 2014 the Commission should 
consist of a number of members equivalent to two thirds of the num-
ber of Member States of the EU with a view to improving its efficiency 
and its capacity to act. A system of strictly equal rotation between the 
Member States should have been established by the Council. However, 
the European Council is competent to alter this number by unanimous 
decision. At its June 2009 meeting in Brussels, the European Council 
notified its intention to take a decision so to ensure that the Commis-
sion will continue to be represented by one national from every Mem-
ber State.
Figure 20: The Commission.
The appointment of Commission members is effected by the Member 
States’ governments by mutual agreement. Such appointment is pre-
ceded by a multiphase-procedure according to art. 17 para. 7 TEU. The 
European Council nominates, via qualified majority, a suitable candi-
date for the Commission presidency who must subsequently be elected 
by a majority of the EP’s members. If the majority does not elect the 
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proposed candidate, the European Council must make a further pro-
posal. The Council thereafter proposes, with the approval of the des-
ignated President and on the basis of the suggestions made by the 
Member States, a list of candidates for the other members of the Com-
mission. The President, the High Representative – being the Vice-pres-
ident of the Commission – and the college of Commissioners are then 
subject to a vote of consent by the EP. The outcome of this process is the 
appointment of the Commission by the European Council.
The term of office of the Commission members is five years; a re-
appointment is permissible. A demission of individual members of the 
Commission is only considered in cases of severe misconduct or in-
competence. As a college, the Commission can be toppled by a motion 
of no-confidence in the EP.
The Treaty of Lisbon accorded the High Representative of the EU 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ( HR ) a special role within the in-
stitutional framework of the EU. In addition to representing the EU in 
international relations and serving as President of the Foreign Affairs 
Council, he or she is also the first vice-president of the Commission 
and in charge of foreign affairs. Given his or her tasks within the Coun-
cil and the Commission, the HR essentially wears two hats. Federica 
Mogherini currently holds the office.
An administrative organisation of more than 20.000 employees is 
directly responsible to the Commission. In this respect, so-called Di-
rectorates-General ( DGs ) and Services are of particular importance, al-
located to oversee differing specific fields of activity. For example, one 
DG is responsible for foreign affairs, another for competition, another 
for agriculture, etc.
The limited legislative competence of the Commission is only of 
importance with respect to the ECSC ( see no. 1 / 14 and 1 / 21, above ). In 
the EU, the Commission participates in the legislative process with its 
rights of legislative initiative. The Commission’s role of motor in the 
EU legislative process now relates to its participation in legislative acts 
of the Council and the EP. With the Commission’s monopoly of leg-
islative initiative, the Council can only enact legislative measures on 
proposal of the Commission. As a result, the Commission can control, 
within the scope of EU competences as well as the competences allo-
cated to it, the fields and manner in which EU legislation is enacted.
Within the scope of the EU Treaty, the Commission possesses a de-
rivative legislative competence to enact delegated and implementing 
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acts, including directives and regulations when, for instance, it has 
been authorised by a legislative act of the Council passed in accord-
ance with the latter’s competences assigned to it by the TFEU. The en-
actment of executive provisions by the Commission includes a wide 
scope of measures, ranging from authentic legal acts to the technical 
adaptation or amendment of legal acts of the Council and purely ad-
ministrative measures.
Executive competences, namely decisions in individual cases on 
the basis of legal acts by the Council, are assigned to the Commission 
especially in the fields of anti-trust law ( artt. 101 et seq. TFEU ), com-
petition policy and agriculture. The Commission is authorised, for in-
stance on the basis of regulations of the Council, in accordance with 
art. 103 TFEU, to take action against agreements between and mergers 
of enterprises which are contrary to EU anti-trust law, and, in particu-
lar, to impose fines and penalties against those involved. For this rea-
son, the Commission is the principal executive organ of the EU anti-
trust law contained in artt. 101 et seq. TFEU and is also, in part due to 
its derivative legislative competence, empowered to enact regulations 
itself in this field of law.
The supervision of compliance with EU primary and secondary law 
vis-à-vis other EU organs – especially vis-à-vis the Council – and the 
Member States is also incumbent on the Commission. The Commis-
sion can institute proceedings before the CJEU against the relevant EU 
organs or Member States. Within the scope of above-mentioned anti-
trust law, the controlling role of the Commission is extended to natural 
and legal persons subject to EU law; in this regard, the Commission is 
empowered to impose coercive measures.
Further provisions and tasks of the Commission include the prep-
aration and execution of the budget, the representation of the EU in 
Member States as well as external representation of the EU, with the 
exception of matters concerning the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy which fall to the HR.
D.  The European Parliament ( EP )
The European Parliament executes consulting and supervisory rights 
together with competences concerning the legislative process which 
extend to co-decision following the Treaty of Lisbon ( co-decision has 
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become the ordinary legislative procedure ). In the context of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, the EP has certain consulting and 
controlling powers. According to art. 14 para. 1 TEU
» The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise leg-
islative and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political 
control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect the 
President of the Commission. «
In the EU, the Commission – as counsellor for EU interests – and the 
Council – as forum for the Member States’ interests – stand vis-à-vis 
the directly elected EP with the latter being composed of representa-
tives of the EU’s citizens. As indicated, the EP is thus neither a national 
Member State parliament nor a democratic body on the level of Mem-
ber State co-operation but, rather, a forum for the representatives of 
all European citizens. It thus complements the democratic feedback 
provided by the members of government acting in the Council who are 
accountable to their national parliament; it does so by means of its di-
rect democratic legitimisation, the latter being supported by a demo-
cratic election. Despite major breakthroughs regarding the legislative 
competences of the EP, the EU arguably still suffers from a democratic 
deficit; the aim is to gradually address this via future amendment of 
the Treaties.
According to art. 14 para. 2 TEU, the number of members of the 
European Parliament may not exceed 750 delegates, plus the Presi-
dent of the EP, so 751 members in total. Contrary to the distribution 
of seats among the Member States prior to the Lisbon Treaty, which 
was assessed with the help of a code favouring small and medium-
sized Member States, a fixed number of delegates per country is no 
longer stipulated by the Treaties. Instead, art. 14 TEU only determines 
the minimum number of six delegates per Member State and that no 
Member State may be allocated more than 96 seats. The precise com-
position of the EP is determined by the European Council in a unani-
mous decision with the consent of the EP.
All EU citizens who are over the age of 18 years are eligible voters 
and can vote in the Member States where they reside. No EU-wide uni-
form electoral procedure exists. The delegates are elected for a period 
of five years.
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Figure 21: European Parliament.
Even though the European Parliament is not a completely independent 
legislative organ, its principal task is participation in the EU legislation 
procedure. Although the monopoly of legislative initiative in the EU is 
granted to the Commission, the EP, similar to the Council, has an in-
direct right to take legislative initiative by requesting, with the major-
ity of its members, that the Commission presents proposals ( art. 225 
TFEU ). The manner in which the EP participates in the actual legisla-
tive process of the EU depends on the specific competence granted to it 
by the Treaties – the general rule being that it may participate by co-de-
cision in the ordinary legislative procedure. There are only a few cases 
of special legislative procedures which are detailed in the respective 
Treaty provisions concerning the adoption of legal acts. In addition, 
there are non-legislative procedures which are used for the adoption 
of acts in Common Foreign and Security Policy or for the adoption of 
non-binding instruments.
A second important role of the EP within the scope of the EU is 
controlling and participation in appointments. The appointment of 
the Commission members requires the consent of the Parliament ( see 
no. 4 / 26, above ). The strongest controlling instrument of the EP is the 
motion of no-confidence against the Commission. The European Par-
liament controls the Commission also by accepting the Commission’s 
budget proposals.
The duty of the Commission to supply answers to questions re-
ferred by the EP, orally or in writing, is also of great practical signifi-
cance. Whilst a formal right of interpellation vis-à-vis the Council does 
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not exist, in practice such an interpellation procedure is exercised with 
the consent of the Council. The EP is empowered to receive reports 
from the Council and the Commission as well as the European Coun-
cil. The EP can institute legal proceedings against the Council and the 
Commission on the basis of infringements of EU law and deploy a 
commission of inquiry.
Every EU citizen or resident has the right to address a written re-
quest to the EP regarding matters falling in the EU’s field of activity 
( art. 227 TFEU ). The EP appoints a public advocate in accordance with 
art. 228 TFEU who accepts complaints made by EU citizens or persons 
resident in the EU.
Further tasks and roles of the EP include its participation in the 
establishment of the budget and in its competences within the con-
text of external relations of the EU to third countries or international 
organisations.
E.  The Court of Justice of the European Union ( CJEU )
The task of the CJEU, as stated in art. 19 para. 1 TEU, is to ensure uni-
form interpretation and application of primary and secondary EU law. 
However, due to its intergovernmental character, the Court’s jurisdic-
tion excludes the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy, except 
for two exceptions in art. 24 TEU.
The important position of the CJEU in the institutional system of 
the EU is linked with the latter’s characteristic of being a legal commu-
nity. The EU, on the one hand, has direct impact on the Member States 
through its issuing of legislation with direct effect but, on the other 
hand, also depends on the Member States to ensure compliance with 
the law as it does not possess instruments of enforcement compara-
ble to those of the sovereign coercive powers of nations. Essentially, it 
is the role of the other EU organs, or, as the case may be, the Member 
States, to apply EU law subject to independent judicial control by the 
CJEU.
The Courts of Justice of the EU include the Court of Justice, the 
General Court ( GC ) and specialised courts. The Court of Justice is 
composed of 28 judges – one judge for each Member State – and is 
supported by nine Advocate-Generals (AG). The judges are appointed 
by the governments of the Member States in mutual agreement for a 
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period of six years. All 28 judges of the Court of Justice are involved in 
making judicial decisions. However, the Court of Justice does not al-
ways hold plenary sessions, but can also form chambers of three, five, 
or 13 judges, which then conduct specific tasks or determine certain 
categories of litigation. The Court of Justice, however, must hold a ple-
nary session when a Member State or an EU organ party to the pro-
ceedings so requests.
In order to relieve the case load of the Court of Justice, especially 
in respect of litigation in which complex circumstances are to be re-
solved, a General Court ( GC ) was assigned to the CJEU; the Court of 
Justice acts as a court of appeal in legal decisions taken by the GC. The 
competence of the GC particularly includes the actions of individuals 
in personnel matters of the EU – notably employment relationships of 
EU officials – as well as the actions of individuals against the Commis-
sion’s decisions in the field of anti-trust law. The GC is composed of at 
least one judge per Member State.
The Court of Justice, unlike the GC, is predominantly competent to 
hear claims or actions of Member States or EU organs. Actions can also 
be brought by Member States or EU organs in cases of violations of pri-
mary and secondary EU law by a Member State, for example, where a 
Member State does not implement a directive in time or acts contrary 
to the principle of loyalty in art. 4 para. 3 TEU; in cases of the nullity of 
an act of an EU organ for reasons of incompetence or Treaty violation; 
or in cases of omission of an EU organ where there is a duty to act.
The most significant role of the CJEU is the so-called preliminary 
reference procedure. According to art. 267 TFEU, the CJEU is author-
ised to interpret all EU primary and secondary law. If a court of a Mem-
ber State is in doubt about the interpretation of a provision of EU law 
in a pending matter, it can approach the CJEU for a binding interpreta-
tion. Member State courts acting as courts of final instance in particu-
lar proceedings have the duty to submit such questions of interpreta-
tion to the CJEU. The CJEU renders its decision on the interpretation 
in the form of a so-called » preliminary ruling «. Through this, the in-
terpretation of the relevant EU law provision becomes binding on all 
Member States and thus also the court that submitted the question. 
The latter has to use the interpretation of the CJEU as a basis for its de-
cision in the pending procedure. The CJEU has no influence on the de-
cision of the case, however; it merely answers the legal question of the 
interpretation of a particular European legal provision.
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Figure 22: Preliminary reference procedure.
The activities of the CJEU within the scope of the preliminary proce-
dure guarantee uniform interpretation and application of EU law. With-
out this, EU law would be threatened by fragmentation via the many 
differing interpretations of Member State courts. Indeed, the Member 
States’ interpretation would result in the type of divergencies studied 
earlier in the context of the interpretation of international treaties ( see 
no. 1 / 71 et seq., above ).
As you will notice in the following chapters on EU law, the case-law 
of the CJEU plays a substantial role. Although EU law is not a » common 
law « system in which case-law operates as a dominant legal source ( see 
no. 2 / 82, above ) and, in principle, while the CJEU was not intended to 
create law but rather to apply and interpret it, the Court frequently em-
ploys preliminary decisions as a means of developing and expanding 
EU law beyond the original intention of the European legislator. This 
development has three distinctive rationales. First, the primary law, 
central to the European legal system, is formulated somewhat vaguely. 
Thus, the direct application by Member States gives rise to a plethora 
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of questions of interpretation. The CJEU can step in here. Second, the 
CJEU’s decisions on interpretation are binding on Member States and 
the EU organs. They thus serve as precedents for subsequent cases and 
leave little room for interpretations differing from that of the CJEU. 
Third, the CJEU’s judges are aware of their potential for legal develop-
ment and have not hesitated to avail themselves of the opportunities 
to engage in doing so.
F.  The European Court of Auditors
The European Court of Auditors audits the European budgets verify-
ing the lawfulness of all income and expenditure of the EU and its or-
gans, as well as its facilities ( art. 287 TFEU ). Particularly, it assesses the 
efficiency of budgetary management and reports all irregularities. Its 
statement is presented to the Council and the EP and published in the 
Official Journal of the EU. Additionally, at the end of each budgetary 
year, it is required to present its budgetary report to the EU organs and 
publish it in the Official Journal.
G.  The European Central Bank ( ECB )
Since December 2009, the European Central Bank is listed among the 
organs of the EU. It also has legal personality under public international 
law. Since 1999, the ECB, together with the Member States that adopted 
the Euro, has been responsible for conducting the monetary policy for 
the Euro region. It is an independent institution of the EU whose or-
gans may not take orders from national governments, EU organs or 
other organisations. Together with the national central banks, the ECB 
forms the so-called European System of Central Banks ( ESCB ) whose 
principal task is the maintenance of price stability ( art. 282 TFEU ).
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III.  Supremacy and direct effect of EU law  
in the Member States
In this chapter, we will examine three important yet difficult principles. 
First, the supremacy of EU law; second, the direct effect of EU law in 
the Member States both in respect of primary and secondary EU law 
and; third, in the context of directives, the so-called » Member State li-
ability « ( created by the CJEU ) arising where a directive has not been 
fulfilled by the Member State or some other primary EU law or regula-
tion has been infringed.
All three principles – supremacy, direct effect and Member State liabil-
ity – are illustrated and discussed by means of the CJEU’s decisions 
which developed or at least affirmed the principles’ very existence. 
Please read the full decisions and do not rely on our synopsis here.
A.  Supremacy of EU Law
CJEU 18. 7. 1964, C-6 / 53, Costa v. ENEL, ECLI : EU : C : 1964 : 66.
By means of law no. 1643 of 6 December 1962, the Italian Republic na-
tionalised the production and distribution of electricity and ENEL, a 
legal entity, was established. In a legal action pending with a Milanese 
court involving an electricity bill between ENEL and a lawyer Flaminio 
Costa, the latter appearing as both a consumer of electricity as well as 
a shareholder in the public limited company, Edisonvolta, which was 
affected by nationalisation, requested that the CJEU apply art. 177 TEC 
( now: art. 267 TFEU ) and interpret artt. 102 ( now: 117 ), 93 ( now: 108 ), 53 
( repealed ) and 37 TEC ( now: 37 TFEU ). These articles were, according to 
Mr. Costa, infringed by the nationalisation law. The Milanese court sub-
mitted the question of interpretation posed by Mr. Costa to the CJEU 
which declared the questions of interpretation impermissible with ref-
erence to art. 177 TEC ( now: art. 267 TFEU ). Thus, the CJEU made a deci-
sion within the context of the preliminary reference procedure.
The decision defines the relationship between EU law and the national 
law of Member States. Primary and secondary EU law form an autono-
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mous legal order enjoying supremacy of application over national law 
enacted later in time.
For instance, the principle » lex posterior derogat legi priori «, hence, 
does not apply to the relationship between national and EU law. Even 
though the European legal order was established in accordance with 
public international law between the Member States on the basis of mu-
tual agreement, an autonomous legal order has developed out of it. The 
rights and duties emanating from this legal order can thus not be prej-
udiced by national measures of Member States subsequently enacted.
Which important clarifications does the CJEU initially make about the 
nature and functionality of the preliminary reference procedure gov-
erned by art. 267 TFEU ?
How does the CJEU justify the principle of the supremacy of EU law es-
tablished in its decision ?
Which parts of EU law ( primary law, secondary law ) enjoy supremacy 
over conflicting national law according to the decision in ENEL ? Does 
the Italian nationalisation law infringe EU law ?
Which task lies ahead for the Commission ( following the CJEU judg-
ment ) in a case where a Member State subsequently enacts laws which 
are contrary to EU law ?
Which possibilities does an individual suffering from infringement of 
EU law have according to the judgment in ENEL ?
B.  Direct effect of EU law
CJEU, 5. 2. 1963, C-26 / 92, van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands, 
ECLI : EU : C : 1963 : 1.
In September 1960, the company Van Gend & Loos imported a speci-
fied quantity of urea-formaldehyde into the Netherlands from Ger-
many. Dutch Customs and Excise charged them an ad valorem duty of 
8 %. This amounted to application of a » Tariefbesluit « which had come 
into force in March 1960. According to the prior » Tariefbesluit « of 1947, 
which was in force at the time the EEC Treaty ( now: TFEU ) came into 
operation in the Netherlands in 1958, a tariff of only 3 % was levied on 
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the importation of this substance into the Netherlands. The company 
Van Gend & Loos brought an action challenging the ad valorem duty 
of 8 % before the Tariefcommissie in Amsterdam, arguing that the in-
creased ad valorem duty – as a result of the Tariefbesluit 1960 – repre-
sented an infringement of the former art. 12 TEC ( now: art. 30 TFEU ). 
Article 12 TEC, unlike the current art. 30 TFEU, did not prohibit all levy-
ing of customs duties on imports between Member States but codified 
the level of customs duties as they existed at the time that the EEC 
Treaty came into force. Accordingly, levying new customs duties and 
increasing old tariff rates between Member States was prohibited ac-
cording to art. 12 TEC.
The Dutch Tariefcommissie submitted the question of how to interpret 
art. 12 TEC to the CJEU in accordance with art. 177 TEC ( now: art. 267 
TFEU ). In the context of a preliminary reference procedure the CJEU 
arrived at the decision outlined below.
The judgment of the CJEU established the principle of direct effect of 
EU law by interpreting art. 12 TEC ( now: art. 30 TEU ) as a prohibition 
on new customs duties on goods between Member States. » Direct ef-
fect « means that the provisions of EU law, which establish rights and 
duties for private persons, do not have to be adopted by Member States 
into their domestic law in order for the rights and duties established by 
them to be directly applicable vis-à-vis individuals. The individual can 
directly invoke the rights established in the Treaties and can demand 
that national authorities and courts apply them directly. Accordingly, 
the authorities in the above case had to refrain from applying their na-
tional law, namely Tariefbesluit 1960, as it was contrary to the corre-
sponding EU law.
According to the CJEU, the predominant reason for this direct appli-
cation of EU law is the quality of the European legal order. However, the 
CJEU did not make use of the argument of the » autonomous « character 
of this » new legal order « here, as it did in the later case of CJEU 18. 7. 1964, 
C-6 / 53, Costa v. ENEL, ECLI : EU : C : 1964 : 66 ( see no. 4 / 55, above ) but ar-
gued that such direct application arises from the perspective of public 
international law in relation to the limitation of Member States’ sover-
eignty by the conclusion of the Treaties. As all Member States agreed to 
limit their sovereignty with regard to market matters, such limitation 
must also apply to the individuals involved.
The direct effect was necessary to realise the goals of the EEC treaty 
( now: TFEU ), especially with regard to the creation of a common mar-
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ket. Without direct effect in national law, the provisions in this regard 
would be ineffective unless proceedings were brought against Member 
States for violation of provisions of the Treaty. A pivotal aspect of the 
CJEU’s interpretative decision was that the ability of individuals to rely 
directly on rights established by the Treaty strengthens the integration 
of the common market. This effect is often dubbed as the » effet utile « 
interpretation of EU law. This teleological interpretation method usu-
ally describes the CJEU’s technique to interpret the European legal pro-
visions in a manner that advances the aims of the TFEU to the greatest 
possible extent.
Of course, not every provision of primary and secondary law is suited 
to direct application. According to the case-law of the CJEU, the require-
ments for the direct application of EU law provisions are as follows. 
First, the provision must grant an unconditional, precisely formulated 
right to the individual. Second, the provision must not grant a sphere of 
discretion to the Member States. Third, the provision must not necessi-
tate any further implementation measures by a Member State.
Pierre Pescatore ( 1919–2010 ), a former CJEU judge, commented on the 
decision in Van Gend en Loos, as well as the principle of the direct ef-
fect of EU law created by the CJEU, as follows:
» It appears from these considerations that in the opinion of the Court, 
the Treaty has created a Community not only of states but also of peo-
ples and persons and that therefore not only Member States but also 
individuals must be visualised as being subjects of Community law. 
This is the consequence of a democratic ideal, meaning that in the 
Community, as well as in a modern constitutional state, Governments 
may not say any more what they are used to doing in international law: 
L’Etat, c’est moi. Far from it: the Community calls for participation of 
everybody, with the result that private individuals are not only liable 
to burdens and obligations, but that they have also prerogatives and 
rights which must be legally protected. It was thus a highly political 
idea, drawn from a perception of the constitutional system of the Com-
munity, which is at the basis of Van Gend en Loos and which continues 
to inspire the whole doctrine flowing from it. «
Pescatore, The Doctrine of » Direct Effect «: An Infant Disease of Com-
munity Law, European Law Review ( 1983 ) 155, 158.
Which provision of EU law did the CJEU interpret in Van Gend en Loos ? 
To what extent can a right for an individual market participant be inter-
4/59
?
163  Supremacy and direct effect of EU law in the Member States
¶Lurger • Thiede: The International Dimensions of Law  
preted from this provision ? How and where can the market participant 
enforce this right ?
What arguments exist against the direct effect of EU law ?
How does the CJEU argue that the provisions of the TFEU must have 
direct effect ? To what extent do the CJEU’s arguments differ with re-
gard to the above decision in CJEU 18. 7. 1964, C-6 / 53, Costa v. ENEL, 
ECLI : EU : C : 1964 : 66 ?
What is » effet-utile-interpretation « ?
Which are the features necessary for a specific provision of EU law to 
have direct effect in the national jurisdictions of the Member States ? 
Which provisions of the TFEU would not fulfil these criteria ? Could 
these criteria also be fulfilled by regulations or directives ?
According to Pescatore’s view, EU law has become more democratic via 
the principle of direct effect. Do you agree ?
C.  Member State liability
CJEU, 19. 11. 1991, joined cases C-6 / 90 and C-9 / 90, Francovich v. Italy, 
ECLI : EU : C : 1991 : 428.
The Italian government was obliged to implement the EU Directive 
80 / 987 concerning the minimum protection of employees in the event 
of the insolvency of their employer by 23 October 1983. According to this 
Directive, Member States had to ensure that the claims of employees 
to remuneration payments could also be satisfied after the insolvency 
of the employer. The Member States could elect their own systems of 
employee protection scheme to this end. Italy did not implement the 
Directive in time and was convicted by the CJEU in 1989 in a Treaty vio-
lation proceeding.
Andrea Francovich, the Italian claimant in the proceeding C-6 / 90, had 
worked for a company in Vicenza but had only received fractional ad-
vance salary payments. He successfully brought legal proceedings 
against the company; he succeeded and the company was ordered to 
pay 6 million Italian Lira, but the compulsory execution was without 
success as the company was insolvent. Francovich brought a subse-
quent action before the Pretura di Vicenza against the Italian state for 
the establishment of one of the guarantees for his salary named in the 
Directive, or, alternatively, for compensation of the damage suffered 
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by him. The Pretura di Vicenza referred the following question on the 
interpretation of art. 189 para. 3 TEC ( now: art. 288 TFEU ) to the CJEU: 
Can an individual successfully bring an action for compensation of 
damage suffered due to non-implementation of a directive against a 
Member State ? The CJEU decided this question in the context of the 
preliminary reference procedure of art. 177 TEC ( now: art. 267 TFEU ).
In the Francovich decision, the CJEU established that a Member State 
could not rely on non-implementation of a directive.
Ensuing from later decisions, a private individual, on whom duties are 
imposed vis-à-vis other individuals by a directive, can rely on the non-
implementation of the directive by the Member State as a defence for 
non-compliance with his or her duties. He or she can rely on the na-
tional legal position which, in such a case, supports the fact that he or 
she has no effective duty arising from the Member State’s non-imple-
mentation of the directive.
In the case of Francovich, the duty to implement the Directive was to 
be discharged by the Member State, via the establishment of means 
guaranteeing remuneration payments after insolvency, and not by a 
private individual. In this regard, a directive which confers uncondi-
tional and precise rights upon individuals has direct effect against the 
Member State. The decision thus established vertical direct effect as 
between private persons and the Member State and rejected a horizon-
tal direct effect between private persons.
In the present case, the rights of the employee were unconditional 
and precisely defined by the Directive. However, as the Directive granted 
a degree of discretion to the Member State concerning the means by 
which employee protection was to be achieved, the right of the indi-
vidual employee was unsuitable for a direct claim against the Member 
State ( see no. 4 / 59, above ). Nevertheless, the CJEU elaborated that the 
fundamental vertical direct effect of a directive against a Member State 
results in liability for damage, caused by non-implementation of a di-
rective in breach of the Member States’ duty to implement it.
As a result, an individual is entitled to compensation for damage 
enforceable against a Member State when rights supposedly granted 
by the directive cannot be enforced due to the non-implementation 
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of this directive by the said Member State. The CJEU mapped out four 
distinct requirements for such a claim. First, the directive must in-
tend to grant rights to individuals. Second, these rights must be pre-
cisely definable with regard to their content and extent. Third, there 
must be a causal relationship between the non-implementation by a 
Member State in breach of its duty to implement the directive and 
the damage suffered by the individual. Third, the infringement of EU 
law by a Member State must represent a » qualified breach «, in other 
words, the infringement must be clearly evident as opposed to aris-
ing only after the assessment of contentious and arguable questions 
of interpretation.
In this judgment the CJEU again refers to the » effet utile « interpre-
tation ( see no. 4 / 58, above ) when rendering Member States liable for 
their omission to implement EU law. In addition, it was noted that the 
direct effect or direct application of EU law in all its differing forms 
of implementation was also based on Member States’ loyalty duties 
based on art. 4 para. 3 TEU ( see no. 4 / 14, above ).
In later decisions, the CJEU argued that Member State liability 
would not only arise as a result of the non-implementation of direc-
tives by Member States, but also as a result of any other infringement 
of an EU legal provision by a Member State. As a result, Member States’ 
liability may also arise due to violations of provisions of EU primary 
and secondary law.
What is to be understood by the » vertical direct effect « of a directive ? 
Which two forms of implementation could such vertical direct effect 
have ?
Why could Francovich not successfully sue the Italian state for its fail-
ure to fulfil its duty imposed by the Directive, but » merely « for compen-
sation of the damage suffered ? Is the right of the individual provided 
for by the Directive sufficiently precise and unconditional ?
How did the CJEU justify the establishment of Member State liability 
in the Francovich case ? At which point does the CJEU refer to the so-
called » effet-utile « of EU law ?
Which prerequisites must be fulfilled for the establishment of a claim 
by an individual against a Member State following the decision in Fran-
covich ?
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IV.  The fundamental freedoms of the EU
In the following we discuss the so-called four fundamental freedoms of 
the EU, as well as the subtle unification of private law systems, which 
have been effected by a multitude of directives with reference to illus-
tratrative CJEU decisions – » Reinheitsgebot «, » GB-INNO « and » Verein 
für Konsumenteninformation « which are included as a digest within 
the chapter.
A.  The four fundamental freedoms of the TFEU
The four fundamental freedoms of the EU are at the very core of the re-
alisation of the customs union, which is usually referred to as the » in-
ternal market «. They are designed to guarantee free movement of eco-
nomic services and market participants across the national European 
borders. They are the free movement of:
 ▷ Goods ( artt. 34, 35 TFEU as well as art. 28, 30 TFEU, art. 110 TFEU ),
 ▷ Workers ( art. 45 TFEU including self-employed entrepreneurs re-
lated to the freedom of establishment in art. 49 TFEU – in this re-
spect, the so-called free movement of persons ),
 ▷ Services ( art. 56 TFEU ), and
 ▷ Capital ( art. 63 TFEU ).
The free movement of goods facilitates the sale of goods across na-
tional borders within the internal market, for instance, the import of 
goods from other Member States, the export of goods to other Member 
States, and the sale of goods to persons domiciled in other Member 
States. These activities may not be impeded by national laws or meas-
ures of the various Member States.
Regarding the freedom to provide services, the same applies to 
the rendering of services across the national borders within the in-
ternal market. For example, the free movement of a service provider 
who moves from one Member State to another to render a service to 
local clients is guaranteed. Likewise, the freedom extends to the lo-
cal provider of services to clients who come to the provider’s Member 
State from another Member State as well as the provision of services 
by e-mail, telephone, internet, etc. by a provider from another Member 
State to local clients.
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In the context of the free movement of persons, EU citizens estab-
lishing an enterprise or who are employed on a continuing basis in an-
other Member State are protected. Their ability to establish a business 
in another Member State or be employed in such state may be impeded 
by national measures of this state.
The free movement of capital protects monetary and capital transac-
tions effected by natural or legal persons between Member States ( and 
to a limited extent also between EU Member States and third countries ).
For example, if an Austrian citizen intends to invest his capital in 
France, he or she must not be restricted in doing so to a greater extent 
than a French national would be.
B.  Common features
The fundamental freedoms prohibit national market regulation by 
Member States. Accordingly, they are first and foremost vertically ori-
ented and directed at Member States. However, in some exceptional 
cases, the CJEU has determined that they have horizontal effect in the 
context of directly restricting private individuals’ conduct.
The fundamental freedoms have a deregulatory effect. They do not 
create any rules but have supremacy over the legal rules of the Mem-
ber States which may impede the fundamental freedoms. They are also 
regulatory in the sense that they establish new uniform or harmonised 
rules for the market. Both instruments, the deregulatory control of the 
fundamental freedoms and the regulatory effect of EU legislation, are 
intended to create an internal market; both the elimination of market 
impediments by national measures through the control of fundamen-
tal freedoms as well as the EU-wide approximation of market condi-
tions via regulations and directives contribute to the establishment of 
a market without frontiers or transport impediments.
In the process of controlling national rules of Member States in 
light of the fundamental freedoms, the CJEU makes no differentiation 
between national rules of private or public law. It assesses both equally 
with a view to assessing the discriminatory or impeding effects that 
such a rule might have on the internal market.
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All of the fundamental freedoms prohibit national rules that dis-
criminate against citizens from other Member States in relation to the 
Member State’s citizens. Additionally, the TFEU provides a general pro-
hibition on discrimination by way of citizenship in art. 18. However, if a 
fundamental freedom has been infringed by a discriminatory national 
rule, in addition to a violation of art. 18 TFEU, the CJEU tends to apply 
the more specific provision on the fundamental freedom violated.
The CJEU has extended the scope of the individual fundamental 
freedoms, initially particularly the free movement of goods and sub-
sequently also the other three freedoms, from a simple prohibition 
against discrimination to a prohibition of restrictions. In this way, na-
tional rules that do not discriminate against foreign nationals, foreign 
goods or foreign capital, yet nevertheless impede the free functioning 
of the internal market are prohibited.
A German legal provision demanding that only imported ( foreign ) beer, 
but not domestic beer, must be brewed in accordance with the » Ger-
man Reinheitsgebot « – a medieval purity requirement – is discrimina-
tory. If the German provision demanded instead that, irrespective of 
the origin of the beer, it must be brewed in accordance with the » Ger-
man Reinheitsgebot «, this might not constitute discrimination that 
could possibly be regarded as a restrictive provision against imported 
beer from a foreign country ( see no. 4 / 86, below ).
The general requirement for the applicability of the fundamental free-
doms is cross-border commerce. In other words, the fundamental free-
doms are not applicable to a domestic entrepreneur constrained by do-
mestic legal provisions in his or her domestic economic activities.
If a person from another Member State intends to offer his or her prod-
ucts or services in Austria or seeks to establish an enterprise or finds 
regular employment in Austria and feels constrained or discriminated 
against by a national legal provision, this represents a case for the con-
trol of the fundamental freedoms.
Not all national provisions of the receiving Member State which prove 
to be discriminatory or an impediment to the internal market are neces-
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sarily a violation of one or more fundamental freedoms. Certain excep-
tions exist if the relevant provision pursues justified objectives in a pro-
portionate manner. Generally, for the justification of a discriminatory 
provision, two factors are relevant. First, there must be relevant grounds 
of justification and, second, the provision must pass the test of propor-
tionality.
As regards the grounds for justification, certain permissible dis-
criminatory barriers concerning the free movement of goods are stip-
ulated in art. 36 TFEU, for the free movement of workers in art. 45 
para. 3 TFEU, for the freedom of establishment in art. 52 TFEU, for 
the freedom of services in art. 62 TFEU and, finally, for the free move-
ment of capital in art. 65 TFEU. In the majority of cases, the justified 
discriminatory barriers contain reasons relating to public policy, the 
protection of the health and life of humans, and, additionally, in re-
spect of the free movement of goods, the » protection of animals and 
plants, the protection of national cultural heritage of artistic, histori-
cal or archaeological value and of industrial or commercial property «. 
This exhaustive list of justified discriminatory barriers in turn justi-
fies discriminatory domestic provisions thereby rendering them le-
gally permissible.
Beside these barriers, certain » mandatory requirements « exist 
which cannot justify discrimination but only non-discriminatory con-
straints to the fundamental freedoms. The CJEU cites the following 
» mandatory requirements of public interest «: the fairness of commer-
cial transactions, the good reputation of a specific sector – for example, 
the financial services sector –, the protection of consumers or custom-
ers of entrepreneurs, the maintenance of the diversity of the media, the 
protection of a functioning administration of justice and an effective 
fiscal control. Unlike the justified discriminatory barriers, the manda-
tory requirements are to be regarded as an open category subject to 
possible future expansion by the CJEU.
For a national provision restricting a fundamental freedom to be 
justified, however, it is not sufficient that it satisfies only one of the 
grounds of justification, namely either a discriminatory barrier or a 
mandatory requirement. The national provision must, additionally, 
pass the test of proportionality. It must be suitable for achieving the 
concerned protection goal; it has to be necessary in order to achieve 
this objective, and it must be proportionate in this respect. This means 
that it has to be a measure that interferes minimally with a fundamental 
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freedom and which is also necessary and proportionate in achieving 
the concerned objective.
Member States that violate one of the fundamental freedoms 
through their national laws can be subject to one of the following three 
outcomes. First, the Commission may commence Treaty violation pro-
ceedings according to artt. 258, 259 TFEU or, second, the affected pri-
vate individual may refer to the direct applicability of the TFEU’s fun-
damental freedoms. In both cases the concerned Member State and its 
courts are obliged to desist from applying the offending national law. 
In the latter case, all prerequisites for the direct applicability of the 
fundamental freedoms have to be fulfilled ( see no. 4 / 59, above ). Third, 
the private individual can refer to the ( vertical ) direct effect of the fun-
damental freedoms in the form of Member State liability ( see no. 4 / 62, 
above ).
In the case of a non-justifiable violation of a fundamental freedom 
by a Member State’s law, the Member State is prohibited from apply-
ing the concerned national provision to the extent that it violates the 
fundamental freedom. This may seem trivial but in fact it is not, be-
cause fundamental freedoms are only violated in cross-frontier circum-
stances. Thus, according to EU law, the Member State is only free to 
continue applying the offending national rule to purely domestic cir-
cumstances.
German law prohibits the distribution of » beer « in Germany which 
is not brewed in accordance with the » German Reinheitsgebot «. This 
prohibition infringes the free movement of goods because the import 
of foreign » beer « not brewed in accordance with the » German Rein-
heitsgebot « is restricted. According to the interpretation of the CJEU, 
a justification for reasons of health or consumer protection is not ap-
plicable. Therefore, from the perspective of EU law, Germany is not 
allowed to apply its distribution prohibition to imported beer from 
other Member States and is free only to apply this rule to domestic 
breweries.
If Germany retains the application of » Reinheitsgebot « to domestic cir-
cumstances, it amounts to so-called » internal discrimination « which 
is not regarded as unlawful with respect to EU law. As a result, domes-
tic brewers have to conform to stricter rules than foreign ones market-
ing their products on the same, namely the German, market. However, 
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such discriminatory treatment of Member State nationals and foreign-
ers could contravene the relevant national constitutional law.
C.  Illustrative case-law
To see how this system of freedoms, justification and sanctions relates 
to real-life scenarios we now examine three CJEU judgments in the re-
lated areas.
CJEU 12. 3. 1987, C-178 / 84, Commission of the European Communities  
v. Federal Republic of Germany ( » Reinheitsgebot für Bier « ), 
ECLI : EU : C : 1987 : 126.
According to the German » Reinheitsgebot « ( purity rule ), only barley, 
hops, yeast and water, and no other further additives, were permitted 
to be used in the production of beer. Beverages from other Member 
States which were not brewed in accordance with this » Reinheitsgebot « 
could not be distributed under the label » beer «. The Commission held 
this to be an infringement of art. 30 TEC ( now: art. 34 TFEU ) and made 
an application, by means of Treaty violation proceedings in accordance 
with art. 169 TEC ( now: art. 258 TFEU ), to the CJEU, requesting it to de-
clare that Germany had infringed its contractual duties.
The CJEU, in a first step, affirmed the existence of a restriction 
( » measure having equivalent effect « in terms of art. 34 TFEU ) of the 
free movement of goods based on the fact that the import of beer 
from other Member States was in fact impeded by the German pro-
vision. In a second step, the CJEU assessed whether any grounds for 
justification existed that have been used in a proportionate man-
ner. Beer which is not brewed in accordance with the » German Re-
inheitsgebot «, is not per se damaging to health; accordingly, the pro-
tection of health as a justified discriminatory barrier in art. 36 TFEU 
could not be relied on. Alternatively, as the consumer may have an 
interest for reasons of personal preference in exclusively consum-
ing beer which has been brewed in accordance with the » German 
Reinheitsgebot «, the justification of » consumer protection « might 
apply; the latter being a » mandatory requirement of public inter-
est «. In different Member States, different consumer approaches 
and different standards of consumer protection exist, leading to the 
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emergence of a gradient in the competitive protection level in the 
relationship between the Member States. The CJEU protects the re-
sponsible citizen and the sensible consumer. The CJEU, thus supports 
the so-called » doctrine of labelling « whereby consumer protection is 
achieved by adequate labelling. Member States are, therefore, not 
permitted to regulate the contents of products offered on the mar-
ket, except for the purpose of preventing a direct health hazard, but 
must instead confine themselves to ensuring that all ingredients of 
a product are clearly visible to the consumer on the product’s pack-
aging. It is thus the consumer’s responsibility to determine whether 
he or she wants to consume products containing certain ingredients. 
Even though some consumers may have an interest in exclusively con-
suming beer which has been brewed according to the » German Re-
inheitsgebot «, a complete prohibition of other beers is regarded as 
a disproportional measure as it is too restrictive. The same objective 
can also be achieved via less restrictive means such as adequately in-
formative labelling.
CJEU 7. 3. 1990, C-362 / 88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confédération du commerce 
luxembourgeois, ECLI : EU: C : 1990 : 102.
The Belgian public limited company GB-INNO operated a number of 
supermarkets in Belgium near the border to Luxembourg. The custom-
ers of these supermarkets included Belgian as well as Luxembourgian 
consumers, the latter having crossed the nearby border. GB-INNO de-
cided to distribute leaflets in Belgium as well as in Luxembourg pro-
viding information about product discounts: in the leaflets, the older, 
higher prices were quoted, which no longer applied, and, additionally, 
the duration of the availability of product discounts was limited to a 
certain period of time. This type of advertising was permissible accord-
ing to Belgian law, but not according to Luxembourgian law. The Lux-
embourgian Regulation concerning unfair competition prohibited the 
quoting of old prices, as well as the specification of the duration of 
the offer, when offering discounts. As a result, a Luxembourgian trade 
association obtained an interim injunction at a Luxembourgian court, 
prohibiting GB-INNO from distributing the leaflets. GB-INNO chal-
lenged this interim injunction at the Luxembourgian Cour de cassa-
tion. The latter submitted the question of the interpretation of the free 
movement of goods in the context of the preliminary reference proce-
dure ( art. 267 TFEU ) to the CJEU in order to assess whether the Luxem-
bourgian Regulation infringed on EU law’s free movement of goods.
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The decision of the CJEU illustrates, on the one hand, that the cross-
border reference requirement is necessary for the freedom of free 
movement of goods to apply. This requirement is met not only when 
the vendor offers his or her products in a foreign Member State but 
also when the purchaser crosses the border and purchases the ven-
dor’s products at the vendor’s place of domicile or registered office. 
Furthermore, the protection of the free movement of goods extends to 
acts preparatory to the purchase process, for example advertising of a 
product by means of leaflets.
On the other hand, the CJEU reinforced its model of the responsi-
ble and sensible consumer ( see no. 4 / 86, above ) in terms of which the 
consumer’s interest in accurate information must be protected. In its 
decision, the CJEU refers to the centrality of » Right of Consumers to In-
formation and Clarification « in EU law. Thus, the consumer model was 
of central importance to the CJEU’s decision as to whether the justifica-
tion of the interest of consumer protection in the Luxembourgian Regu-
lation amounted to a » mandatory requirement of public interest «. The 
Luxembourgian legislators relied on the argument that they intended 
to protect consumers by withholding information about old prices and 
the duration of special offers − based on the apparent assumption of the 
inability of consumers to interpret this information correctly − but the 
CJEU rejected this, finding the Luxembourgian legislator’s approach in-
appropriate and disproportional to the goal of achieving consumer pro-
tection. The Luxembourgian courts were thus not permitted to apply the 
Luxembourgian Regulation to cross-border product purchases.
Finally, the CJEU, in its judgment, established that the free move-
ment of goods not only serves to protect cross-border vendors of prod-
ucts but also consumers who cross the border at their own initiative in 
order to purchase the products. The ambit of the fundamental freedom 
was shifted from its initial focus on the free movement of goods and, 
thus, the freedom of vendors to the freedom of purchasers. It is now 
possible that not only a vendor who is discriminated against might ini-
tiate proceedings but also a consumer suffering from the impediment 
of the free market.
A recent example illustrating this point concerns the question of 
whether medical products purchased in another Member State may be 
subsequently covered by the purchaser’s domestic social insurance. It 
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was determined that such indemnification must be effectuated in the 
same way as domestic medical purchases.
Are EU fundamental freedoms legal provisions that have direct effect 
( in terms of horizontal and vertical direct effect ) in the national legal 
systems of the Member States ?
What legal consequences does the violation of a fundamental freedom 
by a Member State have ? How can the aggrieved citizen defend himself 
or herself against such an infringement ?
Which two steps have to be followed by a court when addressing the 
question of whether a national legal provision ( of a Member State ) vio-
lates a fundamental freedom ( for example the free movement of goods ) ?
Why did the CJEU in the » Reinheitsgebot « decision hold that the Ger-
man provision could not be justified on the grounds of the protection 
of health or the protection of consumers ? Describe the CJEU’s » con-
sumer model «.
Was there a cross-border element in the circumstances of the GB-INNO 
case ?
What is meant by the term » internal discrimination « ? Is such discrimi-
nation permissible according to EU law ?
V.  The harmonisation of private law by 
means of directives and regulations
In the area of private law ( see no. 1 / 37 et seq., above ) a vast number of 
EU directives have been passed in the last decades. These directives 
have clearly altered the private law of all Member States. Numerous fur-
ther directives in the area of contract and private law are in the pipeline.
Recapitulate the differences between EU directives and EU regulations, 
as well as the effectiveness of directives in no. 1 / 27, above.
As directives, unlike regulations, do not unify Member States’ law we 
will not use the term » unification of law « but rather » approximation of 
laws « or » harmonisation of laws «.
European Law
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There are certain clear benefits of the harmonisation of Member States’ 
private law. First, similar legal positions in Member States in respect 
of the regulated issues facilitate the cross-border activity of market 
participants. Vendors, consumers and employees alike are not con-
strained in their economic activities in a foreign Member State by vast 
differences between the domestic legal position and that of the foreign 
Member State. Cross-border market activities are promoted by uni-
form legal positions in areas of the law proximal to the economy.
Second, as many directives aim at uniform protection by means of 
a minimum standard in all Member States, the position of consumers 
in Member States with previously minimal consumer protection has 
improved. A considerable number of consumer protection provisions 
were introduced in these Member States by means of EU directives. 
This extends to other fields of private law, for instance to trade repre-
sentatives, creditors of malicious debtors and bank customers where 
directives have advanced the domestic law in this sphere.
Notwithstanding these achievements, we have to keep in mind some 
serious disadvantages of this approximation of laws. First, directives en-
gage only very selectively in specific legal areas. All remaining legal mat-
ters in the broader context are left to the domestic legislator which re-
sults in grave inconsistencies between harmonised and non-harmonised 
law. With ongoing harmonisation these inconsistencies often spread to 
all spheres of private law. In other words, private law becomes increas-
ingly fragmented and less systematic as a result of the » interference « of 
directives. This is worsened by the fact that the directives are not homo-
geneous in themselves in that those regulating similar issues often do 
not conform to one another and, at times, are even contradictory.
At the same time the approximation of legal positions in the Mem-
ber States achieved by the directives is only relative in nature. As the 
Member States are free to use whatever means they choose to achieve 
the aims set out by the directive and as most directives only set a min-
imum standard, some Member States establish stronger protective 
standards than provided in the directives. Due to this practice, it is very 
difficult for a market participant to ascertain the precise legal position 
in a foreign Member State. Information concerning the exact manner 
in which a directive has been implemented in a certain Member State 
is difficult to obtain.
In order to counter these numerous objections to a further harmo-
nisation the Commission, in 2005, initiated an EU-wide network of re-
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searchers to develop a » Common Frame of Reference « for all existing 
directives in the area of contract law including uniform definition of 
terms and basic principles. The initial results of these studies have 
been published, yet there has been no change in European legislation.
VI.  Directive-conformable interpretation of 
national law
Due to the fact that the texts of directives give rise to many questions of 
interpretation, it is difficult to assess whether specific national imple-
mentation of a directive meets the directive’s requirements. The path 
which national courts should choose in cases of uncertainty regarding 
the interpretation of a directive’s stipulations is the preliminary refer-
ence procedure of the CJEU ( art. 267 TFEU – see no. 4 / 49 above ).
Once the national judge has established the exact content of a di-
rective’s stipulations that is relevant to the case at hand, he or she must 
assess whether the national implementation of the directive’s stipula-
tions was carried out correctly. If the stipulation could have been in-
terpreted in several possible ways within the context of national inter-
pretation principles, the judge is obliged to choose the interpretation 
that most closely conforms to the directive. It is only if domestic im-
plementation is so unrelated to the specifications of the directive that 
the national provision cannot be interpreted as corresponding to the 
directive that the Member State has violated its duty of implementa-
tion ( see no. 4 / 60 et seq., above ). To illustrate this please study the fol-
lowing case.
CJEU 14. 5. 1998, C-364 / 96, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. 
Österreichische Kreditversicherungs AG, ECLI : EU : C : 1998: 226.
The insolvency of the Karthago-Reisen GmbH tour operator resulted in 
80 customers having to pay for their hotel in Greece directly, a payment 
that was originally included in their contract with Karthago-Reisen. 
Following their return to Austria, the concerned travellers requested 
the Austrian Verein für Konsumenteninformation ( Austrian Associa-
tion for Consumer Information ) to bring an action against the insurer 
of Karthago-Reisen. The district court for Commercial Matters in Vi-
enna submitted the question of how to interpret art. 7 of the Package 
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Travel Directive to the CJEU. According to art. 7 of the Directive, the 
tour operator ( by means of concluding an adequate insurance con-
tract ) must prove that, in the case of its inability to pay or its insolvency, 
the reimbursement of sums paid by the package travellers as well as 
the return journey of the package travellers are secured. The Austrian 
implementation of art. 7 of the EU Package Travel Directive in the form 
of a regulation only envisaged this duty to secure the reimbursement 
and the return journey of package travellers in a case where the respec-
tive services have been paid for but not rendered. The travellers had, 
however, made full use of the Greek hotel. The CJEU interpreted art. 7 
of the Directive within the context of the preliminary reference proce-
dure ( art. 267 TFEU ).
In its judgment, the CJEU held that the factual circumstance of a dou-
ble payment was envisaged by the insolvency assurance required by 
the Directive. Therefore, the travellers should also have made a claim 
against the insurer for the » reimbursement of the paid sums « by rea-
son of the implementation of the Directive; the Austrian implemen-
tation of the Directive was insufficient and Austrian law was accord-
ingly required to be supplemented to cover cases where services had 
actually been rendered to travellers but had yet to be paid on-site. As 
a result, the Austrian travellers were conceded a claim against the in-
surer. The reimbursement, however, only extended to the price paid to 
the travel agency. The difference between the price paid to the travel 
agency and the on-site prices paid to the local vendor had to be borne 
by the travellers.
What are the advantages of an approximation of laws achieved by 
means of directives ?
What is the extent of unification of EU law achieved by directives ? 
Compare this to the unifying effect of regulations.
According to the interpretation by the CJEU in the decision » Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation «, to what extent does Austrian implemen-
tation not correspond to the specifications demanded by the Package 
Travel Directive ?
What are the consequences of the incorrect Austrian implementation 
of the Package Travel Directive for the customers of Karthago-Reisen ? 
Can they ( via legal action taken by the Verein für Konsumenteninforma-
tion ) reclaim the sums paid from the tour operator’s insurance ( in other 
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words, do the incorrectly implemented directives have horizontal direct 
effect ) ? Which role does the so-called » directive-conformable interpre-
tation « of the Austrian implementation measure play in this case ??
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FROM THE PREFACE FOR THE FOURTH EDITION:
This collection of texts and materials on private international law and proce-
dure shall fill a gap in the currently available selection of text editions: There 
seems to be no other bilingual edition of the rules governing conflicts of laws 
at present that includes the recently enacted EU regulations in this field. A 
combination of such norms with other materials such as the UN Sales Con-
vention or the ICC Arbitration Rules is equally missing, at least in such com-
pact form. This lacuna was increasingly perceived problematic by the editors 
in the courses they teach in this area, which led to the decision to produce 
this publication. The selection was purposefully kept narrow in order to al-
low students to access both language versions in a handy format.
While most sources included are available both in a German and an Eng-
lish official text anyhow, the English version of the Austrian IPRG is based 
upon the excellent translation produced by Edith Palmer as an annex to her 
extensive presentation of this statute in the 1980 American Journal of Com-
parative Law. We would like to thank its editor-in-chief at the time of asking, 
Mathias W. Reimann, for his kind permission to use said text as indicated. 
Subsequent amendments of the IRPG were translated by the editors of this 
volume themselves, the original translation therefore had to be supplement-
ed or altered insofar.
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